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THE ORATIONS OF *DEMOSTHENES*:

PRONOUNCED

TO EXCITE THE ATHENIANS

AGAINST

PHILIP, KING OF MACEDON.

TRANSLATED BY

THOMAS LELAND, D. D.

FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD.

A NEW EDITION.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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PREFACE.

View of the principal states of Greece.—Characters of Demades, Hyperides, Lycurgus, and Æschines, the orators.—Character of Demosthenes.

To animate a people renowned for justice, humanity, and valour, yet, in many instances, degenerate and corrupted; to warn them of the dangers of luxury, treachery, and bribery; of the ambition and perfidy of a powerful foreign enemy; to recall the glory of their ancestors to their thoughts; and to inspire them with resolution, vigour, and unanimity; to correct abuses, to restore discipline, to revive and enforce the generous sentiments of patriotism and public spirit:—These were the great purposes for which the following Orations were originally pronounced. The subject therefore may possibly recommend them to a British reader, even under the disadvantages of a translation, by no means worthy of the famous original. His candour may pardon them; or sometimes, perhaps, they may escape him, if he suffers his imagination to be possessed with that enthusiasm which our orator is, of all others, most capable of inspiring; and

will, for a while, interest himself in the cause of Athens.

To the history of Greece, I must suppose he is no stranger. Yet, though it may not inform him, his memory may possibly be assisted, by a summary review of the affairs and interests of that country; particularly of those divisions, which had a long time subsisted between its principal states, and on which Philip justly grounded his hopes of success, in his attempts upon their liberties.

These states were, Lacedemon, Athens, and Thebes.

The first, famous for her ancient kings, had acquired new splendour under the reign of Lycurgus. The wisdom of the constitution which he established, and the exact obedience paid to his laws, preserved the state from those domestic divisions which prevailed in other places; and the remarkable temperance of Sparta, the severity of her discipline, her public spirit, and concern for the liberty and happiness of other communities, made her long revered as the parent of Greece. Her constitution, however, was not without its faults. Her government savoured of the humour of her inhabitants, who extended the

same harsh severity to their allies, which they used towards each other. Besides, they were devoted to arms; and their constitution required continual wars for the preservation of it. This made their government distasteful, and favoured the ambition of the Athenians their rivals, who, though a more ancient people, had, for many years, (through their weakness or disorders,) lived without any thought of command.

Athens was originally governed by kings; the last of whom sacrificed his life to the good of his country; and, upon his death, the Athenians took occasion to abolish the royalty, and instituted their perpetual Archons, which were changed to a decennial, and afterwards to an annual magistracy. The state, however, was not completely settled, until Solon, by his wise laws, restored the love of labour and husbandry, opened a way for commerce, taught his countrymen to enrich themselves, and found means to subdue their licentiousness by the rules of justice, order, and discipline. Athens, thus reformed, was in a fair way of growing great and illustrious, when one of the citizens found means to seize the supreme power. The struggles of the Athenians for liberty, against the successors of this man, was one occasion of the Persian war; the glorious exploits of which are too well

known to need a recital. The victories of Marathon, Salamis, and Platæa, the chief honour of which the Athenians assumed to themselves, determined the character of that people, inspired them with the highest notions of glory and honour, and at last prompted them to set up for sovereign umpires of Greece.

SPARTA was willing to resign to them the command of the sea: but they would be absolute in all. And as they had delivered Greece from the oppression of the Barbarians, they thought themselves entitled to oppress her in their turn. They called themselves protectors of the Grecian cities, but behaved like their lords; till at last, Sparta, urged by the complaints of several states, against the violence of Athens, began the famous Peloponnesian war, which was carried on with various success twenty-seven years. The unhappy expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, first shook their power; and the victory of Lysander at Ægos-Potamos, entirely overthrew it.

BY this event, however, Greece only changed her masters. Sparta resumed the superiority; but her new reign lasted only thirty years. The Spartans were possessed with such a prejudice in favour of their own form of government, that they attempted to abolish democracy every

where: and while they imposed their thirty tyrants upon Athens, established a government of ten, in other states, composed of men devoted to their interest. Thus they became more absolute, but at the same time more odious. Their prosperity made them presume too much upon their strength. Their forces were lent to support the pretensions of the younger Cyrus. Their king Agesilaus, was sent into Persia; where the GREAT KING could not put a stop to his progress, but by bribing the Greeks, and by that means raising up enemies against Sparta.

THE Greeks readily hearkened to his solicitations. The Athenians, at the head of the malcontents, resolved to hazard every thing for liberty; and without reflecting on their late miserable condition, presumed to affront that state which had reduced them to it. They knew so well to make a right use of the oversight the Spartans had committed, in provoking the great king, that, joining their force with the Persian fleet, they defeated them, and rebuilt their walls: nor did they lay down their arms, till the Lacedemonians were obliged, by a solemn treaty, to restore the Grecian cities to their liberty. For although the Lacedemonians pretended a voluntary generosity in this affair, yet it appeared, by the consequence, that fear only had obliged them

to it; as they took an opportunity, some time after, to oppress Thebes, though expressly comprehended in the treaty. This raised the states of Greece against them. The Athenians (who always harboured the most inveterate hatred and jealousy of them, and had lately been particularly provoked by an attempt of one of their generals to seize their port), set themselves once more at the head of the confederacy; and took upon themselves the whole expense of the war; in which their arms were crowned with victories by sea and land, at Corinth, Naxos, Corcyra, and Leucas. Thus were the Spartans obliged to renew the treaty, and the cities of Greece again restored to an entire independency.—These bold efforts of the Athenians to reduce the Spartan power, and to regain their former sovereignty, are frequently extolled in the following Orations, as the glorious effects of their concern for the liberties of Greece.

And now the peace was just concluded, and the Greeks had the fairest prospect of enjoying it, when, on a sudden, the Thebans started up, and asserted their claim to sovereign power.

Thebes had, from the earliest ages, been ranked among the most considerable states. The natural slowness and heaviness of the inhabitants

had, however, prevented them from aiming at any pre-eminence. In the Persian war, they even had the baseness to join with the Barbarians. And in order to screen themselves from the resentment of the Athenians, on this account, they afterwards attached themselves to Lacedemon; and continued firm, through the whole course of the Peloponnesian war. They shifted sides, however, some time after, and had some contests with the Lacedemonians. The seizing of their citadel, and the recovery of it out of the hands of the Lacedemonians by Pelopidas, had created a mutual hatred between these two states. And the Thebans, naturally hardy and robust, and grown experienced since the Peloponnesian war, (from which time their arms had been constantly exercised) now at length began to entertain thoughts of commanding. They refused to accede to the treaty negociated by the Athenians, unless they were acknowledged chief of Bœotia. This refusal not only exposed them to the resentment of the king of Persia (who was at that time particularly concerned that the Greeks should be at peace) but raised Athens, Sparta, and indeed all Greece, against them. The Lacedemonians declared war, and thinking them an easy victory, now that they were deserted by their allies, marched their forces a considerable way into the Theban territory. Now it was, that EPAMINONDAS first shone out

in all his lustre. He put himself at the head of the Thebans, and met the enemy at Leuctra, where he gave them a total overthrow. He then marched into Peloponnesus, and had well nigh made himself master of the city of Sparta; relieved some people who had been oppressed by the Spartans; and by his justice and magnanimity, his extensive abilities, and zealous concern for his country, promised to raise the Thebans to the most exalted degree of power and dignity; when, in another engagement with the Lacedemonians at Mantinea, he fell, as it were, in the arms of victory.

The death of Epaminondas, and the peace which ensued, slackened the zeal of the principal powers of Greece, and rendered them too secure. The Athenians, particularly, (when they saw the fortune of Lacedemon at the lowest ebb, and that, on the part of Thebes, they were freed from all apprehensions by the death of the general, the soul of their counsels and designs), were now no longer upon their guard, but abandoned themselves to ease and pleasure. Festivals and public entertainments engaged their attention, and a violent passion for the stage banished all thoughts of business and glory. Poets, players, singers, and dancers, were received with that esteem and applause, which were due to the commanders who

fought their battles. They were rewarded extravagantly, and their performances exhibited with a magnificence scarcely to be conceived. The treasures which should have maintained their armies, were applied to purchase seats in their theatres. Instead of that spirit and vigour which they exerted against the Persian, they were possessed with indolence and effeminacy; they had no farther concern about the affairs of war, than just to keep a few foreign troops in pay; in short, treachery, corruption, and degeneracy, overspread the state.

But while they were sinking into this condition, they found themselves unexpectedly engaged with a very formidable enemy, Philip, king of the Macedonians, a people hitherto obscure, and in a manner barbarous; but now, by the courage, activity, and consummate policy of their monarch, ready to lay the foundation of a most extensive empire.

Philip had been sent early into Thebes as an hostage, where he was so happy as to improve his natural abilities, by the instructions of Epaminondas. The news of his brother Perdiccas being slain in a battle with the Illyrians, determined him to fly to the relief of his country; he eluded the vigilance of his guards, and escaped privately

to Macedon; where, taking advantage of the people's consternation for the loss of their king, and of the dangers they apprehended from an infant reign, he first got himself declared protector to his nephew, and soon after, king in his stead; and indeed the present condition of the Macedonians requiréd a prince of his abilities. The Illyrians, flushed with their late victory, were preparing to march against them; the Pæonians harassed them with perpetual incursions; and, at the same time, Pausanias and Argæus, two of the royal blood, pretended to the crown; the one supported by Thrace, the other by Athens.

UNDER these circumstances, Philip's first care was to gain the affections of his people, to raise their spirits, to train and exercise them, and to reform their military discipline. And now he began to discover those abilities, which afterwards raised him to such an height of power, and which were not to be expected in a prince of the age of twenty-two years.

THE chief motive of the Athenians, in supporting the pretensions of Argæus, was the hopes of getting possession of Amphipolis, a city bordering on Macedon, which they had long claimed as their colony. It had sometimes been in their

hands, sometimes subjected to Lacedemon, according to the different changes of fortune of these states. After the peace of Antalcidas, the Greeks acknowledged the pretensions of the Athenians; and it was resolved, that they should be put in possession of this city at the common charge. Probably the people of Amphipolis refused to submit to their old masters: for the Athenians were obliged to dispatch Iphicrates thither with forces. But the kings of Macedon now began to dispute it with them. Perdiccas made himself master of it; and Philip would very gladly have kept it in his own hands, but this could not be done without weakening his army, and incensing the Athenians, whom his present circumstances required him rather to make his friends; on the other hand, he could not think of suffering them to possess it, as it was the key to that side of his dominions. He therefore took a middle course, and declared it a free city; thereby leaving the inhabitants to throw off their dependance on their old masters, and making it appear to be their own act. At the same time he disarms the Pæonians by the force of presents and promises, and then turns his arms against the Athenians, who had marched to the assistance of Argæus. A battle ensued, in which Philip was victorious. By the death of Argæus, who fell in the action, he was freed from that dispute;

and by his respectful care of the Athenians, when he had them in his power, he so far gained upon that people, that they concluded a peace with him. He now found himself strong enough to break with the Pæonians, whom he subdued; and having gained a complete victory over the Illyrians, he obliged them to restore all their conquests in Macedon. He also shut up the entrance of his kingdom against Pausanias; but having provided for the security of it, in the next place, he thought of making it more powerful and flourishing.

The re-union of Amphipolis he considered as the principal means to this end; and, therefore, under pretence of punishing some wrongs, which he alleged against that city, he laid siege to it. The moment they perceived their danger, the people of Amphipolis sent two of their citizens to Athens, to solicit succours: but, in order to prevent any opposition on the part of the Athenians, Philip gave them the strongest assurances, that his sole design was to put them in possession of it, the moment it was in his power: they therefore suffered him to make a conquest of it. But, instead of performing his promise, he proceeded to take from them Pydna and Potidæa, with which he purchased the friendship of the Olynthians, whom it concerned him at that time to

oblige. The golden mines of Crenides fell next into his hands, and contributed greatly to his successes.

THE Athenians could not but be alarmed at the progress of this prince. His vigilance and activity, his policy and insincerity, now began to appear dangerous; and councils were held to deliberate upon the measures proper to be taken. But, although the Athenians were possessed with delicacy and sensibility, and entertained magnificent ideas of virtue and its duties, yet they wanted application, constancy, and perseverance. The good qualities which had long been the boast of that people, were now disappearing, while their faults increased. Hence it was, that they easily suffered themselves to be lulled into a false security. Besides, they had enough of difficulty to support their jurisdiction in other parts, and to bear up against a considerable revolt of their allies.

THIS revolt produced the war called the social war, which lasted three years, and was succeeded by the Phocian or sacred war, so called, because begun from a motive of religion. The Phocians had plowed up some ground adjoining to the temple of Apollo at Delphos, which their neighbours exclaimed against as sacrilege, and was so

judged by the council of Amphictyons, that venerable assembly composed of representatives from the principal states of Greece, who sat twice every year at Delphos and Thermopylæ. They laid a heavy fine upon them; but, instead of submitting to the sentence, the Phocians alleged, that the care and patronage of the temple belonged anciently to them, and, encouraged by Philomelus, one of their principal citizens, took up arms to assert their claim. The several states of Greece took part in this quarrel, as their interests and inclinations directed. Athens and Sparta, with some other of the Peloponnesians, declared for the Phocians. The Thebans were their principal opposers; and were assisted by the Thessalians, Locrians, and other neighbouring states. At first, Philomelus had some success; but, in the second year of the war, the Thebans gave him a signal defeat, and he himself was killed in the pursuit.

In the mean time, Philip took no part in this war. He was well pleased that the parties should exhaust their strength; and also had an opportunity of securing and extending his frontier without interruption, by taking in such places as were either convenient or troublesome to him. Of this latter kind was the city of Methonè, which, after some resistance, he took and demo-

lished, annexing its lands to Macedon. During the siege, he was in imminent danger of his life, having lost one of his eyes by an arrow. But it was not long before Philip had a fair opportunity of engaging as a party in the Phocian war. The Thessalians, a people susceptible of all impressions, and incapable of preserving any, equally forgetful of benefits and injuries, ever ready to submit to tyrants, and to implore the assistance of their neighbours to free them from slavery,—had some time since been governed by Alexander of Pheræ, the most detestable tyrant ever known in Greece. He was dispatched by Tisiphonus, Lycophron, and Pitholaus, who seized the government, and became equally intolerable. So that the nobility of Thessaly, with the Aleuadæ, descendants from Hercules, at their head, declared against them, and implored the assistance of Philip. This prince willingly sacrificed the hopes of extending his conquests in Thrace to the honour of assisting the Aleuadæ, who were of the same race with him; and of imitating Pelopidas in giving liberty to Thessaly. He had also long wished to have the Macedonians considered as a Grecian people; and, as he thought no opportunity could be so honourable and favourable, as to affect an interest in the affairs of Thessaly, he readily marched against the tyrants, and soon divested them of all their authority.

But Philip's apparent danger from the wound which he received at Methonè, emboldened Lycophron to resume the sovereign power. The Phocians, (who, after the death of Philomelus, had renewed the war with all imaginable vigour under Onomarchus,) espoused the cause of this tyrant, who had engaged the Thessalians to observe a neutrality; and they, in return, supported him with all their power. Philip, therefore, now became involved in the general quarrel. At first, the Phocian general gained some advantages over him; but he afterwards had such success, as enlarged his views, and inspired him with new hopes and expectations. He thought of nothing less than the conquest of Greece; and, under pretence of marching against the Phocians, made a bold attempt to seize the famous pass at Thermopylæ, which he justly called the key of Greece. This roused the Athenians from their lethargy. At the first news of his march, they flew to the pass, and prevented his design, as he did not think it prudent to force his way.

We may reasonably look on his retreat from Thermopylæ as the æra of Philip's hatred to the Athenians. He saw that they were the only people in Greece capable of defeating his projects, or of giving him uneasiness in his own king-

dom: he therefore provided himself, with much diligence, a fleet composed of light ships, which might disturb their trade, and, at the same time, enrich his subjects by bringing in prizes. He also increased his army, and projected the destruction of the Athenian colonies in Thrace. At the same time, he practised very successfully at Athens itself; and, by large appointments, secured some eminent orators, to charm the people with delusive hopes of peace, or to frighten them with expensive estimates, while they pretended a zeal for the defence of the state.

In a democratical government, like that of Athens, Eloquence was the sure means of recommending its possessor to the attention and regard of his fellow-citizens, and of raising him to all public honours and advantages. The gradual improvements of literature had introduced and perfected the arts of moving and persuading; and perhaps the disorders of the state contributed to make them more important, called forth a greater number of public speakers, and opened a larger field for their abilities. Many of those orators, who, about that time, took the lead in the Athenian assemblies, are lost to posterity. The characters, however, of the most eminent have been transmitted, or may be collected from the writings of antiquity.

DEMADES, by his birth and education, seemed destined to meanness and obscurity: but as the Athenian assembly admitted persons of all ranks and occupations to speak their sentiments, his powers soon recommended him to his countrymen, and raised him from the low condition of a common mariner, to the administration and direction of public affairs. His private life was stained with those brutal excesses, which frequently attend the want of early culture, and an intercourse with the inferior and least refined part of mankind. His conduct, as a leader and minister, was not actuated by the principles of delicate honour and integrity; and his eloquence seems to have received a tincture from his original condition. He appears to have been a strong, bold, and what we call a blunt speaker, whose manner, rude and daring, and sometimes bordering on extravagance, had oftentimes a greater effect than the more corrected style of other speakers, who confined themselves within the bounds of decorum and good-breeding.

HYPERIDES, on the contrary, was blessed with all the graces of refinement: harmonious, elegant, and polite, with a well-bred festivity, and delicate irony; excellent in panegyric, and of great natural abilities for affecting the passions; yet his eloquence seems rather to have been

pleasing than persuasive. He is said to have been not so well fitted for a popular assembly, and for political debates, as for private causes, and addressing a few select judges: and even here, when he pleaded the cause of a woman for whom he had the tenderest passion, he was obliged to call the charms of his mistress to the assistance of his eloquence, and was more indebted to these for his success than to his own powers.

LYCURGUS had all the advantages which birth and education could afford for forming an orator. He was the hearer of Plato, and the scholar of Isocrates. He seems to have been particularly affected by the charms of poetry, and the polite arts; nor was he less remarkable for diligence and attention; yet his influence in the assembly seems, like that of Phocion, to have arisen rather from a respect to his character, and the general opinion of his virtue and integrity, than from his abilities as a speaker.

ÆSCHINES was an orator, whose style was full, diffusive, and sonorous. He was a stranger to the glowing expressions, and daring figures of Demosthenes, which he treats with contempt and ridicule. But, though more simple, he is less affecting; and, by being less contracted, has not so much strength and energy. Or, as Quintilian

expresses it, *carnis plus habet, lacertorum minus.* But, if we would view his abilities to the greatest advantage, we must not compare them with those of his rival. Then will his figures appear to want neither beauty nor grandeur. His easy and natural manner will then be thought highly pleasing; and a just attention will discover a good degree of force and energy in his style, which, at first, appears only flowing and harmonious.

But all the[a] several excellencies of his countrymen and contemporaries were at least equalled by Demosthenes. His own no age or nation could attain to. From him, critics have formed their rules, and all the masters in his own art have thought it an honour to imitate him. To enlarge upon his character, would be to resume a subject already exhausted by every critic, both ancient and modern. Let it be sufficient to say, that energy and majesty are his peculiar excellencies. From the gravity of Thucydides, the pomp and dignity of Plato, the ease and elegance, the neatness and simplicity of the Attic writers, he formed a style and manner admirably fitted to his own temper and genius, as well as that of his hearers. His own severity determined him to

[a] Nihil Lysiæ subtilitate cedit; nihil argutiis et acumine Hyperidi; nihil lenitate Æschini et splendore verborum.

Cic. de Orat.

the more forcible methods of astonishing and terrifying, rather than the gentle and insinuating arts of persuasion; nor did the circumstances and dispositions of his countrymen admit of any but violent impressions. As many of those to whom he addressed himself were men of low rank and occupations, his images and expressions are sometimes familiar. As others of them were themselves eminent in speaking, and could readily see through all the common artifices of oratory, these he affects to despise; appears only solicitous to be understood; yet, as it were without design, raises the utmost admiration and delight; such delight as arises from the clearness of evidence, and the fulness of conviction. And, as all, even the lower part of his hearers, were acquainted with the beauties of poetry, and the force of harmony, he could not admit of any thing rude or negligent, but with the strictest attention laboured those compositions which appear so natural and unadorned. They have their ornaments, but these are austere and manly, and such as are consistent with freedom and sincerity. A full and regular series of diffusive reasoning would have been intolerable in an Athenian assembly. He often contents himself with an imperfect hint: a sentence, a word, even his silence is sometimes pregnant with meaning. And this quickness and vehemence flattered a people who

valued themselves on their acuteness and penetration. The impetuous torrent that in a moment bears down all before it, the repeated flashes of lightning, which spread universal terror, and which the strongest eye dares not encounter, are the images by which the nature of his eloquence hath been expressed.

As a statesman and as a citizen, his conduct was no less remarkable. If the fire of his eloquence seems sometimes abated, his judgment and accuracy, and political abilities, are then conspicuous. The bravery with which he opposed the passions and prejudices of his countrymen, and the *general* integrity of his character (to which Philip himself bare witness) are deserving of the highest honour; and, whatever weakness he betrayed in his military conduct, his death must be acknowledged truly heroic.

THE reader will observe, that the Oration, entitled, *On the Halonesus*, is not admitted into the following collection. Some critics ascribe it to[a]

[a] In the oration on the Halonesus, the speaker takes notice of his having been the manager of a prosecution against Callippus, on account of an illegal motion made by this man in the assembly, relative to the boundaries of Cardia. Hegesippus was the person who conducted this prosecution; and this circumstance Libanius mentions as having (together with the difference of style) induced the critics to ascribe this oration, not to Demosthenes, but to He-

Hegesippus, an Athenian orator of inferior character. But, however this may be, it is certainly entirely different from those compositions of Demosthenes which are confessedly genuine. That he really wrote an[b] oration so entitled, the authority of the ancient writers confirm, I think sufficiently. But one would be tempted to believe, that the passages which they have quoted, had been taken up by some old scholiast, and inserted in a performance of his own.

As to the translation now offered to the public, the author has no doubt but that it will meet with all due indulgence from the ingenious and judicious reader. His sentence must determine its fate, and to him it is implicitly submitted.

gesippus. To this we may add another circumstance of the like nature. The speaker observes that he went on an embassy to Macedon, in order to obtain an explanation and amendment of some articles in the treaty concluded between Philip and the Athenians. Hegesippus was at the head of this embassy: nor was Demosthenes at all concerned in it, as appears from the oration of this latter (περὶ τῆς Παραπ.)

[a] Æschines, in his oration on the embassy, mentions two particulars in that of Demosthenes on the Halonesus, neither of which are found in the oration now extant. The first is, that Demosthenes treated Philip's ambassadors with great severity, and insisted that they were really sent as spies. The other, that he recommended to the Athenians by no means to submit their disputes with Philip to the decision of an umpire; for that no one impartial, mediating state could be found through Greece, so totally were the minds of all men corrupted by the Macedonian.

THE

FIRST ORATION

AGAINST

PHILIP:

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF ARISTODEMUS.

IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH OLYMPIAD,
AND THE NINTH OF PHILIP'S REIGN.

INTRODUCTION.

WE have seen Philip opposed in his design of passing into Greece, through Thermopylæ, and obliged to retire. The danger they had thus escaped deeply affected the Athenians. So daring an attempt, which was, in effect, declaring his purposes, filled them with astonishment; and the view of a power, which every day received new accessions, drove them even to despair. Yet their aversion to public business was still predominant. They forgot that Philip might renew his attempt, and thought they had provided sufficiently for their security, by posting a body of troops at the entrance of Attica, under the command of Menelaus, a foreigner. They then proceeded to convene an assembly of the people, in order to consider what measures were to be taken to check the progress of Philip: on which occasion, Demosthenes, for the first time, appeared against that prince, and displayed those abilities which proved the greatest obstacle to his designs.

At Athens, the whole power and management of affairs were placed in the people. It was

their prerogative to receive appeals from the courts of justice, to abrogate and enact laws, to make what alterations in the state they judged convenient; in short, all matters, public or private, foreign or domestic, civil, military, or religious, were determined by them.

Whenever there was occasion to deliberate, the people assembled early in the morning, sometimes in the forum or public place, sometimes in a place called Pnyx, but most frequently in the theatre of Bacchus. A few days before each assembly, there was a Προγραμμα or placart fixed on the statues of some illustrious men erected in the city, to give notice of the subject to be debated. As they refused admittance into the assembly to all persons who had not attained the necessary age, so they obliged all others to attend. The Lexiarchs stretched out a cord dyed with scarlet, and by it pushed the people towards the place of meeting. Such as received the stain were fined; the more diligent had a small pecuniary reward. These Lexiarchs were the keepers of the register, in which were enrolled the names of such citizens as had a right of voting. And all had this right who were of age, and not excluded by a personal fault. Undutiful children, cowards, brutal debauchees, prodigals, debtors to the public, were all ex-

cluded. Until the time of Cecrops, women had a right of suffrage, which they were said to have lost on account of their partiality to Minerva, in her dispute with Neptune about giving a name to the city.

In ordinary cases, all matters were first deliberated in the *senate of five hundred*, composed of fifty senators chosen out of each of the ten tribes. Each tribe had its turn of presiding, and the fifty senators in office were called Prytanes. And, according to the number of the tribes, the Attic year was divided into ten parts, the four first containing thirty-six, the other thirty-five days; in order to make the Lunar year complete, which, according to their calculation, contained one hundred and fifty-four days. During each of these divisions, ten of the fifty Prytanes governed for a week, and were called Proedri: and, of these, he who in the course of the week presided for one day, was called the Epistate: three of the Proedri being excluded from this office.

The Prytanes assembled the people; the Proedri declare the occasion; and the Epistatæ demand their voices. This was the case in the ordinary assemblies: the extraordinary were convened as well by the generals as the Prytanes; and sometimes the people met of their own accord, without waiting the formalities.

The assembly was opened by a sacrifice; and the place was sprinkled with the blood of the victim.—Then an imprecation was pronounced, conceived in these terms: *May the gods pursue that man to destruction, with all his race, who shall act, speak, or contrive, any thing against this state!* This ceremony being finished, the Proedri declared the occasion of the assembly, and reported the opinion of the senate. If any doubt arose, an herald, by commission from the Epistatæ, with a loud voice, invited any citizen, first of those above the age of fifty, to speak his opinion: and then the rest according to their ages. This right of precedence had been granted by a law of Solon, and the order of speaking determined entirely by the difference of years. In the time of Demosthenes, this law was not in force. It is said to have been repealed about fifty years before the date of this oration. Yet the custom still continued, out of respect to the reasonable and decent purpose for which the law was originally enacted. When a speaker had delivered his sentiments, he generally called on an officer appointed for that purpose, to read his motion, and propound it in form. He then sat down, or resumed his discourse, and enforced his motion by additional arguments: and sometimes the speech was introduced by his motion thus propounded. When all the speakers had ended, the

people gave their opinion, by stretching out their hands to him whose proposal pleased them most. And Xenophon reports, that, night having come on when the people were engaged in an important debate, they were obliged to defer their determination till next day, for fear of confusion, when their hands were to be raised.

Porrexerunt manus, saith Cicero, (pro Flacco) *et Psephisma natum est*. And, to constitute this Psephisma or decree, six thousand citizens at least were required. When it was drawn up, the name of its author, or that person whose opinion has prevailed, was prefixed: whence, in speaking of it, they call it his decree. The date of it contained the name of the Archon, that of the day and month, and that of the tribe then presiding. The business being over, the Prytanes dismissed the assembly.

The reader who chooses to be more minutely informed in the customs, and manner of procedure in the public assemblies of Athens, may consult the Archæologia of Archbishop Potter, Sigonius, or the Concionatrices of Aristophanes.

PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.

Aristodemo, Archon—A. R. Philip. 9.—Olympiad. 107. An. 1.

HAD we been convened, Athenians! on some new subject of debate, I had waited until moſt of the usual persons had declared their opinions. If I had approved of any thing proposed by them, I should have continued silent: if not I had then attempted to speak my sentiments. But since those very points, on which these speakers have oftentimes been heard already, are, at this time, to be considered; though[a] I have arisen first, I presume I may expect your pardon; for if they on former occasions had advised the necessary measures, you would not have found it needful to consult at present.

FIRST then, Athenians, these our affairs must not be thought desperate; no, though their situation seems entirely deplorable. For the most shocking circumstance of all our past conduct is really the most favourable to our future expectations. And what is this? That our own total indolence hath

[a] *Though I have arisen first*, &c. Demosthenes was at that time but thirty years old, which made it necessary for him to apologize for his zeal in rising before the other speakers: and the ingenious turn which he gives it, not only prevents any unfavourable impression on the minds of his hearers, but engages their affection, and excites their attention, by the tacit promise of better counsel than they had hitherto received. TOURREIL.

been the cause of all our present difficulties. For were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the honour of our state demanded, there were then no hope of a recovery.

In the next place, reflect, (you who have been informed by others, and you who can yourselves remember)[a] how great a power the Lacedemonians not long since possessed; and with what resolution, with what dignity, you disdained to act unworthy of the state, but maintained the war against them for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention these things? That ye may know, that ye may see, Athenians! that if duly vigilant, ye cannot have any thing to fear; that if once remiss, not any thing can happen agreeable to your desires: witness the then powerful arms of Lacedemon, which a just attention to your interests enabled you to vanquish: and this man's late insolent attempt, which our insensibility to all our great concerns hath made the cause of this confusion.

If there be a man in this assembly who thinks

[a] *How great a power*, &c. It has been already observed in the preface to these orations, that Demosthenes takes many occasions of extolling the efforts of Athens to reduce the Spartan power, and to regain that sovereignty which they lost by the victory of Lysander at Ægos Potamos. These efforts he every where represents as high instances of magnanimity and public spirit: though revenge and jealousy had no less share in them. The victories which the Athenians gained over Sparta at Corinth, Naxos, &c. and which he here alludes to, happened about twenty-four years before the date of this oration; so that he might well appeal to the memories of many persons present.

that we must find a formidable enemy in Philip, while he views, on one hand, the[a] numerous armies which attend him; and, on the other, the weakness of the state thus despoiled of its dominions; he thinks justly. Yet, let him reflect on this: there was a time, Athenians! when we possessed Pydna, and Potidæa, and Methonè, and all that country round: when many of those states, now subjected to him, were free and independent, and more inclined to our alliance than to his. Had then Philip reasoned in the same manner: "How shall I dare "to attack the Athenians, whose garrisons com- "mand my territory, while I am destitute of all "assistance!"—he would not have engaged in those enterprises which are now crowned with success; nor could he have raised himself to this pitch of greatness. No, Athenians! he knew this well, that all these places are but[b] prizes, laid between the combatants, and ready for the conqueror; that the dominions of the absent devolve naturally to those who are in the field; the possessions of the supine to the active and intrepid. Animated by these sentiments, he overturns whole countries; he holds all people in subjection: some, as by the right of

[a] *The numerous armies*, &c. The number of Philip's forces at that time amounted to twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse: a great army compared with those of the Greeks. At their march to Marathon, the Athenians could not assemble more than ten thousand forces. TOURREIL.

[b] *But prizes*, &c. His hearers were of all others most devoted to public games and entertainments, and must therefore have been particularly sensible of the beauty of this image.

conquest; others, under the title of allies and confederates: for all are willing to confederate with those whom they see prepared and resolved to exert themselves as they ought.

And if you (my countrymen!) will now at length be persuaded to entertain the like sentiments: if each of you, renouncing all evasions, will be ready to approve himself an useful citizen, to the utmost that his station and abilities demand: if the rich will be ready to contribute, and the young to take the field: in one word, if you will be yourselves, and banish those vain hopes which every single person entertains, that while so many others are engaged in public business, his service will not be required; you then (if heaven so pleases) shall regain your dominions, recal those opportunities your supineness hath neglected, and chastise the insolence of this man. For you are not to imagine, that, like a god, he is to enjoy his present greatness for ever fixed and unchangeable. No, Athenians! there are who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even among those seemingly the moſt attached to his cause. These are passions common to mankind; nor must we think that his friends only are exempted from them. It is true they lie concealed at present, as our indolence deprives them of all resource. But let us shake off this indolence! for you see how we are situated; you see the outrageous arrogance of this man, who does not leave it to your choice whether you shall act, or remain quiet; but

braves you with his menaces; and talks[a] (as we are informed) in a strain of the highest extravagance; and is not able to rest satisfied with his present acquisitions, but is ever in pursuit of further conquests; and, while we sit down, inactive and irresolute, incloses us on all sides with his toils.

WHEN, therefore, O my countrymen! when will you exert your vigour? when roused by some event? When forced by some necessity? What then are we to think of our present condition? To freemen, the disgrace attending on misconduct, is, in my opinion, the most urgent necessity. Or say, is it your sole ambition to wander through the public places, each inquiring of the other, "What new "advices? Can any thing be more new, than that a man of Macedon should conquer the Athenians,

[a] *And talks (as we are informed)*, &c. The success which had hitherto attended Philip's arms, must naturally have inspired him with those designs which he afterwards executed against the Athenians: and resentment of their late opposition at Thermopylæ might have made him less careful to conceal them, at least in his own court. This the orator represents as *arrogant and extravagant menaces*: not that a man who had so just a conception of the weakness of the Athenian politics, and the vigour and abilities of their enemy, could really believe such designs extravagant and romantic. But it was part of his address sometimes to avoid shocking the national vanity of his countrymen. After all their losses, and amidst all their indolence, they could not entertain a thought so mortifying, as that the conquerors of Persia and the arbiters of Greece could ever see their liberty essentially affected, or their power and glory entirely wrested from them by a king of Macedon.

and give law to Greece?—" Is Philip dead[a]?—No, but in great danger."——How are you concerned in those rumours? Suppose he should meet some fatal stroke: you would soon raise up another Philip if your interests are thus regarded. For it is not to his own strength that he so much owes his elevation, as to our supineness. And should[b] some accident affect him, should Fortune, who hath ever been more careful of the state, than we ourselves, now repeat her favours; (and may she thus crown them!) be assured of this, that by being on the spot, ready to take advantage of the confusion, you will every where be absolute masters; but in your present disposition, even if a

[a] *Is Philip dead,* &c. These rumours and inquiries of the Athenians were occasioned by the wound Philip received at Methonè, the year before, and which was followed by a dangerous fit of sickness.——Longinus quotes this whole passage as a beautiful instance of those pathetic figures, which give life, and force, and energy to an oration. TOURREIL.

The English reader will find the remark in Sect. 18. of Mr. Smith's translation.

[b] *Some accident,* &c. *If he should die.* This is plainly the sense of it: but it must be expressed covertly, as Demosthenes has done, not to transgress against that decorum which Cicero says this orator made his first rule. For there were certain things which the ancients presumed not to express, but in terms obscure and gentle; that they might not pronounce what were called *verba male ominata.* They did not dare to say to any person, *If you should be killed*; *If you should die:* they concealed as much as possible the melancholy and odious idea of an approaching, or even of a distant death. The Greeks said εἴ τι πάθοις; the Romans, *si quid humanitus contingat.* OLIVET.

favourable juncture should present you with Amphipolis [a], you could not take possession of it, while

[a] *Present you with Amphipolis*, &c. They had nothing more at heart than the recovery of this city. So that the author here gives the last and most heightening stroke to his description of their indolence. TOURREIL.

And at the same time by artfully hinting at such an event, as possible, he rouses their attention, and enlivens their hopes and expectations.

The Italian commentator illustrates this passage in the following manner: Monet orator, quod quamvis accidat, ejusdem, (*sci. Amphipolis*) compotes fieri, ipsis tamen non satis id fore ad turbandas res Macedonicas; cum aliis tot locis, quæ memoravimus, privati, ad tantam rerum molem parum opis habere possint, ex una duntaxat civitate. Accordingly, the passage before us hath been rendered to this effect: "If some favourable conjuncture should "deliver up Amphipolis to you, &c. you could not receive the "least benefit from the possession, with respect to Macedon." The assertion of the orator, as expressed in the present translation, hath been pronounced extraordinary, and the argument inconclusive. The substance, therefore, of the present argument, I shall here endeavour to collect: "You are all earnest to be informed whether Philip be dead or no. But, unless you change "your measures, his death or life can make no difference, or "prove of any consequence. Indeed, if some accident should "take him off, nothing more would be necessary to give the full "advantage of the confusion which such an event must occasion, "than to appear on the frontier of Macedon with a powerful force. "This would make you absolute masters of the country. But "in your present circumstances, what would it avail, even if "such a favourable incident, as that of Philip's death, should give "you an opportunity of recovering Amphipolis? So important "an acquisition (which would in a great measure enable you to "command all Macedon) must still be lost; unless you had your "forces ready, you could not take possession of it." Whether there be any thing unreasonable in this assertion, or impertinent in this argument, must be submitted to the reader. With de-

this suspense prevails in your designs and in your councils.

And now, as to the necessity of a general vigour and alacrity; of this you must be fully persuaded: this point therefore I shall urge no further. But the nature of the armament, which, I think, will extricate you from the present difficulties, the numbers to be raised, the subsidies required for their support, and all the other necessaries; how they may (in my opinion) be best and most expeditiously provided; these things I shall endeavour to

ference to this judgment, I must declare, that it appears to me to have rather more force, and to set the fatal consequence of the indolence and irresolution of the Athenians in a stronger light, than the other interpretation; whose propriety may be at once determined, by comparing the passage with the sentence immediately preceding. In that the orator declares, that in case of Philip's death, the Athenians had no more to do, but to appear on the frontier of Macedon, in order to gain the absolute disposal of the affairs of that kingdom; Ἴσθ' ὅτι πλησίον μὲν ὄντες, ἅπασιν δ' ἂν τοῖς πράγμασι τεθαρρηκότες ἐπιστάντες· ὑπως βούλεσθε διοικήσασθε. We must, therefore, be at some pains to clear Demosthenes of the suspicion of inconsistency, if the very next sentence be underſtood, as containing a declaration, That although the Athenians should not only appear upon the borders of Macedon, but there possess themselves of a post of the utmost consequence, still they could derive no advantage from their acquisition, far from having the whole kingdom at their disposal. What seems to have tempted the Italian commentator to suggest this interpretation is, the expression, διδόντων ὑμῖν τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν, *if some conjunctures should* GIVE *you Amphipolis*, which he takes in a literal sense. But the genius of spirited eloquence, and of our orator in particular, fully warrants us to regard it only as a lively figure, and to understand no more by *giving up*, than, *affording a favourable opportunity of gaining*.

explain.——But here I make this request, Athenians! that you would not be precipitate, but suspend your judgment till you have heard me fully. And if, at first, I seem to propose a new kind of armament, let it not be thought that I am delaying your affairs. For it is not they who cry out "instantly! "this moment!" whose counsels suit the present juncture (as it is not possible to repel violences already committed, by any occasional detachment) but he who will shew you, of what kind that armament must be, how great, and how supported, which may subsist until we yield to peace, or till our enemies sink beneath our arms, for thus only can we be secured from future dangers.—These things, I think, I can point out: not that I would prevent any other person from declaring his opinion.—Thus far am I engaged: how I can acquit myself, will immediately appear: to your judgments I appeal.

First, then, Athenians! I say that you should fit out fifty ships of war: and then resolve, that on the first emergency you will embark yourselves. To these I insist that you must add transport and other necessary vessels sufficient for half our horse. Thus far we should be provided against those sudden excursions from his own kingdom to Thermopylæ, to the Chersonesus[a], to Olyn-

[a] *To the Chersonesus.* The year before, Cersobleptes, unable to defend this country against Philip, had put the Athenians in possession of it. Cardia, one of the chief cities, refused to acknowledge these new sovereigns, and had recourse to the protection of

thus, to whatever places he thinks proper. For of this he should necessarily be persuaded, that possibly you may break out from this immoderate indolence, and fly to some scene of action: as you did to Eubœa[b], and formerly, as we are told, to

Philip, who, under pretence of supporting them, carried his arms into the Chersonesus. TOURREIL.

[a] *To Olynthus.* Philip had already committed some acts of hostility against this state, but had not as yet formed the siege of Olynthus, or taken any measures tending to it: for in such a case Demosthenes would not have touched so lightly upon an enterprise, which he afterwards dwells upon so often, and with so much force. TOURREIL.

[b] *To Eubœa, &c.* Mons. Tourreil translates this passage thus: "Et qu'il risque de retrouver en vous ces mêmes Athéniens qu'il "rencontra sur son chemin en Eubée," &c. (for which there is no warrant in the original), and taking for granted that all the expeditions here mentioned were made against Philip, he endeavours to settle the date of this to Eubœa by conjecture. But it does not appear from history that Philip carried his arms into that island, before his attempt on Thermopylæ. In the three succeeding Olynthiac orations, there is not the least mention of such a thing, though there is a particular recital of his expeditions in the third, and though afterwards the orator inveighs loudly against his hostile attempts in Eubœa. I apprehend, therefore, that the expedition hinted at in this place was that which the Athenians made about seven years before in favour of the Eubœans against Thebes; when in five days they brought an army into Eubœa, and in thirty obliged the Thebans to come to terms, and evacuate the island, (according to Æschines). Demosthenes mentions this in other places; particularly about the end of the oration on the state of the Chersonesus; where he quotes part of the speech made by Timotheus to encourage the Athenians to this expedition.

In the above note, I have endeavoured to suggest some reasons why the expeditions, here alluded to, could not have been made

Haliartus[a], and but now, to Thermopylæ. But although we should not act with all this vigour,

against Philip. But it hath been affirmed that, if this were so, it would be almost impertinent in our orator to mention them. That as facts, they must be found spiritless, if taken in a general sense, and, as arguments, inconclusive. The translator can, with sincerity, declare, that if any representation of his tends, in the least, to depreciate the value of the great original, he readily gives it up as utterly erroneous and indefensible. But, at the same time, he must observe, that if it be a fault to make use of such facts and such arguments, it is a fault which Demosthenes has frequently committed. Thus he speaks of the vigorous opposition of his countrymen to the Lacedemonians; of their marching against the Corinthians and Megareans; of their expelling the Thebans from Eubœa, &c. In the second Philippic oration, he tells his countrymen, that the Macedonian must regard them as the great and strenuous defenders of Greece; because he must be informed of the spirit which their ancestors discovered in the days of his predecessor Alexander. If we are not to allow the orator to reason, from the conduct of his contemporaries, on former occasions, to the conduct which they ought to pursue, or which may be expected from them in their contest with Philip, what shall we say of an argument deduced from their ancestors in the heroic age of Athens? The truth seems to be, that although the facts supposed to be alluded to in this passage, had been passed over by historians, (which I cannot admit); yet, we are not from hence to conclude, that they had no weight or importance in the Athenian assembly. We are not to judge of the light in which they appeared there, from the obscurity into which distance of time and place may have now cast them. The reasons of this are obvious.

[a] *To Haliartus.* Tourreil refers this to some action which he supposes might have happened in Bœotia in the course of the Phocian war, and in which the Athenians might have had their share of the honour. But from the text it should seem that the event alluded to must have happened at some considerable dis-

(which yet I must regard as our indispensable duty) still the measures I propose will have their use: as his fears may keep him quiet, when he knows we are prepared: (and this he will know, for there are too many[a] among ourselves, who inform him of every thing), or if he should despise our armament, his security may prove fatal to him; as it will be absolutely in our power, at the first favourable juncture, to make a descent upon his own coasts.

THESE then are the resolutions I propose,—these the provisions it will become you to make. And I pronounce it still further necessary to raise

tance of time, and have descended to the orator by tradition. About forty years before this oration, when Thebes and Sparta began to quarrel, Lysander, the Spartan general, threatened the Thebans with a very dangerous war, and began with laying siege to this city of Haliartus. The Thebans applied for aid to the Athenians, which they readily granted, (though the Thebans had just before pressed for the utter demolition of their state) and obliged Pausanias to raise the siege, after Lysander had been killed. I apprehend that this is the expedition here alluded to. It was the more remarkable as the Athenian power was then at the lowest ebb. "You Athenians!" says Demosthenes in his oration on the Crown, "at a time when the Lacedemonians had "the absolute command both at sea and land; when Attica was "quite encompassed with their commanders and their garrisons; "when Eubœa, Tanagra, all Bœotia, Megara, Ægina, Cleone, "and the other islands were in their possession, when the state "had not one ship, not one wall,—*ye marched out to Haliartus*," &c.

[a] *To many*, &c. He glances particularly at Aristodemus and Neoptolemus. As to Æschines, he had not been with Philip till six years after. TOURREIL.

some other forces which may harass him with perpetual incursions. Talk not of your ten thousands, or twenty thousands of foreigners; of those armies* which appear so magnificent on paper; but let them be the natural forces of the state: and, if you chuse a single person, if a number, if this particular man, or whomever you appoint as general, let them be entirely under his guidance and authority. I also move you, that subsistence be provided for them. But, as to the quality, the numbers, the maintenance of this body, how are these points to be settled?——I now proceed to speak of each of them distinctly.

THE body of infantry, therefore,—but here give

* *Those armies which*, &c. In the Greek it is ἐπιστολίμαίες δυνάμεις.——Instead of enumerating the various senses in which the commentators interpret this expression, I shall copy an observation on it by the Abbé D'Olivet, whose interpretation I have followed:——"I have, without any refinement, chosen a plain "expression, which seems to hit the thought of Demosthenes "directly, and to paint strongly the bitter ridicule of the passage. "It was usual for the Athenians, upon any emergency, to write "to all quarters to demand soldiers. They were answered, that, "in such a place, such a number would be provided: from an- "other place, so many more might be expected. But, in the end, "it appeared, that these were by no means so many effective "men. There were great abatements to be made from the "numbers promised; and we find, besides, from this oration, "that these foreigners were not paid at all, or ill paid; so that "these grand armies were no where complete, but in the *letters* "written to demand them on one part, and to promise them on "the other. If I am not mistaken, this is what Demosthenes "calls δυνάμεις ἐπιστολιμαίες, *armies which exist only in letters.*"

me leave to warn you of an error, which hath often proved injurious to you. Think not that your preparations never can be too magnificent: great and terrible in your decrees; in execution weak and contemptible. Let your preparations, let your supplies at first be moderate: and add to these if you find them not sufficient.—I say then that the whole body of infantry should be two thousand; of these, that five hundred should be Athenians, of such an age as you shall think proper, and with a stated time for service, not long, but such as that others may have their turn of duty. Let the rest be formed of foreigners. To those you are to add two hundred horse, fifty of them at least Athenians, to serve in the same manner as the foot. For these you are to provide transports.—And now, what further preparations?——Ten light galleys. For, as he hath a naval power[a], we must be provided with light vessels, that our troops may have a secure convoy.

But whence are these forces to be subsisted? This I shall explain, when I have first given my reasons, why I think such numbers sufficient, and why I have advised that we should serve in person. As to the numbers, Athenians! my reason is this: it is not at present in our power to provide a force able to meet him in the open field, but we must harass him by depredations: thus the war must be

[a] *As he hath a naval power.* In consequence of his engagements with the Thessalians, he commanded their ports and ships.

carried on at first. We therefore cannot think of raising a prodigious army, (for such we have neither pay nor provisions,) nor must our forces be absolutely mean. And I have proposed that citizens should join in the service, and help to man our fleet; because I am informed, that some time since the state maintained a body of auxiliaries at Corinth[a] which Polystratus commanded[b], and Iphicrates, and Chabrias, and some others; that you yourselves served with them; and that the united efforts of these auxiliary and domestic forces gained a considerable victory over the Lacedemonians. But, ever since our armies have been formed of foreigners alone, their victories have been over our allies and confederates; while our enemies have arisen to an extravagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely the slightest attention to the service of the state, sail off to fight for Artabazus[c], or any other

[a] *At* Corinth. This was in the same war which he alludes to in the beginning of the oration, (Sect. 2.) Corinth was appointed the place of general rendezvous for the Greeks who confederated against Sparta.

[b] *Which* Polystratus *commanded.* Instead of Polystratus, which is a name little known in history, Monsieur Tourreil proposes to to read Callistratus, who, according to Xenophon and Diodorus, was colleague to Iphicrates and Chabrias, in the war of Corcyra. But, as Mr. Mounteney has observed, Polystratus is again mentioned by Demosthenes, together with Iphicrates, in the oration on the immunities; so that it is probable this is the true reading.

[c] *To fight for* Artabazus. He here alludes to an affair which had happened some time before, and had occasioned great commotion. The Athenians had sent Chares at the head of a power-

person, and their general follows them: nor should we wonder at it; for he cannot command, who cannot pay his soldiers. What then do I recommend? that you should take away all pretences both from generals and from soldiers, by a regular payment of the army, and by incorporating domestic forces with the auxiliaries, to be as it were inspectors into the conduct of the commanders. For at present our manner of acting is even ridiculous. If a man should ask, "Are you at peace, Athenians?" the answer would immediately be, "By no means! "we are at war with Philip[a]. Have not we chosen

ful force to reduce Byzantium, Cos, and Chios, which had revolted from them. But this general, when he had a prospect of success in that enterprise, suffered himself to be corrupted by Artabazus, a rebellious Satrap of Asia, and assisted him against an army of seventy thousand men. Chares received a reward proportioned to the service; but this action raised the indignation of the Athenians, as he had not only deserted the cause of the republic, but also incensed the king of Persia. Demosthenes, however, here shifts the blame from Chares to his soldiers, who refused to obey him; (or rather to the people who took no care to provide for their pay.) TOUR.

[a] *We are at war with* Philip. So the orator affects to speak. Though I apprehend it does not appear from history that they were at that time *directly* at war with him. They had indeed joined with the Phocians, and Philip was at the head of the opposite confederacy. Thus far they were engaged against each other, though neither of them, as principals in the quarrel. The Athenians indeed, might have made some attempts to recover Amphipolis; they certainly made some ineffectual preparations to relieve Potidæa and Methonè: and after Philip's attempt on Thermopylæ, did station some forces upon their frontiers to oppose him, in case he renewed his attack. But still the war was not declared in form.——But of this I shall speak more hereafter.

the usual generals and officers [a], both "of horse and "foot?" And of what use are all these, except the single person whom you send to the field? the rest attend your priests in their processions. So that, as if you formed so many men of clay, you make your officers for show, and not for service. My countrymen! should not all these generals have been chosen from your own body; all these several officers from your own body, that our force might be really Athenian? and yet, for an expedition in favour of Lemnos [b], the general must be a citizen, while troops, engaged in defence of our own territories, are commanded by Menelaus [c]. I say not

[a] *The usual officers.* In the text they are mentioned particularly. Ten Taxiarchs Στρατηγοὶ or generals, and phylarchs, and two hipparchs. Each of the ten tribes chose a new general every year, and each of these (originally, when all went to the field), had the command for one day in his turn. Philip was very pleasant on this number of commanders. "I never," said he, "could "find but one general, (meaning Parmenio) but the Athenians "can get ten every year." Anciently the people, upon extraordinary occasions, chose a polemarch, to determine when the opinions of the generals were equally divided. The taxiarch commanded the infantry, the phylarch the cavalry, of his tribe. The whole body of horse was divided into two corps, each of which was commanded by a general of horse, or hipparch. TOUR.

[b] *In favour of* Lemnos. When, in the social war, the revolters invaded it with a fleet of an hundred sail. TOUR.

[c] *By* Menelaus. Monsieur Tourreil says, that this Menelaus was the brother of Philip, by another marriage. But, though Philip and his brother were not on good terms, yet it is not likely that the Athenians would have trusted one so nearly allied to their enemy. OLIVET.

this to detract from his merit, but to whomsoever this command had been entrusted, surely he should have derived it from your voices[a].

PERHAPS you are fully[b] sensible of these truths, but would rather hear me upon another point, that of the supplies, what we are to raise, and from what funds. To this I now proceed.——The sum therefore necessary for the maintenance of these forces, that the soldiers may be supplied with grain, is somewhat above ninety talents[c]. To the ten galleys, forty talents, that each vessel may have a monthly allowance of twenty minæ. To the two thousand foot, the same sum, that each soldier may receive ten drachmæ a month for corn. To the two hundred horse, for a monthly allowance of thirty drachmæ each, twelve talents. And let it not be thought a small convenience, that the soldiers are supplied with grain; for I am clearly satisfied, that if such a provision be made, the war itself will

[a] *From your voices.* The regular method of choosing all officers. However, the choice was sometimes left to the commander in chief. TOUR.

[b] *Perhaps you are fully,* &c. It is not impossible but that the people might have been struck with the freedom and candour of the orator, and given some marks of their approbation.

[c] *Ninety talents.* The Attic talent is computed by Tourreil equal to 187l. 10s.; by Prideaux, to 188l. 6s.; by Arbuthnot, to 193l. 15s. It contained sixty minæ, and each mina, one hundred drachmæ. By the computation of the orator, it appears that the provisions he recommends to be supplied were to last one year. MOUNTENEY.

supply them with every thing else, so as to complete their appointment, and this without any injury to the Greeks or allies; and I myself am ready to sail with them, and to answer for the consequence with my life, should it prove otherwise. From what funds the sum which I propose may be supplied, shall now be explained. * * * * *

[*Here the secretary of the assembly reads a scheme for raising the supplies, and proposes it to the people in form, in the name of the orator.*]

These are the supplies[a], Athenians! in our power to raise; and, when you come to give your voices,

[a] *These are the supplies,* &c. Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives us the rest of this oration as a sixth Philippic, pronounced in the Archonship of Themistocles. But it appears to me, as well as to the other interpreters, a natural conclusion of the first Philippic, and therefore I could not prevail upon myself to separate them.

TOUR.

The scholiast is of the same opinion, and flatly accuses Dionysius of a mistake. Mr. Mounteney has expressed greater deference for this critic. He supposes that this second part is not that which Dionysius quotes, but that there was another oration since lost, which began with the same words; for he observes, that the former part is plainly imperfect of itself, and the two parts are joined in all the copies and manuscripts, and that naturally and consistently.

I must confess (with all submission to these authorities) that although I could not presume to separate them, yet I am not quite satisfied that these two parts are one oration. In the first place, I cannot think that the first Philippic would end abruptly, if this second part was away: for we find, in the first part, all that the orator proposes to speak to in the beginning; and it concludes

determine upon some effectual provision[a], that you may oppose Philip, not by decrees and letters only,

(not unlike a speech in parliament) with a motion in form, for such and such subsidies to be raised, for the maintenance of such and such forces. And as to the manner in which the second part begins, supposing it a distinct oration, we cannot object to that, as Dionysius quotes an oration beginning exactly in the same manner: (see his letter to Ammæus).——It might also be observed, that in the beginning of the oration, having for some time exhorted the Athenians to change their conduct, and act with vigour, Demosthenes says expressly, that he intends to speak no more on that subject; and yet this second part is entirely taken up with it: and lastly, there are some passages in the second part which I suspect do not agree to the particular time when the first oration against Philip was pronounced: (and I imagine that some editors were sensible of this, by their placing the Olynthiac orations before this, which is called the first Philippic:) these passages I shall take notice of as they occur.

As to any similitude between the two parts, I apprehend that is no more than what runs through all these orations, and may be accounted for from the similitude of the subject, without joining them.——But if this second part be really a distinct oration, spoken after the destruction of Olynthus, (for this city was taken the year before the Archonship of Themistocles) how comes it that this event is not mentioned in it?——It had just then thrown the Athenians into the greatest consternation, and as it was the orator's business to encourage them, possibly he might have kept it out of view on purpose. Though perhaps he does hint at it obscurely, and as far as was consistent with prudence, as I shall observe by and by.

[a] *Effectual provision.* In the Greek it is——α αν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκῃ χειροτονήσατε——*choose those things which may be agreeable to you.* I own I do not see how their entering into the resolution they liked best, would of consequence enable them to oppose Philip effectually. Perhaps it might be of disservice, for in other places the orator is ever cautioning them against following the bent of their inclinations.——If we should make a very small alter-

but by actions. And, in my opinion, your plan of operation, and every thing relating to your armament, will be much more happily adjusted, if the situation of the country which is to be the scene of action be taken into the account; and if you reflect that the winds and seasons have greatly contributed to the rapidity of Philip's conquests; that he watches the blowing of the Etesians[a], and the severity of the winter, and forms his sieges when it is impossible for us to bring up our forces. It is your part then to consider this, and not to carry on the war by occasional detachments, (they will ever arrive too late) but by a regular army constantly kept up; and for winter quarters you may command Lemnos, and Thassus, and Sciathus, and the adjacent islands, in which there are ports and provisions, and all things necessary for the soldiery in abundance. As to the season of the year in which we may land our forces with the greatest ease, and be in no danger from the winds, either upon the coast to which we are bound, or at the entrance of those harbours where we may put in for provisions

ation in the text, and for ἀρέσκῃ read ἀρκέσῃ——*those things which may be sufficient for your purposes*, I apprehend the sense would be better and more agreeable to Demosthenes. I have taken the liberty to translate after this reading.

[a] *Of the* Etesians. Winds which blew regularly every year at the rising of the dog-star, when the Greeks were obliged to retire from action, on account of the excessive heats, and which, as they blew from the north, of consequence opposed any attempt of invading Macedon, or sending any forces to those parts which were the seat of Philip's wars at first.

——this will be easily discovered. In what manner and at what time our forces are to act, their general will determine, according to the junctures of affairs. What you are to perform, on your part, is contained in the decree I have now proposed. And if you will be persuaded, Athenians! first, to raise these supplies which I have recommended, then, to proceed to your other preparations, your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and, lastly, to confine your forces, by a law, to that service which is appointed to them; reserving the care and distribution of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining into the conduct of the general; then your time will be no longer wasted in continual debates upon the same subject, and scarcely to any purpose; then, you will deprive him of the most considerable of his revenues. For his arms are now supported, by seizing and making prizes of those who pass the seas.—But, is this all?—No.—You shall also be secure from his attempts: not as when some time since[a] he fell on Lemnos and Imbrus, and carried

[a] *Not as when some time since*, &c. If this be really a part of the first Philippic, these hostilities must have preceded the attempt on Thermopylæ: (else the orator could not have distinguished them into those which happened *some time ago*, and that committed lately). Now I cannot tell how to reconcile such open acts of hostility with the other parts of Philip's conduct, at that time. There was a peace subsisting between him and the Athenians, which he affected to observe, and so far does he appear from making any open and professed attack upon them, that, in the taking of Potidæa and Pydna, he would not act as principal, but as ally to the Olynthians; and, when these cities were taken, dismissed the Athenian garrisons with all imaginable respect and

away your citizens in chains: not as when he surprised your vessels at Gerestus, and spoiled them of an unspeakable quantity of riches: not as when lately he made a descent on the coast of Marathon, and carried off our sacred galley[a]: while you could neither oppose these insults, nor detach your forces at such junctures as were thought convenient.

And now, Athenians! what is the reason, (think ye) that the public Festivals[b] in honour of Minerva and of Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time, whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men of eminence, or of persons less distinguished: (festivals which cost more treasure

honour; and, upon all occasions, courted and cajoled the Athenians. This then is one of those passages, which I suspect do not agree to the particular time when the first Philippic was spoken. But if we suppose, that this, which I call the second part, is really the oration which Dionysius quotes, (and which was spoken to engage the Athenians, to defend the islanders and the cities of the Hellespont against the attempts of Philip) then all the difficulty vanishes. The hostilities here mentioned agree very well to a time of open war. Now Diodorus Siculus informs us, that it was after Olynthus was taken, that the Athenians declared war against Philip in form; and we find, that immediately upon this, he attacked them and their tributary states with such fury, that they were soon glad to sue for peace.

[a] *Our sacred galley.* There were two of these appropriated to religious ceremonies, [and all extraordinary emergencies and occasions of the state] the Paralian and the Salaminian. Harpocration understands here the Paralian. Tour.

[b] *Festivals,* &c. For the Panathenæa and Dionysia, (as these festivals are called in the original) I refer the reader to Potter, and other writers on the antiquities of Greece.

than is usually expended upon a whole navy; and more numbers and greater preparations, than any one perhaps ever cost) while your expeditions have been all too late, as that to Methonè, that to Pegasæ, that to Potidæa. The reason is this: every thing relating to the former is ascertained by law; and every one of you knows long before who is to conduct[a] the several entertainments in each tribe; what he is to receive, when, and from whom, and what to perform. Not one of these things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But in affairs of war, and warlike preparations, there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. So that, when any accident alarms us, first we appoint our Trierarchs[b]; then we allow them the EXCHANGE; then the supplies are considered. These points once set-

[a] *To conduct*, &c. In the original it is *who is the Chorægus*, (that is, the citizen who provided the music, of which each tribe had a band) *and the Gymnasiarch* (he who presided over the wrestlers, and provided what was necessary for that entertainment).

[b] *We appoint our Trierarchs.* The rich citizens who were obliged not only to command, but to equip a vessel of war, at their own expence, (either severally or jointly) for the service of the public. As this was an office of great expence, it was allowed to any one who was nominated, to point out some citizen richer than himself, and to desire he might be substituted in his place, provided he was willing to exchange fortunes with that citizen, and then to take upon him the office of Trierarch. This is what Demosthenes calls *allowing the exchange* [which in its nature must have occasioned confusion and delay].

For a fuller account of these Trierarchs, &c. I refer the reader to Potter's Archæ.

tled, we resolve to man our fleet with strangers[a] and foreigners; then find it necessary to supply their place ourselves. In the midst of these delays, what we are sailing to defend, the enemy is already master of: for the time of action we spend in preparing: and the junctures of affairs will not wait our slow and irresolute measures. These forces too, which we think may be depended on, until the new levies are raised, when put to the proof, plainly discover their insufficiency. By these means, hath he arrived to such a pitch of insolence as to send a letter to the Eubœans[b], conceived in such terms as these:

* * * *The* LETTER *is read.*

WHAT hath now been read, is for the most part true, Athenians! too true! but perhaps not very

[a] *We resolve to man our fleet with strangers,* &c. Μίσθιοις, which I translate *Strangers,* were those foreigners who were permitted to sojourn at Athens, on certain conditions.

This whole passage is an exact description of the proceedings of the Athenians in defence of Olynthus, and of the event. I had it in view, when I observed that possibly we might find some obscure allusions to that affair.

[b] *A letter to the* Eubœans, &c. This letter has not descended to us. It is probable from the context, that he expressed in it a contempt for the Athenian power, and insisted how little dependence the Eubœans could have on that state. And, if this be so, it confirms an observation, which I made before (see a note on page 5.) viz. that the Athenians had as yet given Philip no remarkable opposition in Eubœa.——The letter must have been written when Philip began to raise commotions in that island, in

agreeable in the recital. But if, by suppressing things ungrateful to the ear, the things themselves could be prevented, then the sole concern of a public speaker should be to please. If, on the contrary, these unseasonably pleasing speeches be really injurious, it is shameful, Athenians! to deceive yourselves, and, by deferring the consideration of every thing disagreeable, never once to move until it be too late; and not to apprehend that they who conduct a war with prudence, are not to follow, but to direct events; to direct them with the same absolute authority with which a general leads on his forces: that the course of affairs may be determined by them, and not determine their measures. But you, Athenians! although possessed[a] of the greatest power of all kinds, ships, infantry, cavalry, and treasure; yet, to this day, have never employed any of them seasonably, but are ever last in the field. Just as barbarians[b] engage at boxing, so you

order to make himself master of it. I am induced to think, both from history and Demosthenes, that he did not make any attempts of this kind, so early as the first Philippic, and therefore that this is no part of that oration.

[a] *Possessed of the greatest power,* &c. They could then command three hundred ships of war, and those capable of engaging a navy of double that number; they had twenty thousand foot, and two thousand eight hundred horse: and their revenue amounted to above twelve hundred talents. Tour. & Mount.

[b] *As barbarians,* &c. The learned reader will find a beautiful passage in Aulus Gellius, (l. 3. c. 27.) where, on the contrary, a man of true prudence who engages in the business and dangers of the world, is compared to a skilful boxer, who is ever attentive to defend himself and annoy his adversary. Tour.

make war with Philip: for, when one of these receives a blow, that blow engages him: if struck in another part, to that part his hands are shifted: but to ward off the blow, or to watch his antagonist—for this, he hath neither skill nor spirit. Even so, if you hear that Philip is in the Chersonesus, you resolve to send forces thither; if in Thermopylæ, thither; if in any other place, you hurry up and down, you follow his standard. But no useful scheme for carrying on the war, no wise provisions[a], are ever thought of, until you hear of some enterprise in execution, or already crowned with success. This might have formerly been pardonable, but now is the very critical moment, when it can by no means be admitted.

It seems to me, Athenians! that some divinity, who, from a regard to Athens, looks down upon our conduct with indignation, hath inspired Philip with this restless ambition. For were he to sit down in the quiet enjoyment of his conquests and acquisitions, without proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among you, who, I think, would be unmoved at those transactions[b], which have branded our state with the odious marks of

[a] *No wise provisions*, &c. I have followed the reading which Mr. Mounteney adopts, Περι των πραγματων, &c. instead of χρηματων.

[b] *At those transactions*, &c. The taking of Pydna, and Potidæa, and Amphipolis, may warrant what the orator here says. Yet I should choose to apply it to their suffering Olynthus by their misconduct to fall under the power of Philip.

infamy, cowardice, and all that is base. But as he still pursues his conquests, as he is still extending his ambitious views, possibly, he may at last call you forth, unless you have renounced the name of Athenians. To me it is astonishing that none of you looks back to the beginning[a] of this war, and considers that we engaged in it to chastise the insolence of Philip; but that now it is become a defensive war to secure us from his attempts. And that he will ever be repeating these attempts is manifest, unless some power rises to oppose him. But, if we wait in expectation of this, if we send out armaments composed of empty galleys, and those hopes with which some speaker may have flattered you; can you then think your interests well secured? shall we not embark? shall we not sail, with at least a part of our domestic force, now, since we have not hitherto? But where shall we

[a] *Looks back to the beginning*, &c. I shall trouble the reader but with one argument more, in favour of my suspicion, that this is no part of the first Philippic. The passage I now quote, I cannot think, is applicable to the transactions of the Athenians and Philip, before his attempt on Thermopylæ; when (from the time of Argæus's death) they acted against each other only indirectly; and, instead of punishing Philip, the Athenians could not even prevail upon themselves to defend those dominions which they claimed as their own. But it is a very exact description of what happened after their declaration of war against Philip, which succeeded the taking of Olynthus: for this declaration was made from a sense of the danger of Philip's growing power, a resentment of his infractions, and a resolution to reduce him: and yet they were quickly obliged to defend themselves against further attempts.

make our descent?—Let us but engage in the enterprise, and the war itself, Athenians! will show us where he is weakest. But if we sit at home, listening to the mutual invectives and accusations of our orators, we cannot expect, no, not the least success, in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city is detached, although the whole be not present, the favour of the gods and the kindness of fortune attend to fight upon our side; but when we send out a general, and an insignificant decree, and the hopes of our speakers, misfortune and disappointment must ensue. Such expeditions are to our enemies a sport, but strike our allies with deadly apprehensions. For it is not, it is not possible for any one man to perform every thing you desire. He may promise, and harangue, and accuse this or that person: but to such proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For when a general, who commanded a wretched collection of unpaid foreigners, hath been defeated; when there are persons here, who, in arraigning his conduct, dare to advance falsehoods, and when you lightly engage in any determination, just from their suggestions, what must be the consequence? How then shall these abuses be removed?—By offering yourselves, Athenians! to execute the commands of your general, to be witnesses of his conduct in the field, and his judges at your return: so as not only to hear how your affairs are transacted, but to inspect them. But, now, so shamefully are we degenerated, that each of our commanders is twice or thrice called before you to answer for his life, though not one of them

dared to hazard that life, by once engaging his enemy. No; they choose the death of robbers and pilferers, rather than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors should die by the sentence of the law. Generals should meet their fate bravely in the field.

THEN; *as to your own conduct*—Some wander about, crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedemonians, and they are concerting the destruction of Thebes, and the dissolution[a] of some free states. Others assure us he hath sent an embassy to the KING[b]; others, that he is fortifying places in Illyria[c]. Thus we all go about framing our several tales. I do believe indeed, Athenians! he is intoxicated with his greatness, and does entertain his imagination with many such visionary prospects, as he sees no power rising to oppose him, and is elated with his success. But I cannot be persuaded that he hath so taken his measures, that the weakest among us know what he is next to do, (for it is the weakest among us who spread these rumours). Let us disregard them: let us be persuaded of this, that

[a] *The dissolution*, &c. Wherever the Lacedemonians had power, they were always for establishing oligarchies, as has been observed in the preface to these orations.

[b] *To the king*, &c. So the king of Persia was called. The intent of this embassy was supposed to be to make such demands as must produce a war with the Persian, which Isocrates had exhorted him to very early.

[c] *He is fortifying places in Illyria.* Possibly these rumours were spread by Philip's friends, to persuade the Athenians that his views and schemes were removed to a great distance from Athens.

he is our enemy, that he hath spoiled us of our dominions, that we have long been subject to his insolence, that whatever we expected to be done for us by others, hath proved against us, that all the resource left is in ourselves, that, if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad, we may be forced to engage here—let us be persuaded of this, and then we shall come to a proper determination,—then shall we be freed from those idle tales. For we are not to be solicitous to know what particular events will happen; we need but be convinced nothing good can happen, unless you grant the due attention to affairs, and be ready to act as becomes Athenians.

I, ON my part, have never upon any occasion chosen to court your favour, by speaking any thing but what I was convinced would serve you. And, on this occasion, I have freely declared my sentiments, without art, and without reserve. It would have pleased me, indeed, that, as it is for your advantage to have your true interest laid before you, so I might be assured that he who layeth it before you, would share the advantage: for then I had spoken with greater alacrity. However, uncertain as is the consequence with respect to me, I yet determined to speak, because I was convinced that these measures, if pursued, must have their use. And, of all those opinions which are offered to your acceptance, may that be chosen which will best advance the general weal!

END OF THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.

THE

FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION:

PRONOUNCED

Four Years after the First Philippic,

IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF CALLIMACHUS,

THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH OLYMPIAD, AND THE TWELFTH OF PHILIP'S REIGN.

INTRODUCTION.

THE former oration doth not appear to have had any considerable effect. Philip had his creatures in the Athenian assembly, who probably recommended less vigorous measures, and were but too favourably heard. In the mean time, this prince pursued his ambitious designs. When he found himself shut out of Greece, he turned his arms to such remote parts as he might reduce, without alarming the states of Greece; and, at the same time, he revenged himself upon the Athenians, by making himself master of some places which they laid claim to. At length his success emboldened him to declare those intentions which he had long entertained secretly against the Olynthians.

Olynthus (a city of Thrace, possessed by Greeks originally from Chalcis,—a town of Eubœa, and colony of Athens) commanded a large tract called the Chalcidian region, in which there were thirty-two cities. It had arisen by degrees to such a pitch of grandeur, as to have frequent and remarkable contests both with Athens and Lacedemon. Nor did the Olynthians show great regard to the friendship of

Philip when he first came to the throne, and was taking all measures to secure the possession of it; for they did not scruple to receive two of his brothers by another marriage, who had fled to avoid the effects of his jealousy, and endeavoured to conclude an alliance with Athens against him, which he, by secret practices, found means to defeat. But as he was yet scarcely secure upon his throne, instead of expressing his resentment, he courted, or rather purchased, the alliance of the Olynthians, by the cession of Anthemus, a city which the kings of Macedon had long disputed with them; and afterwards by that of Pydna and Potidæa, which their joint forces had besieged and taken from the Athenians. But the Olynthians could not be influenced by gratitude towards such a benefactor. The rapid progress of his arms, and his glaring acts of perfidy, alarmed them exceedingly. He had already made some inroads on their territories, and now began to act against them with less reserve. They therefore dispatched ambassadors to Athens, to propose an alliance, and request assistance against a power which they were equally concerned to oppose.

Philip affected the highest resentment at this step, alledged their mutual engagements to adhere to each other in war and peace, inveighed

against their harbouring his brothers, whom he called the conspirators; and, under pretence of punishing their infractions, pursued his hostilities with double vigour, made himself master of some of their cities, and threatened the capital with a siege.

In the mean time, the Olynthians pressed the Athenians for immediate succours. Their ambassadors opened their commission in an assembly of the people, who had the right either to agree to, or to reject their demand. As the importance of the occasion increased the number of speakers, the elder orators had debated the affair before Demosthenes arose. In the following oration, therefore, he speaks as to a people already informed, urges the necessity of joining with the Olynthians, and confirms his opinion by powerful arguments; lays open the designs and practices of Philip, and labours to remove their dreadful apprehensions of his power. He concludes with recommending to them to reform abuses, to restore ancient discipline, and to put an end to all domestic dissensions.

FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION[a].

Callimacho, Archon—A. R. Philip 12—Olympiad. 107. An. 4.

In many instances, (Athenians!) have the gods, in my opinion, manifestly declared their favour to this state; nor is it least observable in this present juncture. For, that an enemy should arise against Philip, on the very confines of his kingdom, of no inconsiderable power, and, what is of most importance, so determined upon the war, that they consider any accommodation with him, first as insidious, next, as the downfall of their country; this seems no less than the gracious interposition of heaven itself. It must, therefore, be our care, (Athenians!) that we ourselves may not frustrate this goodness. For it must reflect disgrace, nay, the foulest infamy, upon us, if we appear to have thrown away not those states and territories only which we once commanded, but those alliances and favourable incidents which fortune hath provided for us.

[a] I have disposed the Olynthiac orations in the order pointed out by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. And it plainly appears that this should precede the others; for, in this, Demosthenes solicits the immediate conclusion of an alliance with Olynthus; in the others, he supposes the alliance already concluded, and insists only on the necessity of effectually fulfilling their engagements.

To begin on this occasion with a display of Philip's power, or to press you to exert your vigour, by motives drawn from hence, is, in my opinion, quite improper. And why? Because whatever may be offered on such a subject, sets him in an honourable view, but seems to me as a reproach to our conduct. For the higher his exploits have arisen above his former estimation, the more must the world admire him; while your disgrace hath been the greater, the more your conduct hath proved unworthy of your state. These things therefore I shall pass over. He indeed, who examines justly, must find the source of his greatness here, not in himself. But the services he hath here received, from those whose public administration hath been devoted to his interest; those services which you must punish, I do not think it seasonable to display. There are other points of more moment for you all to hear, and which must excite the greatest abhorrence of him, in every reasonable mind—These I shall lay before you.

And now, should I call him perjured and perfidious, and not point out the instances of this his guilt, it might be deemed the mere virulence of malice, and with justice. Nor will it engage too much of your attention to hear him fully and clearly convicted, from a full and clear detail of all his actions. And this I think useful upon two accounts: first, that he may appear, as he really is, treacherous and false; and then, that they who are struck with terror, as if Philip was something more than

human, may see that he has exhausted all those artifices to which he owes his present elevation, and that his affairs are now ready to decline. For I myself (Athenians!) should think Philip really to be dreaded and admired, if I saw him raised by honourable means. But I find, upon reflection, that at the time when certain persons drove out the Olynthians from this assembly, when desirous of conferring with you, he began with abusing our simplicity by his promise of surrendering Amphipolis, and executing the secret article[a] of his treaty, then so much spoken of: that, after this, he courted the friendship of the Olynthians by seizing Potidæa, where we were rightful sovereigns, despoiling us his former allies, and giving them possession; that, but just now, he gained the Thessalians, by promising to give up Magnesia[b]; and, for their ease, to take the whole conduct of the Phocian war upon himself. In a word, there are no people who ever

[a] *The secret article*, &c. When Philip had declared Amphipolis a free city, the Athenians, who were desirous of recovering it, sent ambassadors to Philip to solicit his assistance for that purpose; and on this condition promised to make him master of Pydna. But, lest the people of Pydna, who were averse to Philip's government, should take the alarm, the whole negociation was transacted secretly in the senate, without being referred, as usual, to the assembly of the people. This account Ulpian and Suidas cite from Theopompus.

[b] *Magnesia*. He had made himself master of this city when he marched into Thessaly against the tyrants. The Thessalians remonstrated against this proceeding, but suffered themselves to be amused by his assurances that he would give it up, while he really determined to keep possession of it. TOURREIL.

made the least use of him, but have suffered by his subtlety; his present greatness being wholly owing to his deceiving those who were unacquainted with him, and making them the instruments of his success. As these states therefore raised him, while each imagined he was promoting some interest of theirs, these states must also reduce him to his former meanness, as it now appears that his own private interest was the end of all his actions.

THUS then, Athenians! is Philip circumstanced. If not, let the man stand forth who can prove to me, I should have said to this assembly, that I have asserted these things falsely; or that they whom he hath deceived in former instances, will confide in him for the future; or that the Thessalians, who have been so basely, so undeservedly enslaved[a], would not gladly embrace their freedom.—If there be any one among you who acknowledges all this, yet thinks that Philip will support his power, as he hath secured places of strength, convenient ports, and other like advantages, he is deceived. For when forces[b] join in harmony and affection, and

[a] *Enslaved.* When Philip had dispossessed the Tyrants of Thessaly, he began to set himself up in their place, but not by open force. He was so complete a master of dissimulation, appeared so gentle, so affable, so humane, so amiable, even to the conquered, that the Thessalians gave themselves up to him, with an entire confidence, which he knew how to take the advantage of. TOURREIL.

[b] *For when forces,* &c. I need not take notice to the learned reader, how highly this passage is ornamented in the original, by

one common interest unites the confederating powers, then they share the toils with alacrity, they endure the distresses, they persevere. But when extravagant ambition, and lawless power, (as in his case) have aggrandized a single person; the first pretence, the slightest accident, overthrows him, and all his greatness is dashed at once to the ground. For it is not, no, Athenians! it is not possible to found a lasting power upon injustice, perjury, and treachery. These may perhaps succeed for once, and borrow for a while, from hope, a gay and flourishing appearance. But time betrays their weakness, and they fall into ruin of themselves. For, as in structures of every kind, the lower parts should have the greatest firmness, so the grounds and principles of actions should be just and true. But these advantages are not found in the actions of Philip.

I SAY then, that you should dispatch succours to the Olynthians: (and the more honourably and expeditiously this is proposed to be done, the more

the beauty of the metaphors, the grandeur of the composition, and the fineness of the sentiment. The word ἀνεχαιτισε, by which he expresses the downfall of Philip, I apprehend, is not to be rendered into our, or perhaps any other language. It gives us the idea of a generous steed, tossing its mane, impatient of the bit, and casting his rider to the ground; which at once expresses the subjection of the states conquered by Philip, their impatience of his government, their bold effort to regain their liberty, and the downfall of their master. The change of tenses (ἀνεχαιτισε και διελυσεν) adds greatly to the force and beauty: it seems as if the destruction of Philip was too quick for words.

agreeably to my sentiments) and send an embassy to the Thessalians, to inform some, and to enliven that spirit already raised in others; (for it hath actually been resolved to demand the restitution of Pegasæ[a], and to assert their claim to Magnesia). And let it be your care, Athenians! that our ambassadors may not depend only upon words, but give them some action to display, by taking the field in a manner worthy of the state, and engaging in the war with vigour. For words, if not accompanied by actions, must ever appear vain and contemptible, and particularly when they come from us, whose prompt abilities, and well-known eminence in speaking, make us to be always heard with the greater suspicion.

WOULD you indeed regain attention and confidence, your measures must be greatly changed, your conduct totally reformed; your fortunes, your persons, must appear devoted to the common cause; your utmost efforts must be exerted. If you will act thus, as your honour and your interest require, then, Athenians! you will not only discover the weakness and insincerity of the confederates of Philip, but the ruinous condition of his own kingdom will also be laid open. The power and sovereignty of Macedon may have some weight indeed, when joined with others. Thus, when you marched against the Olynthians under the conduct of Timo-

[a] *Pegasæ*. A city of Thessaly, which he had made himself master of five years before. TOURREIL.

theus, it proved an useful ally; when united with the Olynthians against Potidæa, it added something to their force; just now, when the Thessalians were in the midst of disorder, sedition, and confusion, it aided them against the family of their tyrants; (and in every case, any, even a small accession of strength, is, in my opinion, of considerable effect). But of itself, unsupported, it is infirm, it is totally distempered; for, by all those glaring exploits which have given him this apparent greatness, his wars, his expeditions, he hath rendered it yet weaker than it was naturally. For you are not to imagine that the inclinations of his subjects are the same with those of Philip. He thirsts for glory; this is his object, this he eagerly pursues, through toils and dangers of every kind, despising safety and life, when compared with the honour of achieving such actions as no other prince of Macedon could ever boast of. But his subjects have no part in this ambition. Harassed by those various excursions he is ever making, they groan under perpetual calamity; torn from their business and their families, and without opportunity to dispose of that pittance which their toils have earned, as all commerce is shut out from the coasts of Macedon by the war.

Hence one may perceive how his subjects in general are affected to Philip. But then his auxiliaries, and the soldiers of his phalanx[a], have the

[a] *The soldiers of his phalanx.* In the original, πεζεταιροι, *fellow-soldiers.* A term invented for the encouragement of this body, and

character of wonderful forces, trained completely to war. And yet I can affirm, upon the credit of a person from that country, incapable of falsehood, that they have no such superiority. For, as he assures me, if any man of experience in military affairs should be found among them, he dismisses all such, from an ambition of having every great action ascribed wholly to himself; (for, besides his other passions, the man hath this ambition in the highest degree). And, if any person, from a sense of decency, or other virtuous principle, betrays a dislike of his daily intemperance, and riotings, and obscenities[a], he loses all favour and regard; so that none are left about him but wretches, who subsist on rapine and flattery, and who, when heated with wine, do not scruple to descend to such instances of revelry, as it would shock you to repeat. Nor can the truth of this be doubted; for they whom we all conspired to drive from hence, as infamous and

to reconcile them to all the severities of their duty. Such kind of familiarities cost but little, and are often of considerable service to a prince. TOUR.

[a] *Obscenities.* In the original, χορδαξισμούς. Certain lascivious dances, so called from the name of a satyr, said to have invented them. Theophrastus mentions it as a part of the character of a man utterly abandoned, that, when inflamed by wine he is even capable of dancing the *Chordax.* TOUR.

In this description of the dissolute manners of Philip and his court, one would imagine that the orator had aggravated a little; yet we have the whole description still more heightened in history. The learned reader will find it in Athenæus, Book 6. TOUR.

abandoned, Callias the public servant[a], and others of the same stamp, buffoons, composers of lewd songs, in which they ridicule their companions; these are the persons whom he entertains and caresses. And these things, Athenians! trifling as they may appear to some, are to men of just discernment great indications of the weakness both of his mind and fortune. At present, his successes cast a shade over them; for prosperity hath great power to veil such baseness from observation. But let his arms meet with the least disgrace, and all his actions will be exposed. This is a truth, of which he himself, Athenians! will, in my opinion, soon convince you, if the gods favour us, and you exert your vigour. For, as in our bodies, while a man is in health, he feels no effect of any inward weakness; but, when disease attacks him, every thing becomes sensible, in the vessels, in the joints, or in whatever other part his frame may be disordered; so in states and monarchies, while they carry on a war abroad, their defects escape the general eye; but when once it approaches their own territory, then they are all detected.

If there be any one among you, who, from Philip's good fortune, concludes that he must prove a formidable enemy, such reasoning is not unworthy

[a] *The public servant.* One of those public slaves, who attended the Athenian generals in the field. They chose slaves for this business, that, if there was occasion for their evidence on any public inquiry into the conduct of the war, they might be put to the torture, from which free citizens were exempted. ULP.

a man of prudence. Fortune hath great influence, nay, the whole influence in all human affairs; but then, were I to chuse, I should prefer the fortune of Athens, (if you yourselves will assert your own cause with the least degree of vigour), to this man's fortune. For we have many better reasons to depend upon the favour of heaven than this man. But our present state is, in my opinion, a state of total inactivity, and he who will not exert his own strength, cannot apply for aid, either to his friends or to the gods. It is not then surprising, that he, who is himself ever amidst the dangers and labours of the field; who is every where; whom no opportunity escapes; to whom no season is unfavourable! should be superior to you, who are wholly engaged in contriving delays, and framing decrees, and inquiring after news. I am not surprised at this, for the contrary must have been surprising: if we, who never act, in any single instance, as becomes a state engaged in war, should conquer him, who, in every instance, acts with an indefatigable vigilance. This indeed surprises me, that you, who[a] fought the cause of Greece against Lacedemon, and generously declined all the many favourable opportunities of aggrandizing yourselves! who, to secure their property to others, parted with your own by your contributions, and bravely exposed yourselves in battle, —should now decline the service of the field, and delay the necessary supplies, when called to the defence of your own rights: that you, in whom

[a] See note on Philip. 1. page 2.

Greece in general, and each particular state, hath often found protection, should sit down quiet spectators of your own private wrongs: This, I say, surprises me; and one thing more, that not a man among you can reflect how long a time we have been at war with Philip, and in what measures this time hath all been wasted. You are not to be informed, that, in delaying, in hoping that others would assert our cause, in accusing each other, in impeaching, then again entertaining hopes in such measures as are now pursued, that time hath been entirely wasted. And are you so devoid of apprehension, as to imagine, when our state hath been reduced from greatness to wretchedness, that the very same conduct will raise us from wretchedness to greatness? No! this is not reasonable, it is not natural; for it is much easier to defend, than to acquire dominions. But now, the war hath left us nothing to defend: we must acquire. And to this work you yourselves alone are equal.

THIS, then, is my opinion. You should raise supplies; you should take the field with alacrity. Prosecutions should be all suspended until you have recovered your affairs; let each man's sentence be determined by his actions; honour those who have deserved applause; let the iniquitous meet their punishment: Let there be no pretences, no deficiencies on your part; for you cannot bring the actions of others to a severe scrutiny, unless you have first been careful of your own duty. What indeed can be the reason, think ye, that every man

whom ye have sent out at the head of an army, hath deserted your service, and sought out some private expedition, (if we must speak ingenuously of these our generals also)? The reason is this: when engaged in the service of the state, the prize for which they fight is yours. Thus, should Amphipolis be now taken, you instantly possess yourselves of it: the commanders have all the danger, the rewards they do not share. But, in their private enterprises, the dangers are less; the acquisitions are all shared by the generals and soldiers; as were Lampsacus, Sigæum[a], and those vessels which they plundered. Thus are they all determined by their private interest. And, when you turn your eyes to the wretched state of your affairs, you bring your generals to a trial; you grant them leave to speak; you hear the necessities they plead; and then acquit them. Nothing then remains for us, but to be distracted with endless contests and divisions, (some urging these; some those measures), and to feel the public calamity. For in former times, Athenians, you divided into classes[b], to raise supplies. Now, the

[a] *Lampsacus, Sigæum,* &c. Chares received these two cities of Asia Minor, from the Satrap Artabazus, in return for his service, (see note on Ph. 1. p. 7). This general, instead of employing the fleet he had been intrusted with, for the recovery of Amphipolis, according to his instructions, joined with some pirates, and committed considerable outrages in the Ægean Sea. He was accused of this at his return, but escaped, by flying from public justice, until his faction grew powerful enough to reinstate him in his former command. TOURREIL.

[b] *Classes,* &c. [Συμμορίαι.] Each of the ten tribes elected one hundred and twenty of the richer citizens, out of their own

business of these classes is to govern; each hath an orator at its head, and a general, who is his creature; the THREE HUNDRED are assistants to these, and the rest of you divide, some to this, some to that party. You must leave the power of speaking, of advising, and of acting, open to every citizen. But if you suffer some persons to issue out their mandates, as with a royal[a] authority; if one set of men be forced to fit out ships, to raise supplies, to take up arms; while others are only to make decrees against them, without any charge, any employment besides; it is not possible that any thing can be effected seasonably and successfully: for the injured party ever will desert you; and

body, who were obliged to perform the public duties, and to raise supplies for the exigencies of the state, out of their private fortunes. The twelve hundred persons, thus chosen, were divided into two parts, and each of these into ten classes, called Συμμορίαι. These were again subdivided into two parts, according to the estates of those who composed them. And thus, out of the ten first classes, were appointed the THREE HUNDRED, that is, such a number of the wealthy citizens, who were on all occasions to supply the commonwealth with money; and, with the rest of the twelve hundred, to perform all extraordinary duties in their turns. It seems, however, that, in the time of Demosthenes, these classes sought pretences to avoid their duty, and contended for the power of throwing the whole weight of public business on each other.

[a] *As with a royal*, &c. Eubulus, Aristophon, Hyperides, and Lycurgus, governed every thing with an absolute power in the assemblies; the conduct of military affairs was entirely engrossed by Diopithes, Menestheus, Leosthenes, and Chares. Thus the administration of affairs was shared among a few men as it were by lot: so that the popular government degenerated into an oligarchy. See Plutar. in Phocion.

and then your sole resource will be to make them feel your resentment instead of your enemies.

To sum up all, my sentiments are these:—That every man should contribute in proportion to his fortune; that all should take the field in their turns, until all have served; that whoever appears in this place, should be allowed to speak; and that, when you give your voices, your true interest only should determine you, not the authority of this or the other speaker. Pursue this course, and then your applause will not be lavished on some orator, the moment he concludes; you yourselves will share it hereafter, when you find how greatly you have advanced the interests of your state.

END OF THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC.

THE SECOND

OLYNTHIAC ORATION.

PRONOUNCED

IN THE SAME YEAR.

INTRODUCTION.

TO remove the impression made on the minds of the Athenians by the preceding oration, Demades and other popular leaders in the interest of Philip, rose up, and opposed the propositions of Demosthenes, with all their eloquence. Their opposition, however, proved ineffectual; for the assembly decreed, that relief should be sent to the Olynthians; and thirty galleys and two thousand forces were accordingly dispatched under the command of Chares. But these succours, consisting entirely of mercenaries, and commanded by a general of no great reputation, could not be of considerable service; and were besides suspected, and scarcely less dreaded by the Olynthians, than the Macedonians themselves. In the mean time, the progress of Philip's arms could meet with little interruption. He reduced several places in the region of Chalcis, razed the fortress of Zeira, and, having twice defeated the Olynthians in the field, at last shut them up in their city. In this emergency, they again applied to the Athenians, and pressed for fresh and effectual succours. In the following oration, Demosthenes endeavours to support

this petition, and to prove, that both the honour and the interest of the Athenians demanded their immediate compliance. As the expence of the armament was the great point of difficulty, he recommends the abrogation of such laws as prevented the proper settlement of the funds necessary for carrying on a war of such importance. The nature of these laws will come immediately to be explained.

It appears, from the beginning of this oration, that other speakers had arisen before Demosthenes, and inveighed loudly against Philip. Full of the national prejudices, or disposed to flatter the Athenians in their notions of the dignity and importance of their state, they breathed nothing but indignation against the enemy, and possibly, with some contempt of his present enterprises, proposed to the Athenians to correct his arrogance, by an invasion of his own kingdom. Demosthenes, on the contrary, insists on the necessity of self-defence; endeavours to rouse his hearers from their security, by the terror of impending danger; and affects to consider the defence of Olynthus as the last and only means of preserving the very being of Athens.

OLYNTHIAC THE SECOND.

Callimacho, Archon—A. R. Philip. 12.—Olympiad. 107. An. 4.

I AM by no means affected in the same manner, Athenians! when I review the state of our affairs, and when I attend to those speakers, who have now declared their sentiments. They insist, that we should punish Philip: but our affairs, situated as they now appear, warn us to guard against the dangers with which we ourselves are threatened. Thus far therefore I must differ from these speakers, that I apprehend they have not proposed the proper object for your attention. There was a time indeed, I know it well, when the state could have possessed her own dominions in security, and sent out her armies to inflict chastisement on Philip. I myself have seen that time, when we enjoyed such power. But, now, I am persuaded, we should confine ourselves to the protection of our allies. When this is once effected, then we may consider the punishment his outrages have merited. But, till the first great point be well secured, it is weakness to debate about our more remote concernments.

AND now, Athenians! if ever we stood in need

of mature deliberation and counsel, the present juncture calls loudly for them. To point out the course to be pursued on this emergency I do not think the greatest difficulty: but I am in doubt in what manner to propose my sentiments; for all that I have observed, and all that I have heard, convinces me, that most of your misfortunes have proceeded from a want of inclination to pursue the necessary measures, not from ignorance of them. Let me intreat you, that, if I now speak with an unusual boldness, ye may bear it: considering only whether I speak truth, and with a sincere intention to advance your future interests: for you now see that by some orators, who study but to gain your favour, our affairs have been reduced to the extremity of distress.

I THINK it necessary, in the first place, to recal some late transactions to your thoughts. You may remember, Athenians! that, about three or four years since, you received advice that Philip was in Thrace, and had laid siege to the fortress of Heræa. It was then the month of November[a]. Great commotions and debates arose: It was resolved to send out forty galleys; that all citizens under the age of five and forty[b], should themselves embark; and that

[a] *Of November.* The reducing the Attic months to the Julian hath occasioned some dispute among the learned. As I thought it best to make use of Roman names in the translation, I have followed the reduction of Scaliger.

[b] *Under the age of five and forty,* &c. This expresses their zeal, and their apprehensions of the danger: for by the laws of

sixty talents should be raised. Thus it was agreed; that year passed away; then came in the months July[a], August, September. In this last month, with great difficulty, when the mysteries had first been celebrated, you sent out Charidemus[b], with just ten vessels unmanned, and five talents of silver. For when reports came of the sickness, and the death of Philip, (both of these were affirmed) you laid aside your intended armament, imagining, that at such a juncture, there was no need of succours. And yet this was the very critical moment, for, had they been dispatched with the same alacrity with which they were granted, Philip would not have then escaped, to become that formidable enemy he now appears.

Athens a citizen was exempted from military service at the age of forty, except on some very urgent occasions.

[a] *July*, &c. That is, the first months of the next year; for the reader is to observe, that the Attic year commenced on that new-moon, whose full-moon immediately succeeded the summer-solstice.

[b] *Charidemus*. That is, the worst of all your generals: a foreigner, a soldier of fortune, who had sometimes fought against you, sometimes betrayed your cause, and who, on many occasions, had proved himself unworthy of the confidence you reposed in him.—Monsieur Tourreil translates this passage thus: "Ce "fut en ce dernier mois qu' IMMEDIATEMENT après la célébration "des mysteres, vous DEPECHATES d'ici Charidème," &c. Here there are two unfortunate words, which express haste and expedition: whereas the description, in the original, labours on in the slowest and heaviest manner possible. Every single word marks out the tediousness or the meanness of their armament.

But what was then done cannot be amended. Now we have the opportunity of another war; that war I mean which hath induced me to bring these transactions into view, that you may not once more fall into the same errors. How then shall we improve this opportunity? *This is the only question.* For, if you are not resolved to assist with all the force you can command, you are really serving under Philip, you are fighting on his side. The Olynthians are a people whose power was thought considerable. Thus were the circumstances of affairs: Philip could not confide in them; they looked with equal suspicion upon Philip. We and they then entered into mutual engagements of peace and alliance: this was a grievous embarrassment to Philip, that we should have a powerful state confederated with us, spies upon the incidents of his fortune. It was agreed that we should by all means engage this people in a war with him. And now, what we all so earnestly desired is effected: the manner is of no moment. What then remains for us, Athenians! but to send immediate and effectual succours, I cannot see. For besides the disgrace that must attend us, if any of our interests are supinely disregarded, I have no small apprehensions of the consequence, (the Thebans[a] affected

[a] *The Thebans*, &c. They had a mortal hatred to the Athenians, as they had favoured Lacedemon after the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, and had lately taken part with the Phocians against them in the sacred war. [And even before these times, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans strenuously contended for the utter extirpation of Athens.] Tour.

as they are towards us, and the Phocians exhausted of their treasures) if Philip be left at full liberty to lead his armies into these territories, when his present enterprises are accomplished. If any one among you can be so far immersed in indolence, as to suffer this, he must choose to be witness of the misery of his own country, rather than to hear of that which strangers suffer; and to seek assistance for himself, when it is now in his power to grant assistance to others. That this must be the consequence, if we do not exert ourselves on the present occasion, there can scarcely remain the least doubt among us.

But as to the necessity of sending succours, this it may be said, we are agreed in; this is our resolution. But how shall we be enabled? that is the point to be explained.—Be not surprised, Athenians! if my sentiments on this occasion seem repugnant to the general sense of this assembly. —— Appoint magistrates[a] for the inspection of your laws: not in order to enact any new laws; you have already a sufficient number; but to repeal

[a] *Magistrates for*, &c. In the original Νομοθετας. So were those citizens called, who were entrusted by the people with the regulation of their laws. They were chosen by lot, to the number of 1001, that their votes might not be equal. Every citizen, at certain times, and in certain assemblies, had usually a right to complain of any law. The president of the assembly proposed the complaint to the people: five advocates were allowed to plead in defence of the law, and, after hearing them, the people referred the affair to the Nomothetæ.

those whose ill effects you now experience. I mean the laws relating to the theatrical funds[a] (thus openly I declare it) and some about the soldiery[b]. By the first, the soldier's pay goes as theatrical expences to the useless and inactive; the others screen those from justice who decline the service of the field, and thus damp the ardour of those

[a] *The theatrical funds*, &c. The Athenians, as well as the other Greeks, were ever passionately fond of the entertainments of the theatre. Disputes for places soon became remarkably inconvenient, and called for a regulation. The magistrates therefore ordered that a small price should be paid for places, to reimburse the builders of the theatre, which as yet knew not that magnificence which riches and luxury afterwards introduced. This purchasing of places began to be complained of by the poorer citizens; and therefore Pericles, out of a pretended zeal for their interest, proposed, that a sum of money (which had been deposited in the treasury, after the war of Egina, when they had made a thirty years peace with Lacedemon, and was intended as a public resource in case of any invasion of Attica) should be distributed among the citizens, to defray the expence of their entertainments in time of peace only. The proposal and the restriction were both agreed to. But as all indulgences of this kind degenerate, sooner or later, into licentiousness, the people began to consider this distribution as their unalienable property. And, the very year of the Olynthiac orations, Eubulus, a popular leader of a party opposite to Demosthenes, prevailed to have a law passed, which forbad any man, upon pain of death, to make a motion, or proposal of a decree, for restoring what was now called the theatrical funds to the military, or any other public service. This is the law which Demosthenes here attacks.

[b] *about the soldiery*. The laws of Solon exacted personal service from every citizen with the utmost rigour. Those which the orator complains of must have been made when the state began to be corrupted.

disposed to serve us. When you have repealed these, and rendered it consistent with safety to advise you justly, then seek for some person to propose that decree[a] which you all are sensible the common good requires. But, till this be done, expect not that any man will urge your true interest, when, for urging your true interest, you repay him with destruction. Ye will never find such zeal, especially since the consequence can be only this; he who offers his opinion, and moves for your concurrence, suffers some unmerited calamity; but your affairs are not in the least advanced: nay, this additional inconvenience must arise, that for the future it will appear more dangerous to advise you than even at present; and the authors of these laws should also be the authors of their repeal. For it is not just that the public favour should be bestowed on them, who, in framing these laws, have greatly injured the community, and that the odium should fall on him whose free-

[a] *That decree, which,* &c. A decree for the alienation of the theatrical funds. While Eubulus's law was in force, such a decree could not be proposed. The usefulness and necessity of it, however, the orator ventures to insinuate; for the penalty was not understood as extending to a man's barely declaring his sentiments, provided he did not make the motion in form. In the latter part of this oration, he seems to propose another method of avoiding the ill consequences of the law of Eubulus: and that is, that the theatrical distributions should be still continued; but that all those who were in public offices, and who usually received their several salaries and appointments, should now serve the state without fee or reward. The name only of these distributions would have then remained.

dom and sincerity are of important service to us all.——Until these regulations be made, you are not to think any man so great, that he may violate these laws with impunity, or so devoid of reason, as to plunge himself into open and foreseen destruction.

And be not ignorant of this, Athenians! that a decree is of no signification, unless attended with resolution and alacrity to execute it. For were decrees of themselves sufficient to engage you to perform your duty; could they even execute the things which they enact, so many would not have been made to so little, or rather to no good purpose; nor would the insolence of Philip have had so long a date. For, if decrees can punish, he hath long since felt all their fury. But they have no such power: for though proposing and resolving be first in order; yet, in force and efficacy, action is superior. Let this then be your principal concern, the others you cannot want; for you have men among you capable of advising, and you are of all people most acute in apprehending: now, let your interest direct you, and it will be in your power to be as remarkable for acting. What season indeed, what opportunity do you wait for, more favourable than the present? or when will you exert your vigour, if not now, my countrymen? Hath not this man seized all those places that were ours? should he become master of this country* too, must

* *Of this country,* &c. That is, the country of Chalcis, where

we not sink into the lowest state of infamy? are not they whom we have promised to assist, whenever they are engaged in war, now attacked themselves? Is he not our enemy? is he not in possession of our dominions? is he not a barbarian[a]? is he not every base thing words can express? If we are insensible to all this, if we almost aid his designs; Heavens! can we then ask to whom the consequences are owing? Yes, I know full well, we never will impute them to ourselves. Just as in the dangers of the field: not one of those who fly will accuse himself; he will rather blame the general, or his fellow-soldiers: yet every single[b] man that fled was accessary to the defeat: he who blames others might have maintained his own post;

Philip took two and thirty cities, before he laid siege to Olynthus. TOUR.

[a] *A barbarian?* This was the term of reproach, which the Greeks applied to all other nations: nor were the Macedonians excepted. In the time of Xerxes, Alexander, King of Macedon, could not be admitted into the Olympic games, until he had proved his descent to be originally from Argos. And when he came over from the Persian camp, to give the Greeks notice of the motions of Mardonius, he justified his perfidy by his ancient descent from Greece: which he needed not to have had recourse to, if Macedon had not been then considered as a part of the barbarian world. TOUR.

[b] *Yet every single,* &c. The orator did not foresee, that, in ten years after, he himself would be guilty of this very crime; be branded with the name of infamy, for casting away his shield at the battle of Chæronea, and have nothing to oppose to the reproaches of his enemies, but a weak and trifling pleasantry. TOUR.

and, had every man maintained his, success must have ensued. Thus then, in the present case, is there a man whose counsel seems liable to objection? let the next rise, and not inveigh against him, but declare his own opinion. Doth another offer some more salutary counsel? pursue it, in the name of Heaven!——"But then it is not "pleasing."——This is not the fault of the speaker, unless[a] in that he hath neglected to express his affection in prayers and wishes. To pray is easy, Athenians! and in one petition may be collected as many instances of good fortune as we please. To determine justly, when affairs are to be considered, is not so easy. But what is most useful, should

[a] *Unless in that he hath*, &c. This passage, which is translated pretty exactly from the original, seems, at first view, to have something of a forced and unnatural air. Indeed it is not possible for us to perceive fully and clearly the strength and propriety of every part of these orations. To this it would be requisite to know the temper and disposition of the hearers, at that particular time when each of them was delivered; and also to have before us every thing said by other speakers in the debate. In many places we find very plain allusions to the speeches of other orators. And it is not unreasonable to think, that there are other more obscure ones which escape our observation. If we suppose, for instance, that, in the present debate, before Demosthenes arose, some other speaker had amused the people with flattering hopes, with professions of zeal and affection, with passionate exclamations, and prayers to the gods for such and such instances of public success; while at the same time he neglected to point out such measures as were fit to be pursued, or perhaps recommended pernicious measures.——Upon such a supposition, I say, this passage, considered as an indirect reproof of such a speaker, will perhaps appear to have sufficient force and propriety.

ever be preferred to that which is agreeable, where both cannot be obtained.

But if there be a man who will leave us the theatrical funds, and propose other subsidies for the service of the war, are we not rather to attend to him? I grant it, Athenians! if that man can be found. But I should account it wonderful, if it ever did, if it ever can happen to any man on earth, that, while he lavishes his present possessions on unnecessary occasions, some future funds should be procured, to supply his real necessities. But such proposals find a powerful advocate in the breast of every hearer. So that nothing is so easy as to deceive one's self: for what we wish, that we readily believe: but such expectations are oftentimes inconsistent with our affairs. On this occasion therefore, let your affairs direct you; then will you be enabled to take the field; then will you have your full pay. And men, whose judgments are well directed, and whose souls are great, could not support the infamy which must attend them, if obliged to desert any of the operations of a war, from the want of money: they could not, after snatching up their arms and marching against the Corinthians*

* *The Corinthians.* This alludes to an expedition that the Athenians had made about an age before. Some time after the Persian war, when the Greeks began to quarrel among themselves, Corinth and Megara had some dispute about their boundaries. The better to support their quarrel, the Megareans quitted the Lacedemonians, and entered into an alliance with Athens. But, as this state was then engaged both in Egypt and

and Megareans[a], suffer Philip to enslave the states of Greece, through the want of provisions for their forces.—I say not this wantonly, to raise the resentment of some among you. No; I am not so unhappily perverse, as to study to be hated, when no good purpose can be answered by it: but it is my opinion, that every honest speaker should prefer the interest of the state to the favour of his hearers. This (I am assured, and perhaps you need not be informed) was the principle which actuated the public conduct of those of our ancestors who spoke in this assembly: (men, whom the present set of orators are ever ready to applaud, but whose example they by no means imitate:) such were Aristides, Nicias, the former Demosthenes, and Pericles. But since we have had speakers, who,

Egina, the Corinthians imagined they would not be able to give any assistance; and therefore invaded the territories of Megara. But the Athenians came immediately to the assistance of their allies, although they were obliged to commit the defence of their city to their old men and boys: and the Corinthians were repulsed. TOUR.

[a] *The Megareans.* This war happend twelve years after that mentioned in the preceding note. The Megareans, after having put an Athenian garrison to the sword, that was stationed in their territory, joined with Lacedemon, and even with Corinth their mortal enemy, against whom the Athenians had espoused their quarrel. This state, incensed at the ingratitude of their revolt, determined to reduce them to reason. They issued out a mandate, directing the Megareans to abstain from cultivating a piece of ground consecrated to Ceres and Proserpine; and, on their refusing to comply, published an edict, to exclude them from all commerce in Attica; and bound their generals by an oath to invade their territories once every year. TOUR.

before their public appearance, ask you: "What "do you desire? what shall I propose? how can "I oblige you?" the interest of our country hath been sacrificed to momentary pleasure and popular favour. Thus have we been distressed; thus have these men risen to greatness, and you sunk into disgrace.

And here let me intreat your attention to a summary account of the conduct of your ancestors, and of your own. I shall mention but a few things, and these well known; for, if you would pursue the way to happiness, you need not look abroad for leaders; our own countrymen point it out. These our ancestors, therefore, whom the orators never courted, never treated with that indulgence with which you are flattered, held the sovereignty of Greece, with general consent, five and forty years[a]; deposited above ten thousand talents in our public treasury; kept the king of this country in-

[a] *Five and forty years.* In Wolfius's edition it is 65. But this reading is found in other copies, and is confirmed by the parallel passage in the oration on regulating the commonwealth. The orator computes from the death of Pausanias, when the supreme command was given to the Athenians, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Add to this the 27 years of that war, during which time the Athenians maintained their power, though not with consent; and the whole will be 72 years complete, and part of the 73d year. Agreeably to this last calculation, Demosthenes says, in the third Philippic, that the Athenians commanded in Greece 73 years. These two accounts are thus easily reconciled, by distinguishing the times of the voluntary and the involuntary obedience of the Greeks. Tour.

that subjection, which a barbarian owes to Greeks; erected monuments of many and illustrious actions, which they themselves achieved, by land and sea; in a word, are the only persons who have transmitted to posterity such glory as is superior to envy,——Thus great do they appear in the affairs of Greece.——Let us now view them within the city, both in their public and private conduct. And, first, the edifices which their administrations have given us, their decorations of our temples, and the offerings deposited by them, are so numerous and so magnificent, that all the efforts of posterity cannot exceed them. Then, in private life, so exemplary was their moderation, their adherence to the ancient manners so scrupulously exact, that if any of you ever discovered the house of Aristides, or Miltiades, or any of the illustrious men of those times, he must know that it was not distinguished by the least extraordinary splendour. For they did not so conduct the public business as to aggrandize themselves; their sole great object was to exalt the state. And thus, by their faithful attachment to Greece, by their piety to the gods, and by that equality which they maintained among themselves, they were raised (and no wonder) to the summit of prosperity.

Such was the state of Athens at that time, when the men I have mentioned were in power. But what is your condition, under these indulgent ministers who now direct us? Is it the same, or nearly

the same?—Other things I shall pass over, though I might expatiate on them. Let it only be observed, that we are now, as you all see, left without competitors; the Lacedemonians lost[a]; the Thebans engaged[b] at home; and not one of all the other states of consequence sufficient to dispute the sovereignty with us. Yet at a time, when we might have enjoyed our own dominions in security, and been the umpires in all disputes abroad, our territories have been wrested from us; we have expended above one thousand five hundred talents to no purpose; the allies[c] which we gained in war have been lost in time of peace; and to this degree of power have we raised an enemy against ourselves. (For let the man stand forth, who can show whence Philip hath derived his greatness, if not from us.)

"WELL! if these affairs have but an unfavourable aspect, yet those within the city are much more flourishing than ever."——Where are the

[a] *The Lacedemonians lost.* The battles of Leuctra and Mantinea had entirely destroyed their power. TOUR.

[b] *Engaged,* &c. In the Phocian war.

[c] *The allies,* &c. Ulpian and Wolfius understand this of the peace, by which the Athenians consented that the people of Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, and other revolters, should all continue free. But it seems more natural to apply it to some prior events; as the taking of Pydna and Potidæa, and other cities of Thrace, that were then subject to Athens, and which Philip made himself master of, after he had concluded a peace with the Athenians, in the second year of his reign. TOUR.

proofs of this? The walls which have been whitened?—the ways we have repaired?—the supplies of water; and such trifles?——Turn your eyes to the men, of whose administrations these are the fruits. Some of whom, from the lowest state of poverty, have arisen suddenly to affluence; some from meanness to renown: others have made their own private houses much more magnificent than the public edifices. Just as the state hath fallen, their private fortunes have been raised.

And what cause can we assign for this? How is it that our affairs were once so flourishing, and now in such disorder? Because, formerly, the people dared to take up arms themselves; were themselves masters of those in employment; disposers themselves of all emoluments: so that every citizen thought himself happy to derive honours and authority, and all advantages whatever, from the people. But now, on the contrary, favours are all dispensed, affairs all transacted, by the ministers; while you, quite enervated, robbed of your riches, your allies, stand in the mean rank of servants and assistants: happy if these men grant you the theatrical appointments, and send you scraps of the public meal[a]. And, what is of all most sordid, you hold yourselves obliged to them for that which is your own: while they confine you within these

[a] *Of the public meal.* Demetrius Phalereus records a saying of Demades, in ridicule of the custom of distributing victuals to the people. "The state (said he) is now become a feeble old wo-"man, that sits at home in her slippers, and sups up her ptisan."

walls, lead you on gently to their purposes, and soothe and tame you to obedience. Nor is it possible, that they, who are engaged in low and groveling pursuits, can entertain great and generous sentiments. No! Such as their employments are, so must their dispositions prove.—And now, I call Heaven to witness, that it will not surprise me, if I suffer more, by mentioning this your condition, than they who have involved you in it! Freedom of speech you do not allow on all occasions; and that you have now admitted it, excites my wonder.

But, if you will at length be prevailed on to change your conduct; if you will take the field, and act worthy of Athenians; if these redundant sums which you receive at home be applied to the advancement of your affairs abroad; perhaps, my countrymen! perhaps some instance of consummate good fortune may attend you, and ye may become so happy as to despise those pittances, which are like the morsels that a physician allows his patient. For these do not restore his vigour but just keep him from dying. So, your distributions cannot serve any valuable purpose, but are just sufficient to divert your attention from all other things, and thus increase the indolence of every one among you.

But I shall be asked, "What then! is it your "opinion, that these sums should pay our army?" ——And besides this, that the state should be regulated in such a manner, that every one may have

his share of public business, and approve himself an useful citizen, on what occasion soever his aid may be required. Is it in his power to live in peace? He will live here with greater dignity, while these supplies prevent him from being tempted by indigence to any thing dishonourable. Is he called forth by an emergency like the present? Let him discharge that sacred duty which he owes to his country, by applying these sums to his support in the field. Is there a man among you past the age of service? Let him, by inspecting and conducting the public business, regularly merit his share of the distributions which he now receives, without any duty enjoined, or any return made to the community. And thus, with scarcely any alteration, either of abolishing or innovating, all irregularities are removed, and the state completely settled, by appointing one general regulation, which shall entitle our citizens to receive, and at the same time oblige them to take arms, to administer justice, to act in all cases as their time of life and our affairs require. But it never hath, nor could it have been moved by me, that the rewards of the diligent and active should be bestowed on the useless citizen; or that you should sit here, supine, languid, and irresolute, listening to the exploits of some general's foreign troops, (for thus it is at present)—— Not that I would reflect on him who serves you in any instance. But you yourselves, Athenians! should perform those services for which you heap honours upon others, and not recede from that illustrious rank of virtue, the price of all the glo-

rious toils of your ancestors, and by them bequeathed to you.

THUS have I laid before you the chief points in which I think you interested. It is your part to embrace that opinion which the welfare of the state in general, and that of every single member, recommends to your acceptance.

END OF THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC.

THE THIRD

OLYNTHIAC ORATION.

PRONOUNCED

IN THE SAME YEAR.

INTRODUCTION.

THE preceding oration had no further effect upon the Athenians, than to prevail on them to send orders to Charidemus, who commanded for them at the Hellespont, to make an attempt to relieve Olynthus. He accordingly led some forces into Chalcis, which, in conjunction with the forces of Olynthus, ravaged Pallene, a peninsula of Macedon, towards Thrace, and Bottia, a country on the confines of Chalcis, which, among other towns, contained Pella, the capital of Macedon.

But these attempts could not divert Philip from his resolution of reducing Olynthus, which he had now publicly avowed. The Olynthians, therefore, found it necessary to have once more recourse to Athens; and to request, that they would send troops, composed of citizens, animated with a sincere ardor for their interest, their own glory, and the common cause.

Demosthenes, in the following oration, insists on the importance of saving Olynthus; alarms his hearers with the apprehension of a

war, which actually threatened Attica, and even the capital; urges the necessity of personal service; and returns to his charge of the misapplication of the public money, but in such a manner as sheweth, that his former remonstrances had not the desired effect.

OLYNTHIAC THE THIRD.

Callimacho, Archon—A. R. Philip. 12.—Olympiad. 107. An. 4.

I AM persuaded, Athenians! that you would account it less valuable to possess the greatest riches[a], than to have the true interest of the state, on this emergency, clearly laid before you. It is your part therefore, readily and cheerfully to attend to all who are disposed to offer their opinions. For your regards need not be confined to those whose counsels are the effect of premeditation[b]: it is your good fortune to have men among you, who can at once suggest many points of moment. From opinions, therefore, of every kind, you may easily choose that most conducive to your interest.

[a] *The greatest riches.* Ulpian finds out a particular propriety in this exordium. He observes, that, as the orator intends to recommend to them to give up their theatrical appointments, he prepares them for it by this observation; and, while he is endeavouring to persuade them to a just disregard of money, appears as if he only spoke their sentiments.

[b] *Premeditation.* Monsieur Tourreil admires the greatness of mind of Demosthenes, who, though he gloried in the pains and labour his orations cost him, was yet superior to that low and malignant passion, which oftentimes prompts us to decry those talents which we do not possess. I suspect, however, that this passage was occasioned by some particular circumstance in the debate. Perhaps some speaker who opposed Demosthenes, might

And now, Athenians! the present juncture calls upon us: we almost hear its voice, declaring loudly that you yourselves must engage in these affairs, if you have the least attention to your own security. You entertain I know not what sentiments on this occasion: my opinion is, that the reinforcements should be instantly decreed; that they should be raised with all possible expedition; that so our succours may be sent from this city, and all former inconveniencies be avoided; and that you should send ambassadors to notify these things, and to secure our interests by their presence. For, as he is a man of consummate policy, complete in the art of turning every incident to his own advantage, there is the utmost reason to fear, that, partly by concessions, where they may be seasonable, partly by menaces, (and his menaces[a] may be believed,) and partly by rendering us and our absence suspected; —he may tear from us something of the last importance, and force it into his own service.

Those very circumstances, however, which contribute to the power of Philip, are happily the most favourable to us. For that uncontrolled command with which he governs all transactions, public and secret; his entire direction of his army, as their leader, their sovereign, and their treasurer; and his

have urged his opinion somewhat dogmatically, as the result of mature reflection and deliberation.

[a] *His menaces may*, &c. Although his *promises* could by no means be relied on.

diligence, in giving life to every part of it, by his presence; these things greatly contribute to carrying on a war with expedition and success, but are powerful obstacles to that accommodation which he would gladly make with the Olynthians. For the Olynthians see plainly that they do not now fight for glory, or for part of their territory, but to defend their state from dissolution and slavery. They know how he rewarded those traitors of Amphipolis, who made him master of that city, and those of Pydna, who opened their gates to him. In a word, free states, I think, must ever look with suspicion on an absolute monarchy, but a neighbouring monarchy must double their apprehensions.

Convinced of what hath now been offered, and possessed with every other just and worthy sentiment, you must be resolved, Athenians! you must exert your spirit, you must apply to the war, now, if ever; your fortunes, your persons, your whole powers, are now demanded. There is no excuse, no pretence left, for declining the performance of your duty. For that which you were all ever urging loudly, that the Olynthians should be engaged in a war with Philip, hath now happened of itself; and this in a manner most agreeable to our interest. For, if they had entered into this war at our persuasion, they must have been precarious allies, without steadiness or resolution; but as their private injuries have made them enemies to Philip, it is probable that enmity will be lasting, both on account of what they fear, and what they have already

suffered. My countrymen! let not so favourable an opportunity escape you: do not repeat that error which hath been so often fatal to you. For when, at our return from assisting the Eubœans[a], Hierax and Stratocles, citizens of Amphipolis, mounted this gallery[b], and pressed you to send out your navy, and to take their city under your protection, had we discovered that resolution in our own cause, which we exerted for the safety of Eubœa, then had Amphipolis been yours, and all those difficulties had been avoided, in which you have been since involved. Again, when we received advice of the sieges of Pydna, Potidæa, Methone, Pegasæ, and other places, (for I would not detain you with a particular recital) had we ourselves marched with a due spirit and alacrity to the relief of the first of these cities, we should now find much more compliance, much more humility in Philip. But by still neglecting the present, and imagining our future interests will not demand our care, we have aggrandized our enemy, we have raised him to a degree of eminence greater than any king of Macedon hath ever yet enjoyed.—Now we have another opportunity. That which the Olynthians, of them-

[a] *The Eubœans.* This refers to the expedition in favour of the Eubœans against the Thebans, which is mentioned in the note on Phil. 1. page 10. The Athenians prepared for this expedition in three days, according to Demosthenes; in five, according to Æschines. And their success was as sudden as their preparation.

[b] *This gallery*, in the original τουτο τὸ BHMA. That eminence where all the public speakers were placed, and from whence the people were addressed on all occasions.

selves, present to the state: one no less considerable than any of the former.

And, in my opinion, Athenians! if a man were to bring the dealings of the gods towards us to a fair account, though many things might appear not quite agreeable to our wishes, yet he would acknowledge that we had been highly favoured by them; and with great reason: for that many places had been lost in the course of war is truly to be charged to our own weak conduct. But that the difficulties arisen from hence have not long affected us, and that an alliance now presents itself to remove them, if we are disposed to make the just use of it; this I cannot but ascribe to the divine goodness. But the same thing happens in this case as in the use of riches. If a man be careful to save those he hath acquired, he readily acknowledges the kindness of fortune; but if by his imprudence they be once lost, with them he also loses the sense of gratitude. So in political affairs, they who neglect to improve their opportunities, forget the favours which the gods have bestowed; for it is the ultimate event which generally determines men's judgment of every thing precedent. And therefore all affairs hereafter should engage your strictest care, that, by correcting our errors, we may wipe off the inglorious stain of past actions. But should we be deaf to these men too, and should he be suffered to subvert Olynthus, say, what can prevent him from marching his forces into whatever territory he pleases?

Is there not a man among you, Athenians! who reflects by what steps Philip, from a beginning so inconsiderable, hath mounted to this height of power? First, he took Amphipolis: then he became master of Pydna; then Potidæa fell; then Methone: then came his inroad into Thessaly: after this, having disposed affairs at Pheræ, at Pegasæ, at Magnesia, entirely as he pleased, he marched into Thrace[a]. Here, while engaged in expelling some, and establishing other princes, he fell sick. Again, recovering, he never turned a moment from his course to ease or indulgence, but instantly attacked the Olynthians. His expeditions against the Illyrians, the Pæonians, against Arym-

[a] *Into Thrace. Here, while engaged,* &c. Thrace was inhabited by an infinite number of different people, whose names Herodotus hath transmitted. And he observes, that could they have united under a single chief, or connected themselves by interest or sentiment, they would have formed a body infinitely superior to all their neighbours. After Teres, the Thracians had divers kings. This prince had two sons, Sitalces and Sparadocus, among whose descendants various contests arose, till after a series of usurpations and revolutions, Seuthes recovered part of the territory of his father Mæsades, and transmitted the succession peaceably to Cotis the father of Cersobleptes (as Demosthenes says, not his brother, as Diodorus). At the death of Cotis the divisions recommenced, and in the place of one king, Thrace had three, Cersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus; Cersobleptes dispossessed the other two, and was himself dethroned by Philip. Frontinus reports, that Alexander, when he had conquered Thrace, brought the princes of that country with him in his expedition into Asia, to prevent their raising any commotions in his absence. A proof that Philip and Alexander had established several petty kings in Thrace, who were vassals to Macedon.

TOURREIL.

bas[a], I pass all over.——But I may be asked, why this recital now?——That you may know and see your own error, in ever neglecting some part of your affairs, as if beneath your regard: and that active spirit with which Philip pursueth his designs: which ever fires him: and which never can permit him to rest satisfied with those things he hath already accomplished. If then he determines firmly and invariably to pursue his conquests; and if we are obstinately resolved against every vigorous and effectual measure; think, what consequences may we expect! In the name of Heaven, can any man be so weak, as not to know, that by neglecting this war, we are transferring it from that country to our own? And should this happen, I fear, Athenians! that as they who inconsiderately borrow money upon high interest, after a short-lived affluence are deprived of their own fortunes; so we, by this continued indolence, by consulting only our ease and pleasure, may be reduced to the grievous necessity of engaging in affairs the most shocking and disagreeable, and of exposing ourselves in the defence of this our native territory.

[a] *Arymbas.* He was the son of Alcetas, king of Epirus, and brother to Neoptolemus, whose daughter Olympias Philip married. About three years before the date of this oration, the death of their father produced a dispute between the brothers about the succession: Arymbas was the lawful heir: yet Philip obliged him, by force of arms, to divide the kingdom with Neoptolemus: and not contented with this, at the death of Arymbas, he found means, by his intrigues and menaces, to prevail on the Epirots to banish his son, and to constitute Alexander the son of Neoptolemus sole monarch. TOURREIL.

To censure, some one may tell me, is easy, and in the power of every man: but the true counsellor should point out that conduct which the present exigence demands.—Sensible as I am, Athenians! that, when your expectations have in any instance been disappointed, your resentment frequently falls not on those who merit it, but on him who hath spoken last; yet I cannot, from a regard to my own safety, suppress what I deem of moment to lay before you. I say, then, this occasion calls for a twofold armament. First, we are to defend the cities of the Olynthians; and for this purpose to detach a body of forces: in the next place, in order to infest his kingdom, we are to send out our navy manned with other levies. If you neglect either of these, I fear your expedition will be fruitless. For, if you content yourselves with infesting his dominions, this he will endure, until he is master of Olynthus; and then he can with ease repel the invasion: or, if you only send succours to the Olynthians, when he sees his own kingdom free from danger, he will apply with constancy and vigilance to the war, and at length weary out the besieged to a submission. Your levies therefore must be considerable enough to serve both purposes.——These are my sentiments with respect to our armament.

And now as to the expence of these preparations. You are already provided for the payment of your forces better than any other people. This provision is distributed among yourselves in the manner most agreeable; but if you restore it to the army, the sup-

plies will be complete without any addition; if not an addition will be necessary; or the whole, rather, will remain to be raised. "How then! (I may be "asked) do you move for a decree to apply those "funds to the military service?" By no means! it is my opinion indeed, that an army must be raised; that this money really belongs to the army; and that the same regulation which entitles our citizens to receive, should oblige them also to act. At present you expend the sums on entertainments, without regard to your affairs. It remains, then, that a general contribution be raised: a great one, if a great one be required: a small one, if such may be sufficient. Money must be found: without it nothing can be effected: various schemes are proposed by various persons: do you make that choice which you think most advantageous; and, while you have an opportunity, exert yourselves in the care of your interests.

IT is worthy[a] your attention to consider how the

[a] *It is worthy*, &c. Hitherto the orator has painted Philip in all his terrors. He is politic, and vigilant, and intrepid; he has risen gradually to the highest pitch of power; and is now ready to appear before the walls of Athens, if he is not instantly opposed: but, lest this description should dispirit the Athenians, he is now represented in a quite different manner. His power is by no means real and solid; his allies are prepared to revolt, his kingdom is threatened with war and desolation, and he is just ready to be crushed by the very first effort that is made to distress him: but as it was necessary that the danger to which they were exposed, should make the deepest impression upon the minds of his hearers, he returns to his former description, and concludes with

affairs of Philip are at this time circumstanced. For they are by no means so well disposed, so very flourishing, as an inattentive observer would pronounce. Nor would he have engaged in this war at all, had he thought he should have been obliged to maintain it. He hoped that, the moment he appeared, all things would fall before him. But these hopes were vain. And this disappointment, in the first place, troubles and dispirits him. Then the Thessalians alarm him; a people remarkable for their perfidy[b] on all occasions, and to all persons. And just as they have ever proved, even so he finds them now. For they have resolved in council to demand the restitution of Pegasæ, and have opposed his attempt to fortify Magnesia: and I am informed that for the future he is to be excluded from their ports and markets, as these conveniences belong to the states of Thessaly, and are not to be intercepted by Philip. And, should he be deprived of such a fund of wealth, he must be greatly straitened to support his foreign troops. Besides this, we

the dreadful image of a formidable enemy, ravaging their territory, and shutting them up within their walls.

[b] *Their perfidy.* This people had a bad character from the earliest times, so as to become even proverbial; and Greece, and Athens particularly had experienced their want of faith on very important occasions. They invited Xerxes into Greece, and were not ashamed to join Mardonius after the battle of Salamis, and to serve him as guides in his invasion of Attica; and in the heat of a battle between Athens and Sparta, they on a sudden deserted their allies, the Athenians, and joined the enemy. See Thucyd. Book I. TOURREIL.

must suppose that the Pæonians and the Illyrians, and all the others, would prefer freedom and independence to a state of slavery. They are not accustomed to subjection, and the insolence of this man, it is said, knows no bounds; nor is this improbable; for great and unexpected success is apt to hurry weak minds into extravagancies. Hence it often proves much more difficult to maintain acquisitions, than to acquire. It is your part, therefore, to regard the time of his distress as your most favourable opportunity: improve it to the utmost; send out your embassies; take the field yourselves, and excite a general ardor abroad; ever considering how readily Philip would attack us, if he were favoured by any incident like this, if a war had broken out on our borders. And would it not be shameful to want the resolution to bring that distress on him, which, had it been equally in his power, he certainly would have made you feel!

This too demands your attention, Athenians! that you are now to determine whether it be most expedient to carry the war into his country, or to fight him here. If Olynthus be defended, Macedon will be the seat of war; you may harass his kingdom, and enjoy your own territories free from apprehensions. But, should that nation be subdued by Philip, who will oppose his marching hither? will the Thebans? let it not be thought severe when I affirm that they will join readily in the in-

vasion[a]. Will the Phocians? a people scarcely able[b] to defend their own country, without your assistance. Will any others[c]?——"But, Sir," cries some one, "he would make no such attempt."—This would be the greatest of absurdities; not to execute those threats, when he hath full power, which, now when they appear so idle and extravagant, he yet dares to utter. And I think you are not yet to learn how great would be the difference between our engaging him here, and there. Were we to be only thirty days abroad, and to draw all the necessaries of the camp from our own lands, even were there no enemy to ravage them, the damage would, in my opinion, amount to more than the whole expence of the late war[d]. Add then the presence of an enemy, and how greatly must the calamity be increased? but, further, add the infamy; and to those who judge rightly, no distress can be more grievous than the scandal of misconduct.

[a] *Join readily in the invasion.* The reasons of Thebes's hatred to Athens have been already assigned. See note on Olynth. 2. p. 74.

[b] *Scarcely able,* &c. The Phocians were at this time reduced to a very low state, by a continued series of ill success in the sacred war. Philomelus and Onomarchus had perished; Phayllus and Phalecus, their successors, had been frequently defeated; and the Thebans were continually gaining advantages over them. Tour.

[c] *Will any others?* He avoids all mention of the Thessalians; because he had just shewed that they were ill-affected to Philip, and therefore might be supposed willing to join with the Athenians.

[d] *Of the late war.* That is, their expedition into Thrace, in order to recover Amphipolis, which, according to the calculation of Æschines, cost them 1500 talents. Tour.

It is incumbent, therefore, upon us all, (justly influenced by these considerations) to unite vigorously in the common cause, and repel the danger that threatens this territory. Let the rich *exert themselves on this occasion*; that by contributing a small portion of their affluence, they may secure the peaceful possession of the rest. Let those who are of the age for military duty, that, by learning the art of war in Philip's dominions, they may become formidable defenders of their native land. Let our orators, that they may safely submit their conduct to the public inspection. For your judgment of their administrations will ever be determined by the event of things. And may we all contribute to render that favourable!

END OF THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC.

THE ORATION

ON THE

PEACE:

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF ARCHIAS,

THREE YEARS AFTER THE OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Athenians sent those succours to Olynthus, which were recommended in the preceding oration. But they could not defend that state against its domestic enemies; for, the year following, two of its citizens, Lasthenes and Euthycrates, betrayed the city to Philip. He razed it, threw part of the inhabitants in chains, sold another part, and distinguished the two traitors only by the cruelty of their death. His two brothers, who had been harboured in Olynthus, he also sacrificed to his jealousy and revenge.

These events, no less than the repeated instances of Demosthenes, prevailed on the Athenians to declare war against Philip in form. Hitherto he had kept some measures with them, and had sought various pretences for glossing over his hostilities; but now he fell with the utmost fury upon all their tributary states, and obliged Demosthenes to appear once more in the assembly, to persuade the Athenians to defend the Islanders, and their colonies, which lay upon the Hellespont. But scarcely had the war been

declared, when the vigour of their enemy, and their own fickleness and indolence, made them weary of it. Ctesiphon and Phrynon were sent to sound Philip's dispositions towards a separate peace. This was as he could wish. The Phocian war was at present the object of his views: and his arts had just regained the Thessalians over to the confederacy, who had been prevailed on to stand neuter. To the Athenian ministers, therefore, he made such professions, that Demosthenes, and nine others, were sent to negociate the peace; who proceeded as far as they were authorised, and returned with Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus, on the part of Philip. Ambassadors were sent, soon after, from Athens, with full powers to conclude the treaty. In the first of these embassies, Demosthenes had met with some Athenian prisoners in Macedon, whom he promised to redeem at his own expence, and took this opportunity to perform it, while his colleagues, in the mean time, were to proceed, with all expedition, in order to conclude with Philip. Three months elapsed, however, before they came to an audience with the king, who was all this time making himself master of those places in Thrace, which the Athenians claimed as their right. At last, the terms of the treaty were agreed to; but, by affected delays, and by corrupting the ambassa-

dors, he found means to defer the execution of it, until he had advanced his troops into Thessaly, in order to proceed against the Phocians. He then concluded the peace, and, on their return, the ambassadors, who had conducted the treaty (and Æschines in particular,) expatiated upon his candour and sincerity. They declared, at the very time when he was giving Thebes the most solemn assurances that he would exterminate the Phocians, that his sole views were to screen this people from the fury of their enemies, and to controul the insolence of the Thebans. They also vouched for his performing several things in favour of the state, not formally stipulated in the treaty. Thus were the Athenians amused, and Philip suffered to pass the streights of Thermopylæ, and to pursue his march into Phocis,

His reputation and approach struck such a terror into the Phocians, that, although they received a reinforcement of a thousand Spartans, they yet sent to treat, or rather to submit. He allowed Phalecus, with eight thousand mercenaries, to retire into Peloponnesus; but the rest, who were inhabitants of Phocis, were left at his mercy. The disposal of these he referred to the Amphictyons, from an affected regard to the authority of an assembly composed of the representatives of the states of Greece. They thun-

dered out the severest decrees against this wretched people. Among other things, it was enacted, that they should lose their seat in the Amphictyonic council, and that the double voice which they had enjoyed in it, should be transferred to Philip, who, by the same resolution, gained the superintendency of the Pythian games, which the Corinthians forfeited by taking part with the Phocians.

The Athenians had not been present at Philip's election into this council; and probably, to avoid all opposition, he had assembled only such Amphictyons as were devoted to his interest. He thought it proper, however, to send circular letters to the absent states, inviting them to assemble at Delphos, and to ratify his election.

Athens, among others, received the invitation; and, as Philip's ambitious designs could be no longer concealed, many were for violent measures. The proposal raised a ferment in the assembly; which seems to have breathed nothing but indignation and opposition. On this occasion, Demosthenes thought it his duty to moderate their heat; and, in the following oration, endeavours to prevent their being betrayed into any rash and imprudent measures.

THE ORATION ON THE PEACE[a].

Archia, Archon.—A. R. Philip. 15.—Olympiad. 108. An. 3.

ATHENIANS!

I SEE that this debate must be attended with many difficulties and great commotion; not only because many of our interests are already given up, and therefore unnecessary to be now laid before you;

[a] I shall here take the liberty to transcribe a remark from the authors of the Universal History.

Libanius and Photius had taken pains to prove that the oration to which we refer above, ought not to be ascribed to Demosthenes. We might well enough defend ourselves, by alleging, that it has been generally esteemed his, and, as such, has constantly maintained its place in his works. This would be sufficient for our purpose; but, in truth, the arguments on which the opposite sentiment is built, are so easily overturned, that we might be justly blamed for neglecting so favourable an occasion of setting this point in a true light. Demosthenes, say those who will not allow this oration to be his, charged Æschines with betraying his country, on account of his recommending warmly a peace with Philip; they cannot therefore think, that Demosthenes would run openly into those measures which he had so lately and so warmly decried; or that he, who on every other occasion singly opposed Philip, and ran all hazards to bring him into odium with the people, should now be single on the other side, and attempt to cross the disposition of the Athenians, in favour of peace and Philip. These objectors forget, that Demosthenes was a patriot as well as an orator; that he did not pursue Philip with implacable hatred, because he was king of Macedon, but because he

but because it is impossible to agree on such expedients as may secure what yet remain; but that a variety of clashing opinions must divide the assembly. Then, to advise, is naturally a difficult and distressing part. But you, Athenians! have rendered it yet more distressing; for all other people naturally seek counsel while affairs are yet depending; you deliberate, when the event hath made it too late. Hence hath it happened, through the whole course of my observation, that the man who arraigns your conduct is heard with esteem, and his sentiments approved; yet have your affairs ever miscarried, and the objects of your deliberations have all been lost. But, although this be too true, still I am persuaded, (and from this persuasion I arose

thought him both willing and able to obstruct the designs of Athens, and even to reduce her, from that splendid pre-eminence which she now held in Greece, to the ordinary rank of a state, in name free, but in truth dependent upon him; this was the motive of Demosthenes's heat on other occasions; and the motive to his coolness now was the strict alliance between Philip and the other Grecian states, which rendered it a thing impracticable for Athens to contend with him and them alone. Besides, as he rightly observes in the harangue, it would have been ridiculous for those who refused to enter into an equal war for rich cities and fertile provinces, to have rushed suddenly into a most unequal contest about an empty title, or, as he emphatically expresses it, *To take away the shadow of Delphos from him who was master of Delphos itself.* We therefore acknowledge this to be the oration of Demosthenes, because he was worthy of it.

It is scarcely worth while to take notice of a small mistake in this remark. Libanius does not deny that Demosthenes was the author of this oration. He allows it to have been written by him, but is of opinion that he never ventured to pronounce it.

to speak) that if you will put an end to tumult and opposition, and grant me that attention which becomes those who are consulting for their country, and upon so important an occasion; I have some points to urge, some measures to propose, which may serve our present interests, and repair our past miscarriages.

SENSIBLE as I am, Athenians! that to expatiate on those counsels one hath formerly given, and to speak of one's self, is the most successful artifice of those who dare to practise such artifice; yet to me it is so odious, so detestable, that, although I see it necessary, yet I loath it. However, it will assist your judgment, I presume, on this occasion, if you recal to mind something of what I formerly have mentioned.——You may remember, that during the disorders of Eubœa, when certain persons persuaded you to assist Plutarchus[a], and to undertake

[a] *To assist Plutarchus.* Philip had long regarded Eubœa as very proper, by its situation, to favour the designs he meditated against Greece. He therefore took pains to form a party in the island, and fomented divisions and factions in the several states of which it was composed. Plutarch, the governor of Eretria, one of the principal cities of Eubœa, applied to the Athenians for assistance against some attempts of Philip, and obtained it; but afterwards (having probably been gained over to Philip's party) he took up arms against the very auxiliaries he had invited. But this perfidy did not disconcert Phocion who commanded them. He gained a victory over the Macedonians, and drove Plutarch out of Eretria. Phocion was afterwards recalled, and Molossus, his successor in this war, was defeated and taken prisoner by Philip.

an inglorious and expensive war; I was the first, the only one who rose up to oppose it, and scarcely escaped their fury, who for a trifling gain were urging you to many highly pernicious measures. In a little time, when the load of infamy had fallen upon you, and that you had suffered such treatment as no people ever received from those they had assisted; you were all made sensible of the iniquity of your seducers, and the justness and integrity of my counsels. Again, when I saw Neoptolemus the player[a] (in that full security which his profession gave him) involving the state in the greatest distress, and, in all his public conduct, devoted to Philip: I appeared, and warned you of the danger; and this from no secret motive, no private enmity[b], no officious baseness, as the event itself discovered. But it is not the defenders of Neoptolemus that I accuse, (for he was not depending on a single one) but you yourselves: for, had you been spectators in the theatre, not engaged in affairs of the highest and most intimate concernment to the public, you could not have heard him with more indulgence, nor me with more resent-

[a] *Neoptolemus the player.* This Neoptolemus was also a great tragic poet, though the orator only mentions the less honourable distinction. Not that the profession of a player was held in disesteem in Greece. Players were the favourites of princes, and were raised to the highest employments in the state. This very man was nominated, the year before, one of the ten ambassadors that were to conclude the peace with Philip. TOUR.

[b] *No private enmity,* &c. Probably, this is a repetition of the very words of Neoptolemus's party.

ment. And now you all know, that he who then went over to the enemy, pretending to collect some debts, that he might bring them hither, (as he said) to enable him to serve the state; that he who was perpetually inveighing against the cruelty of accusing a man for thus transferring his effects from that country hither; the moment that a peace freed him from all apprehensions, converted that estate[a] into money, which he acquired here, and brought it off with him to Philip.

THESE two instances, which I have produced, shew with what fidelity and truth I spoke on those occasions. I shall mention one, and but one more, and then proceed to the point now to be debated. When we had received the solemn ratification of the treaty, and that the embassy returned home; when certain persons assured you, that Thespia and Platæa were to be repeopled[b]; that, if Philip be-

[a] *That estate.* The text has it, οὐσίαν φανερὰν. The Athenians distinguished two sorts of goods or estates, *apparent*, by which they understood *lands*; and *not apparent*, that is, *money, slaves, moveables*, &c.

[b] *That Thespia and Platæa were to be repeopled.* Thespia had been razed by the Thebans, under Epaminondas. Platæa had been twice destroyed by them; once, when Archidamus, king of Sparta, obliged the Platæans to surrender at discretion, in the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war. The Thebans who were then joined with Lacedemon, insisted, that they should be exterminated. The treaty of Antalcidas restored them; but this did not last long; for, three years before the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans reduced them to their former wretched state, because they refused to join with them against the Lacedemonians.

TOUR.

came master of the Phocians, he would spare them, that Thebes was to submit to his regulation[a]; that Oropus[b] was to be ours; that Eubœa should be given up[c] to us, as an equivalent for Amphipolis; with other such insidious promises, which, in spite of interest, of justice, and of honour, drove you to abandon Phocis; I never attempted to deceive you, I was not silent; no, you must remember I declared that I knew of none, that I expected none of these things; but thought that whoever mentioned them could scarcely be serious.

And these instances of my superior foresight I do by no means ascribe to any extraordinary penetration; I speak it not from boasting or arrogance;

[a] *That Thebes was to submit to his regulation.* In the Greek it is διοικεῖν *administraturum.* Philip made use of this soft expression, to persuade the Athenians that he would reduce the Thebans to reason, and put it out of their power to undertake any act of outrage or injustice; and, at the same time, to avoid alarming the Thebans, or alienating them from his party. Wolfius thinks, that διοικεῖν is put for διοικίζειν, and translates it *dissipaturum, that he would exterminate the Thebans.* But I cannot think that he would have expressed himself in a manner so harsh, and so likely to make the Thebans his enemies. Tour.

[b] *That Oropus,* &c. This city had been taken from the Athenians, the third year of the 103d Olympiad, by Themison, the tyrant of Eretria, and afterwards put into the hands of the Thebans. Their mutual pretensions to this city had oftentimes embroiled these two states. Tour.

[c] *Eubœa should be given up,* &c. For he had by this time gained a great authority in that island, and stationed his garrisons in most of its cities.

nor do I pretend to any superiority but what arises from these two causes: The first is fortune, which I find more powerful than all the policy and wisdom of man; the other, that perfect disinterestedness with which my judgments are ever formed: so that no man can hold out any advantage to my view, to influence my public conduct. Hence it is, that, on all occasions of debate, your true interest strikes my eye directly. But when a bribe is, as it were, cast into one scale, it then preponderates, and forces down the judgment with it; so that it is not possible that a person, thus influenced, can ever offer good and salutary counsel.

And now, to give my sentiments on thepresent occasion:—Whether subsidies, or alliances,or whatever schemes are concerting for the public good, one point must be secured; the continuance of the present peace. Not that it is so very excellent, or so worthy of you: but, of what kind soever it may be, it were more for the interest of your affairs that it had never been concluded, than that now, when it is concluded, you should infringe it; for we have suffered ourselves to be deprived of many advantages, which would have given our arms much more security and strength.

In the next place, we must be careful not to drive those to extremities, who are now assembled, and call themselves the council of Amphictyons; nor to afford them a pretence for a general war against us. Were we again engaged with Philip

for Amphipolis, or any such private matter of dispute, in which neither Thessalians, nor Argians, nor Thebans, were concerned; in my opinion, none of these would join against us; and, least of all, ——let me be heard out without interruption,—— the Thebans: not that they wish well to us, or would not willingly recommend themselves to Philip; but they are perfectly sensible (however mean their understandings may be thought), that, were they to engage in a war with you, the evils would all fall on them[a]; the advantages others would lie ready to intercept. They would therefore never be betrayed into such a quarrel, unless the cause were general. In like manner, another war with the Thebans for Oropus, or any such private cause, could not, I think, distress us: for there are those who would join either with us or them, to repel an invasion, but, in offensive measures, would concur with neither. This is the true nature, the very spirit of alliances. There are none so much attached to us or Thebes, as to desire that we should maintain our own power and triumph over our competitor. To be secure, they would all wish us for their own sakes, but that either of us should reduce the other to subjection, and so be enabled to give law to them, not one would bear.

WHERE then lies the danger? What are you to

[a] *The evils would all fall on them,* &c. Sparta only waited for this rupture, to assert its power once more. And from Philip's former conduct it appeared very plainly, that he knew how to avail himself of such a quarrel.

guard against? that general pretence for uniting against us, which the war now in agitation may afford the states. For, if the Argians[a], and the Messenians, and the Megalopolitans, and such other of the Peloponnesians as are in the same interest, should make it a cause of quarrel, that we have sought a treaty with the Lacedemonians, and seem to have favoured their designs[b]: if the Thebans, incensed as they are said to be at present, should become yet more incensed at our harbouring their exiles[c], and taking every occasion of declaring ourselves implacably averse to them; if the Thessalians should resent our reception of the fugitive Phocians, and Philip our opposing his admission into the council of Amphictyons; I fear, that, to re-

[a] *For if the Argians*, &c. When the Spartan power was broken by Thebes, these people, who had been dependent on Sparta, asserted their freedom. This occasioned some contests which still subsisted, and in which the Spartans were favoured by Athens. TOURREIL.

[b] *To have favoured their designs*, &c. The designs of the Lacedemonians, of reducing these people to their former subjection.—Tourreil translates ἐκδέχεσθαι, "to approve." Suidas renders it stronger, "to forward, to promote," ἐκδέχεσθαι, "significat ali-" quid ab altero accipere, quod ipse deinde tractandum suscipias." Wolfius applies ἐκεῖνοις to the Argians, &c. and translates the passage thus, "propter acta quædam sua impedita." But I have chosen the other interpretation as the most natural.

[c] *At our harbouring their exiles.* Many of the cities of Bœotia favoured the Phocians in the sacred war. But, when this war was ended, and the Thebans became masters of these cities, they treated the inhabitants with great cruelty, and obliged them to take shelter at Athens.

venge these private quarrels, they may use the authority of this council, to give sanction to a general war against us; and, in the violence of resentment, forget even their own interest, as it happened in the Phocian war. You are not ignorant that the Thebans and Philip, and the Thessalians, although they had by no means the same views, have yet all concurred in the same scheme of conduct. The Thebans, for instance, were not able to hinder Philip from passing, and becoming master of Thermopylæ, nor from coming in, after all their toils, and depriving them of the glory; (for, as to possessions[a], and the acquisition of territories, the Thebans have succeeded happily; but, in point of honour and reputation, they have suffered most shamefully). If Philip did not pass, they were to expect nothing: it was highly disagreeable to them; yet, for the sake of Orchomenus and Coronea[b], which they greatly desired, but were not able to take, they chose to endure all this. And yet there are persons who dare to assert, that Philip did not surrender these cities to the Thebans freely, but was compelled. Away with such pretences! I am satisfied that this was equally his concern with the gaining the Streights, the glory of the war, the honour of deciding it, and the direction of the Pythian games; and these were the greatest objects of his most earnest wishes. As to the Thessalians, they neither

[a] *As to possessions*, &c. All Phocis was given up to them immediately after the war.

[b] *Orchomenus and Coronea*, &c. The Phocians had taken these two cities from them the year before.

desired to see the Thebans aggrandized, nor Philip; (for in their power they saw danger to themselves;) but two things they greatly desired, a seat in the council[a] of Amphictyons, and the wealth of Delphos; and thence were they induced to join in the confederacy. Thus you may observe, that private interest oftentimes engages men in measures quite opposite to their inclinations. And, therefore, it is your part to proceed with the utmost caution.

"WHAT then?" saith some one, "shall these ap-"prehensions make us yield to his demands? is this "your motion?" Not at all! I only mean to shew you, how you may maintain your dignity, avoid a war, and approve your moderation and justice to the world. As to those violent men who think we should brave all dangers nor foresee the difficulties attending upon arms, I wish them to consider this. We allow the Thebans to possess Oropus: were we asked the motive; we should answer, To avoid a war. In like manner, by the present treaty, we yield Amphipolis to Philip; we suffer the Cardians to be distinguished[b] from the other inhabitants of the Chersonesus; the king of Caria[c] to possess Chios,

[a] *A seat in the council,* &c. Of which they had been deprived by the Phocians making themselves masters of Delphos, where this council assembled.

[b] *We suffer the Cardians to be distinguished,* &c. This is explained in the introduction to the oration on the state of the Chersonesus.

[c] *The king of Caria.* Mausolus, king of that country, had assisted these islands against Athens, in the social war; and when,

and Cos, and Rhodes; and the Byzantines [a] to cruize for prizes; and this, because we think that peace and tranquillity will produce more advantages than violence and contests about these points. And, if thus directed in our conduct towards each particular state, and where our interest is highly and intimately concerned, it would be perfect weakness and absurdity to provoke the resentment of them all for a shadow [b].

at the conclusion of this war, the Athenians were obliged to declare them free and independent, their ally made himself master of them. Upon the death of Mausolus, his wife, Artemisia, maintained his dominion in these new-conquered islands. She survived her husband but two years, and was succeeded by her brother Hidrieas, who reigned in Caria at the time that this oration was pronounced. TOUR.

[a] *And the Byzantines*, &c. These people had also revolted from the Athenians, and joined with the islanders in the social war:—How far, or on what pretence, they were suffered to commit those outrages upon the seas, does not appear. TOUR.

[b] *For a shadow.* In the Greek, Περὶ τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιᾶς, *for a shadow in Delphos.* That is, for an empty title of Amphictyon, or of a protector of the temple of Delphos.

END OF THE ORATION ON THE PEACE.

THE

SEVENTH ORATION

AGAINST

PHILIP:

COMMONLY CALLED THE SECOND.

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF LYCISCUS,

TWO YEARS AFTER THE ORATION ON THE PEACE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Greeks thought it proper to confirm, or at least not to oppose Philip's admission into the council of Amphictyons, where he immediately assumed a despotic power. In every enterprise he armed himself with one of their decrees, and, under pretence of executing them, made a merit of oppressing several states of Greece.

The Thebans opened him an entrance into Peloponnesus, where, from their inveterate hatred to the Lacedemonians, they were constantly fomenting divisions. They solicited Philip to join with them, the Messenians, and the Argians, to reduce the power of Lacedemon, which, without any right but that of the strongest, had erected itself into a kind of sovereignty to the prejudice of the neighbouring states. Philip willingly listened to an overture, which agreed so well with his own views. He proposed, or rather dictated a decree to the Amphictyons, that the Lacedemonians should suffer Argos and Messene to enjoy an absolute independence; and under the pretence of supporting their authority, at the same time marched a great body of forces towards those parts.

The Lacedemonians, justly alarmed, applied to Athens for succour; and strongly urged by their ambassadors, the conclusion of a league which was necessary for their common safety. All the powers, interested in crossing this league, used their utmost diligence to that end. Philip, by his ministers, represented to the Athenians, that they could not with justice declare against him: and that, if he had not come to a rupture with the Thebans, he had in this done nothing contrary to his treaty with Athens. And this indeed was true, with respect to the public articles of the peace; whatever private assurances he might have given their ambassadors. The representatives of Thebes, Argos, and Messene, pressed the Athenians on their part, and reproached them with having already too much favoured the Lacedemonians, those enemies of Thebes, and tyrants of Peloponnesus. The strength of those remonstrances somewhat staggered the Athenians. They were unwilling to break with Philip, and then, on the other hand, could not but see danger to themselves in the ruin of Lacedemon. They were therefore in doubt what answer to give to the Lacedemonian ambassadors: on which occasion Demosthenes pronounced the following oration.

PHILIPPIC THE SECOND.

Lycisco. Archon—A. R. Philip. 17—Olympiad. 109. An. 1.

ATHENIANS!

WHEN the hostile attempts of Philip, and those outrageous violations of the peace, which he is perpetually committing, are at any time the subject of our debates; the speeches on your side I find humane and just[a]; and that the sentiments of those

[a] *Humane and just.* An opposition to the growing power of Macedon, the orator ever affects to consider as the cause of liberty, of justice, and of Greece. The interest of the nation, that is, of the whole assemblage of the Grecian states, was, professedly, the first great object of regard to every member of every community. This was their most extensive affection. The distinction of Greek and Barbarian precluded the rest of mankind from a just share in their philanthropy. At least, it was not generally considered as a duty, to extend their benevolence farther than the boundaries of their nation. These included all that were really considered of the same *kind.* And hence it is, as I conceive, that the love of their countrymen was called, by the most extensive term, the love of mankind. The word, therefore, in the original, (φιλανθρώπους) which is rendered *humane*, the translator understood as expressive of a regard to the general welfare of Greece. Nor was it owing to any design of concealing his ignorance, that this explanation was not originally allowed a place in the notes on this oration. What is, or is imagined to be clear to us, we are apt to flatter ourselves, must, at first glance, appear to others exactly in the same light. Just as we sometimes suppose that the difficulty we ourselves cannot conquer, is, in itself, absolutely insuperable.

who inveigh against Philip never fail of approbation: but as to the necessary measures, to speak out plainly, not one hath been pursued, nor any thing effected even to reward the attention to these harangues. Nay, to such circumstances is our state reduced, that the more fully and evidently a man proves that Philip is acting contrary to his treaty, and harbouring designs against Greece, the greater is his difficulty in pointing out your duty.

The reason is this. They who aspire to an extravagant degree of power, are to be opposed by force and action, not by speeches; and yet, in the first place, we public speakers are unwilling to recommend or to propose any thing to this purpose, from the fear of your displeasure; but confine ourselves to general representations of the grievous, of the outrageous nature of his conduct, and the like. Then, you who attend, are better qualified than Philip, either to plead the justice of your cause, or to apprehend it, when enforced by others: but, as to any effectual opposition to his present designs, in this, you are entirely inactive. You see then the consequence, the necessary, the natural consequence; each of you excels in that which hath engaged your time and application; he, in acting; you, in speaking. And if, on this occasion, it be sufficient that we speak with a superior force of truth and justice, this may be done with the utmost ease; but if we are to consider how to rectify our present disorders, how to guard against the danger of plunging inadvertently into still greater; against the progress of

a power which may at last bear down all opposition; then must our debates proceed in a different manner; and all they who speak, and all you who attend, must prefer the best and most salutary measures to the easiest and most agreeable.

First, then, Athenians! if there be a man who feels no apprehensions at the view of Philip's power, and the extent of his conquests; who imagines that these portend no danger to the state, or that his designs are not all aimed against you; I am amazed! and must intreat the attention of you all, while I explain those reasons briefly, which induce me to entertain different expectations, and to regard Philip as our real enemy; that if I appear to have looked forward with the more penetrating eye, you may join with me; if they, who are thus secure and confident in this man, you may yield to their direction.

In the first place, therefore, I consider the acquisition made by Philip when the peace was just concluded: Thermopylæ, and the command of Phocis. What use did he make of these?——He chose to serve the interest of Thebes, not that of Athens. And why? As ambition is his great passion, universal empire the sole object of his views, not peace, not tranquillity, not any just purpose: he knew this well, that neither our constitution nor our principles would admit him to prevail upon you, (by any thing he could promise, by any thing he could do) to sacrifice one state of Greece to your private in-

terest; but that, as you have the due regard to justice, as you have an abhorrence of the least stain upon your honour, and as you have that quick discernment which nothing can escape; the moment his attempt was made, you would oppose him with the same vigour as if you yourselves had been immediately attacked. The Thebans, he supposed, (and the event confirmed his opinion) would, for the sake of any private advantage, suffer him to act towards others as he pleased; and far from opposing or impeding his designs, would be ready at his command to fight upon his side. From the same persuasion he now heaps his favours upon the Messenians and Argians. And this reflects the greatest lustre upon you, my countrymen! for by these proceedings you are declared the only invariable assertors of the rights of Greece; the only persons, whom no private attachment, no views of interest, can seduce from their affection to the Greeks.

And that it is with reason he entertains these sentiments of you, and sentiments so different of the Thebans and the Argians; he may be convinced, not from the present only, but from a review of former times. For he must have been informed, I presume, he cannot but have heard, that your ancestors, when, by submitting to the King, they might have purchased the sovereignty of Greece, not only scorned to listen, when Alexander[a],

[a] *When Alexander*, &c. The reader may find the history here alluded to in the eighth and ninth books of Herodotus. The expressions in the original are as contemptuous as possible, ὁ τοῦτο;

this man's ancestor, was made the messenger of such terms, but chose to abandon their city, encountered every possible difficulty, and, after all this, performed such exploits, as men are ever eager to recite, yet with the just force and dignity no man ever could express; and therefore it becomes me to be silent on this subject; for in reality their actions are superior to the power of words. As to the ancestors of the Thebans and the Argians, the one, he knows, fought for the Barbarian; the others did not oppose him[a]. He knew then, that both

or as some editions have it, ὁ τούτων ῥόγονος, the ancestor of *these wretches the Macedonians*; and then, not Πρέσβευς, *ambassador*, but ΚΗΡΥΞ, *herald* or *crier, the slave or menial officer of his master Mardonius. Avec le titre d' ambassadeur* (as Tourreil translates it) suggests the honourable idea which Demosthenes takes such pains to keep out of view.

[a] *The one, he knows, fought for the Barbarian; the others did not oppose him.* The readiness with which the Thebans granted earth and water, the tokens of submission to the Persian, the regret with which they joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ, their joining openly with Xerxes, when his arms had the appearance of success, and other circumstances, confirmed by the united testimony of historians, all warrant the assertion of Demosthenes. The Argians were engaged to a neutrality, by an artifice of the Persians, who pretended to derive their descent from Perseus, the son of Acrisius, one of the kings of Argos. This pretence, how gross soever, was sufficient for a people who chose to be deceived: and would not reflect that this monarchy had not the title of Persian, till the reign of Cyrus. Their infidelity to the cause of Greece they concealed under the veil of ambition; for they professed themselves ready to concur in the common defence, provided that they were admitted to an equal share of the command with Lacedemon: which proposal was rejected, as they desired.

Tour.

these people would attend but to their private interest, without the least regard to the common cause of Greece: should he choose you for allies, you would serve him so far only as justice would permit; but, if he attached himself to them, he gained assistants in all the schemes of his ambition. This it is that then determined him, this it is that now determines him to their side rather than to yours: not that he sees they have a greater naval force[a] than we; or that, having gained the sovereignty in the inland countries, he declines the command of the seas, and the advantages of commerce; or that he hath forgotten those pretences, those promises which obtained him the peace.

But I may be told, "it is true, he did act thus; "but not from ambition, or from any of those mo- "tives of which I accuse him; but as he thought "the cause of Thebes more just than ours[b]."—This

[a] *A greater naval force,* &c. Athens, as a maritime power, was superior to all the other Greeks. At the battle of Salamis, of the three hundred vessels which composed the Grecian fleet, two hundred were Athenian. Three hundred ships sailed from the port of Athens upon the expedition to Sicily; and their fleet was afterwards increased to four hundred. TOUR.

[b] *The cause of Thebes more just than,* &c. The union of Philip with the Thebans had a very plausible colour; that of espousing the cause of Apollo, and punishing the sacrilegious profaners of his temple. It was not convenient to display this at large, and therefore he cuts it short by one vague expression. For the art of an orator appears no less in suppressing such things as may prove unfavourable to his design, than in dwelling on those points which may assist it. TOUR.

of all pretences he cannot now allege. Can he, who commands the Lacedemonians[a] to quit their claim to Messene, pretend that, in giving up Orchomenus and Coronea to the Thebans, he acted from regard to justice? But now comes his last subterfuge. He was compelled: and yielded these places, quite against his inclinations, being encompassed by the Thessalian horse and Theban infantry. Fine pretence!——Just so, they cry, he is to entertain suspicions of the Thebans: and some spread rumours of their own framing, that he is to fortify Elatea[b]. Yes! these things are yet to be, and so will they remain, in my opinion; but his attack on Lacedemon, in conjunction with the Thebans and Argians, is not yet to be made. No; he is actually detaching forces; supplying money; and is himself expected at the head of a formidable army. The Lacedemonians, therefore, the enemies of Thebes, he now infests. And will he then restore the Phocians, whom he hath but just now ruined? Who can believe this? I, for my part, can never think, if Philip had been forced into those former measures, or if he had now abandoned the Thebans

[a] *Can he, who commands the Lacedemonians*, &c. Because the pretensions of each were of the same nature. Lacedemon assumed the supreme power in Peloponnesus. Thebes affected the like power in Bœotia.

[b] *To fortify Elatea.* This was the most considerable city in Phocis; and, by its situation, very well fitted to keep the Thebans in awe. So that some years after, when Philip perceived that the Thebans were growing cool to him, his first step was to take possession of Elatea. Tour.

that he would make this continued opposition to their enemies. No! his present measures prove that all his past conduct was the effect of choice; and from all his actions it appears, that all his actions are directly levelled against this state. And there is in some sort a necessity for this. Consider, he aims at empire, and from you alone he expects opposition. He hath long loaded us with injuries; and of this he himself is most intimately conscious: for those of our possessions which he hath reduced to his service, he uses as a barrier to his other territories: so that, if he should give up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he would not think himself secure even in Macedon. He is therefore sensible, that he entertains designs against you, and that you perceive them. Then, as he thinks highly of your wisdom, he concludes that you must hold him in that abhorrence which he merits: hence is he alarmed: expecting to feel some effects of your resentment, (if you have any favourable opportunity) unless he prevents you by his attack. Hence is his vigilance awakened: his arm raised against the state: he courts some of the Thebans, and such of the Peloponnesians as have the same views with him; whom he deems too mercenary to regard any thing but present interest, and too perversely stupid to foresee any consequences. And yet persons of but moderate discernment may have some manifest examples to alarm them, which I had occasion to[a]

[a] *Which I had occasion to*, &c. When Philip first began to interest himself in the disputes between these states and Lacedemon,

mention to the Messenians, and to the Argians. Perhaps it may be proper to repeat them here.

"MESSENIANS!" said I, "how highly (think ye) "would the Olynthians have been offended, if any "man had spoken against Philip at that time, when "he gave them up Anthemus[a], a city which the "former kings of Macedon had ever claimed? "when he drove out the Athenian colony, and gave "them Potidæa? when he took all our resentment "on himself, and left them to enjoy our domini- "ons? Did they expect to have suffered thus? "had it been foretold, would they have believed "it? you cannot think it! Yet, after a short en- "joyment of the territories of others, they have "been for ever despoiled of their own by this man. "Inglorious has been their fall, not conquered only, "but betrayed and sold by one another. For those "intimate correspondences with tyrants ever por- "tend mischief to free states. Turn your eyes, "(said I, to the Thessalians) think ye, that when "he first expelled their tyrants, when he then gave

the Athenians sent an embassy to endeavour to weaken his interest in Peloponnesus, and to dissuade the Messenians and Argians from accepting of his interposition. On this occasion it was, that Demosthenes made the oration from which he now quotes this passage.

[a] *Anthemus.* This city of Macedon had been possessed by the ancestors of Philip from the earliest ages; for we learn from Herodotus, (B. 5.) that, about two hundred years before, Amyntas made an offer of Anthemus to Hippias the son of Pisistratus.

TOUR.

" them up Nicæa[a] and Magnesia, that they ex-
" pected ever to have been subjected to those go-
" vernors[b] now imposed on them? or that the man
" who restored them to their seat in the Amphicty-
" onic council, would have deprived them of their
" own proper revenues? yet, that such was the
" event, the world can testify. In like manner, you
" now behold Philip lavishing his gifts and pro-
" mises upon you. If you are wise, you will pray
" that he may never appear to have deceived and
" abused you. Various are the contrivances for
" the defence and security of cities; as battlements,
" and walls, and trenches, and other kind of forti-
" fications; all which are the effects of labour, and
" attended with continual expence. But there is
" one common bulwark, with which men of pru-
" dence are naturally provided, the guard and se-
" curity of all people, particularly of free states,
" against the assaults of tyrants. What is this?
" Distrust. Of this be mindful: to this adhere:
" preserve this carefully, and no calamity can affect
" you.—What is it you seek? (said I:) Liberty?

[a] *Nicæa.* This city of Locris had been given up to Philip, by Phalecus, at the conclusion of the sacred war. TOUR.

[b] *Those governors,* &c. The tyranny said to have been imposed by Philip on the Thessalians, is, in the original of this passage, called a government of TEN: Yet, in the third Philippic, it is styled a tetrarchy, or government of FOUR. Hence, there are grounds to presume, that an error has crept into the ancient copies. Unless it be supposed that Philip divided the country of Thessaly into four districts, and over each of those established ten governors; if, by such a supposition, the authority of the copies may be preserved.

"And do ye not perceive that nothing can be more "adverse to this than the very titles of Philip? "every monarch, every tyrant, is an enemy to li- "berty, and the opposer of laws. Will ye not then "be careful, lest, while ye seek to be freed from "war, ye find yourselves his slaves?"

But although they heard these things, and loudly expressed their approbation; though the like points were frequently urged by the ambassadors, while I was present; and probably were afterwards repeated; yet still they have no less dependence on the friendship and the promises of Philip. But it is not strange that the Messenians and some of the Peloponnesians should act contrary to the dictates of nature, reason, and reflection. Even you, who are yourselves fully sensible, and constantly reminded by your public speakers, that there are designs forming against you; that the toils of your enemies are surrounding you; will, I fear, be plunged by your supineness into all those dangers that threaten you: so prevalent is the pleasure and indulgence of a moment over all your future interests.—But, as to the course necessary to be pursued, prudence requires, that this be debated hereafter among yourselves. At present, I shall propose such an answer to these ministers, as may be worthy of your concurrence . . . . . [a].

[a] Though none of our editors take notice of it, in this place the proper officer must have proposed the orator's motion in form. Unless we suppose, that this oration has descended to us imperfect; for, as the text now stands, there is a manifest want of connection between this sentence and what follows. Oliver.

It would be just, Athenians! to call the men before you, who gave those promises which induced you to conclude the peace. For neither would I have undertaken the embassy, nor would you (I am convinced) have laid down your arms, had it been suspected that Philip would have acted thus, when he had obtained a peace. No! the assurances he then gave were quite different from his present actions. There are others also to be summoned. Who are these?—The men, who, at my return from the second embassy (sent for the ratification of the treaty) when I saw the state abused, and warned you of your danger, and testified the truth, and opposed with all my power the giving up Thermopylæ and Phocis; the men, I say, who then cried out, that I, the water-drinker, was morose and peevish; but that Philip, if permitted to pass, would act agreeably to your desires; would fortify Thespia and Platæa; restrain the insolence of Thebes; cut through the Chersonesus[a] at his own expence; and give you up Eubœa and Oropus, as an equivalent for Amphipolis.—That all this was positively affirmed, you cannot, I am sure, forget, though not remarkable for remembering injuries. And, to complete the disgrace, you have engaged your posterity to the same treaty, in full dependence

[a] *Cut through the Chersonesus*, &c. When Cersobleptes had given up the Chersonesus to the Athenians, it became perpetually exposed to the incursions of Thrace. The only way of putting a stop to them was to cut through the Isthmus (for the Thracians had no ships). And this Philip promised to do in favour of the Athenians and their colonies. Tour.

on those promises; so entirely have you been seduced.

And now, to what purpose do I mention this? and why do I desire that these men should appear? —I call the gods to witness, that, without the least evasion, I shall boldly declare the truth!—Not that, by breaking out into invectives*, I may expose my-

* *Not that, by breaking out into invectives.* Wolfius, whom the translator here follows, hath been severely censured for this interpretation by the Italian commentator, who renders the former part of the sentence thus: "Eos non ideo vocari velim, ut qui "olim convitiis dehonestatus fui, æque nunc mihi a vobis famam "conciliem."—παρ' ὑμῖν ought not to be rendered *a vobis*, but *apud vos:* or, as the translator, who follows Lucchesini's authority, has justly explained it, in his note, "in your presence." But my objection to this interpretation does not arise from grammatical nicety, but from a regard to the context, the surest comment. If Demosthenes, instead of the disgraceful treatment he formerly received, both from the partizans of Macedon and from the people, was now to be received with applause, and to triumph over his opposers, how could these have another opportunity of receiving Philip's gold? Such wages were only paid when earned. They were bestowed, not on ineffectual efforts, but real services; and these his friends could not perform, if disgraced and discouraged by the assembly. The whole sentiment of the orator, as translated by Wolfius, is this: "I do not wish "that these men may appear, in order to indulge my indigna- "tion and resentment against them, that so they may retort my "accusations with double virulence (as was the case when we "first returned from our embassy) and thus, by once more gain- "ing your favour, and triumphing over me, they may have an "opportunity of boasting their services to Philip, and obtaining "their reward." The passage manifestly alludes to the transactions of the assembly, when the ten ambassadors returned, who had been sent to treat with Philip about a peace: and which are

self to the like treatment, and once more give my old enemies an opportunity of receiving Philip's gold; nor yet that I may indulge an impertinent vanity of haranguing. But I apprehend the time must come, when Philip's actions will give you more concern than at present. His designs, I see, are ripening: I wish my apprehensions may not prove just; but I fear that time is not far off. And when it will no longer be in your power to disregard events; when neither mine, nor any other person's information, but your own knowledge, your own senses, will assure you of the impending danger; then will your severest resentment break forth. And as your ambassadors have concealed certain things, influenced (as they themselves are conscious) by corruption; I fear that they who endeavour to restore what these men have ruined, may feel the weight of your displeasure: for there are some, I find, who generally point their anger not at the deserving objects, but those most immediately at their mercy.

WHILE our affairs, therefore, remain not absolutely desperate; while it is yet in our power to debate; give me leave to remind you all of one thing, though none can be ignorant of it. Who was the man[a] that persuaded you to give up Phocis

particularly described by Demosthenes, in his oration *on the embassy*. And we may safely appeal to the reader, who consults that oration, as to the propriety of the present interpretation.

[a] *Who was the man*, &c. The person pointed at is Æschines. These two statesmen accused each other, when the bad conse-

and Thermopylæ? which, once gained, he also gained free access for his troops to Attica and to Peloponnesus; and obliged us to turn our thoughts from the rights of Greece, from all foreign interests, to a defensive war, in these very territories; whose approach must be severely felt by every one of us: and that very day gave birth to it; for, had we not been then deceived, the state could have nothing to apprehend. His naval power could not have been great enough to attempt Attica by sea, nor could he have passed by land through Thermopylæ and Phocis. But he must have either confined himself within the bounds of justice, and lived in a due observance of his treaty, or have instantly been involved in a war, equal to that which obliged him to sue for peace.

Thus much may be sufficient to recal past actions to your view. May all the gods forbid, that the event should confirm my suspicions! for I by no means desire that any man should meet even the deserved punishment of his crimes, when the whole community is in danger of being involved in his destruction.

quences of this treaty came to be universally felt and acknowledged.

END OF THE SECOND PHILIPPIC.

THE

ORATION

ON THE

STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS:

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF SOSIGENES,

TWO YEARS AFTER THE SECOND PHILIPPIC.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the foregoing oration, the vehemence of Demosthenes determined the Athenians to oppose the attempts of Philip, and his representations to the Argians and Messenians inspired them with suspicion, and at length detached them from all connections with Macedon. When Philip therefore found his practices in Peloponnesus unsuccessful, he began to turn his thoughts to other enterprises: to pursue his conquests in Thrace, and cross the Athenian interest in the Chersonesus. This peninsula had, with some little interruption, been for many years in the hands of the Athenians. Cotys, as king of the country, had lately wrested it from them, and left it in succession to his son Cersobleptes. But he being unable to support himself against the power of Philip, resigned it again to the Athenians; and they, according to custom, sent in a colony, which the inhabitants received, and freely shared their lands and habitations with their new guests. The people of Cardia, the principal city, however, still asserted their independence; and, when Diopithes, the commander of the Athenian colony, would have

reduced them by force of arms, had recourse to Philip, who immediately detached a body of forces to their support. Diopithes considered this proceeding as an act of hostility against Athens; without waiting for instructions from his state, raised a considerable force, and, while Philip was engaged in war in the inland parts of Thrace, entered the maritime parts (which were his territories) with fire and sword, and brought off a great booty, which he lodged safe in the Chersonesus. Philip was not at leisure to repel this insult: he therefore contented himself with complaining by letters to the Athenians of this conduct of their general. The pensioners which he had at Athens immediately exerted themselves for their master. They inveighed loudly against Diopithes, accused him of violating the peace which then subsisted between them and Philip, of involving the state in war, of exaction, rapine, and piracy, and pressed for his being recalled.

Demosthenes, judging that, at such a juncture the public interest was connected with that of Diopithes, undertakes his defence in the following oration; throws the whole blame of the exactions and piracies he is accused of upon the Athenians themselves; turns their attention to Philip and his hostilities; and concludes, that

whoever opposes or distresses him in any manner, does a service to the state; and that, instead of disavowing what Diopithes had done, or directing him to dismiss his army, they should reinforce him, and shew the king of Macedon, they know how to protect their territories, and to maintain the dignity of their country, as well as their ancestors.

It appears from the beginning of this oration, that before Demosthenes arose, the affair had been violently contested in the assembly. Possibly the heat of opposition added to the natural fire of the orator. For the style of the oration is (in my opinion) remarkably animated: and we find an extraordinary degree of severity and indignation breaking out in every part of it.

THE

ORATION

ON THE

STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS.

Sosigenes, Archon—A. R. Philip. 19.—Olympiad. 109. An. 3.

It were to be wished, Athenians! that they who speak in public would never suffer hatred or affection to influence their counsels; but, in all that they propose, be directed by unbiassed reason; particularly, when affairs of state, and those of highest moment, are the object of our attention. But since there are persons, whose speeches are partly dictated by a spirit of contention, partly by other like motives, it is your duty, Athenians! to exert that power which your numbers give you; and in all your resolutions, and in all your actions, to consider only the interest of your country.

Our present concernment is about the affairs of the Chersonesus, and Philip's expedition into Thrace, which hath now engaged him eleven months: but

most of our orators insist upon the actions and designs of Diopithes. As to crimes objected to those men whom our laws can punish when we please, I, for my part, think it quite indifferent, whether they be considered now, or at some other time; nor is this a point to be violently contested, by me or any other speaker. But when Philip, the enemy of our country, is now actually hovering about the Hellespont[a], with a numerous army, and making attempts on our dominions, which if one moment neglected, the loss may be irreparable; here, our attention is instantly demanded; we should resolve, we should prepare with all possible expedition, and not run from our main concern, in the midst of foreign clamours and accusations.

. . . . . .

I HAVE frequently been surprised at assertions made in public; but never more, than when I lately heard it affirmed in the senate[b], that there are but two expedients to be proposed, either absolutely to declare war, or to continue in peace. The point is this: if Philip acts as one in amity with us; if he does not keep possession of our dominions, contrary to his treaty; if he be not every where spiriting up enemies against us; all debates are

[a] *Hovering about the Hellespont.* By the Hellespont we are to understand not the streight itself that separates Europe from Asia, but the cities and countries all along the coast.

[b] *In the senate.* Into which Demosthenes had been admitted, in the archonship of Themistocles, a little after the taking of Olynthus. And (if we may believe Æschines) not in the regular manner, but by intrigue and bribery.

at an end; we are undoubtedly obliged to live in peace, and I find it perfectly agreeable to you. But if the articles of our treaty, ratified by the most solemn oaths, remain upon record open to public inspection; if it appears, that long before the departure of Diopithes and his colony, who are now accused of involving us in a war, Philip had unjustly seized many of our possessions (for which I appeal to your own decrees;) if, ever since that time, he has been constantly arming himself with all the powers of Greeks and Barbarians, to destroy us; what do these men mean, who affirm we are either absolutely to declare war, or to observe the peace? You have no choice at all; you have but one just and necessary measure to pursue, which they industriously pass over. And what is this? To repel force by force. Unless they will affirm, that, while Philip keeps from Attica and the Piræus[a], he does our state no injury, makes no war against us. If it be thus they state the bounds of peace and justice, we must all acknowledge that their sentiments are inconsistent with the

[a] *The Piræus.* This is the first time the orator mentions this celebrated port of Athens. It was at first detached from the city, but afterwards joined to it, by two long walls, which the Greeks called the Legs of the Piræus; and from that time, by the advice of Themistocles, the Athenians made this their principal harbour. It would contain 400 ships of war; was well fortified, and furnished with a market, to which all the trading part of Greece resorted. Historians call it the *triple port*, for it really contained three: the first called Κάνθαρος, from an hero of that name: the second Ἀφροδίσιον, from two temples of Venus that were erected in it: the third Ζέα, because it was the mart for corn. Tour.

common rights of mankind, with the dignity and the safety of Athens.

Besides, they themselves contradict their own accusation of Diopithes. For shall Philip be left at full liberty to pursue all his other designs, provided he keeps from Attica; and shall not Diopithes be permitted to assist the Thracians? and if he does, shall we accuse him of involving us in a war?——But this is their incessant cry, "our foreign troops commit outrageous devastations on "the Hellespont: Diopithes, without regard to "justice, seizes and plunders vessels! These things "must not be suffered!" Be it so: I acquiesce! but while they are labouring to have our troops disbanded by inveighing against that man, whose care and industry support them; (if they really speak from a regard to justice) they should shew us that, if we yield to their remonstrances, Philip's army also will be disbanded: else, it is apparent that their whole aim is to reduce the state to those circumstances which have occasioned all the losses we have lately suffered. For, be assured of this, that nothing hath given Philip such advantage over us, as his superior vigilance in improving all opportunities. For, as he is constantly surrounded by his troops, and his mind perpetually engaged in projecting his designs, he can, in a moment, strike the blow where he pleases. But we wait till some event alarms us: then we are in motion, then we prepare. To this alone I can impute it, that the

conquests he hath lately made he now enjoys in full security; while all your efforts are too late, all your vast expences ineffectual: your attempts have served only to discover your enmity, and inclination to oppose him; and the consequences of your misconduct are still further aggravated by the disgrace.

KNOW then, Athenians! that all our orators allege at present are but words, but idle pretences. Their whole designs, their whole endeavours are to confine you within the city; that, while we have no forces in the field, Philip may be at full liberty to act as he pleases. Consider the present posture of affairs. Philip is now stationed in Thrace, at the head of a large army; and (as we are here informed) sends for reinforcements from Macedon and Thessaly. Now, should he watch the blowing of the Etesian winds, march his forces to Byzantium, and invest it; in the first place, can you imagine that the Byzantines would persist in their present folly; or that they would not have recourse to you for assistance? I cannot think it. No: if there were a people in whom they less confided[a] than in us,

[a] *If there were a people in whom they less confided*, &c. In the third year of the 105th Olympiad, the Byzantines entered into a league with Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, against the Athenians, and withdrew themselves from their dominion. This is what Demosthenes calls their *folly and extravagance*. They had reason to think the Athenians would regard them as rebellious subjects, and treat them with the resentment of offended sovereigns; "however," says the orator, "if they were reduced to the alternative

they would receive even these into their city, rather than give it up to him; unless prevented by the quickness of their attack. And, should we be unable to sail thither, should there be no forces ready to support them, nothing can prevent their ruin. ——"But the extravagance and folly of these men "exceed all bounds."——I grant it. Yet still they should be secured from danger; for this is the interest of our state. Besides, it is by no means clear that he will not march into the Chersonesus itself. On the contrary, if we may judge from the letter which he sent to you, he is determined to oppose us in that country. If then the forces stationed there be still kept up, we may defend our own dominions, and infest those of our enemy; if they be once dispersed and broken, what shall we do, if he attempt the Chersonesus?——"Bring Diopithes to a trial."——And how will that serve us?—— "No: but we will dispatch succours from hence." ——What if the winds prevent us?——"But he "will not turn his arms thither."——Who will be our surety for this? Consider, Athenians! is not the season of the year approaching, in which it is thought by some, that you are to withdraw your forces from the Hellespont, and abandon it to Philip? But suppose, (for this too merits our attention) that, at his return from Thrace, he should neither

"of either submitting to Philip, or having recourse to you for "protection, they would without hesitation choose the latter." The event confirmed his prediction. Philip besieged Byzantium, the Byzantines had recourse to the Athenians, and Phocion, at the head of their army, obliged Philip to raise the siege. Tour.

bend his force against the Chersonesus, nor Byzantium, but fall on Chalcis or Megara, as he lately did upon Oreum[a]; which would be the wiser course, to oppose him here, and make Attica the seat of war, or to find him employment abroad? I think, the latter.

Let these things sink deep into our minds; and let us not raise invidious clamours against those forces which Diopithes is endeavouring to keep up for the service of his country, or attempt to break them; let us rather prepare to reinforce them; grant their general the necessary supplies of money, and in every other instance favour his designs with an hearty zeal. Imagine this question proposed to Philip: "which would be most agreeable to you, "that the forces commanded by Diopithes"—(of whatever kind they be, for I shall not dispute on that head) "should continue in full strength and "good esteem at Athens, and be reinforced by de-"tachments from the city; or that the clamours "and invectives of certain persons should prevail "to have them broken and disbanded?" I think he would choose this latter. And are there men among us labouring for that which Philip would intreat the gods to grant him? and, if so, is it still a question, whence our distresses have arisen?

Let me intreat you to examine the present state

[a] *As he lately did upon Oreum.* In the third Philippic, we shall find a particular account of the manner in which he reduced this city to his obedience.

of Athens, with an unbiassed freedom; *to consider* how we are acting, and how our affairs are conducted. We are neither willing to raise contributions, nor do we dare to take the field, nor do we spare the public funds, nor do we grant supplies to Diopithes, nor do we approve of those subsidies he hath procured himself: but we malign him, we pry into his designs, and watch his motions. Thus we proceed, quite regardless of our interests; and while in words we extol those speakers who assert the dignity of their country, our actions favour their opposers. It is usual, when a speaker rises, to ask him, "What are we to do?" Give me leave to propose the like question to you: "What am I to "say?" For, if you neither raise contributions, nor take the field, nor spare the public funds, nor grant subsidies to Diopithes, nor approve of those provisions he hath made himself, nor take the due care of our interests, I have nothing to say. If you grant such unbounded licence to informers, as even to listen to their accusations of a man, for what they pretend he will do, before it be yet done, what can one say?——

But it is necessary to explain to some of you the effect of this behaviour[a]: (I shall speak with an un-

[a] *But it is necessary to explain to some of you the effect of this behaviour.* To the same purpose hath the sentence been translated by Wolfius and Tourreil. But this interpretation, which is acknowledged consonant to grammatical rules of construction, hath yet been stigmatised as a total perversion of the author's reasoning, and the sense of the context. Clamours had been raised

daunted freedom, for in no other manner can I speak.)——It has been the constant custom of all

against an Athenian general, who had exacted contributions from the islanders and Grecian settlements along the coast of Asia. Demosthenes appears as his advocate. He proceeds, as it is observed, to shew, that it had ever been the custom of other commanders to raise the like contributions. Hence it is inferred, that the meaning of the phrase here quoted, must be, that *the general is warranted, by justice and custom, to act as he had done.* The orator, indeed, doth proceed to give instances of this custom. But this conclusion I cannot admit; for, whatever deference and respect the writers who have adopted it, may justly claim, a greater deference and respect is due to the original, where we find a conclusion of a different nature, deduced in express terms. "It hath been the constant custom," saith Demosthenes, "of all "the commanders who have sailed from this city, (if I advance "a falsehood, let me feel the severest punishment) to take money "from the Chians, and from the Erythrians, and from any peo-"ple that would give it; I mean of the inhabitants of Asia. "They who have but one or two ships take a talent; they who "command a greater force raise a larger contribution. And the "people who give this money, whether more or less, do not give "it for nothing: (they are not so mad) no: it is the price they "pay to secure their trading vessels from rapine and piracy, to "provide them with the necessary convoys, and the like; how-"ever they may pretend friendship and affection, and dignify "those payments with the name of free gifts. It is therefore "evident, that, as Diopithes is at the head of a considerable "power, the same contributions will be granted to him. Else, "how shall he pay his soldiers; how shall he maintain them, "who receives nothing from you, and has nothing of his own? "From the skies? No; but from what he can collect, and beg, "and borrow." Then follows the conclusion from the whole: Οὐδὲ ΟΤΝ ἄλλο ποιῆτι ὁι καληγορήνλες ἐν ὑμῖν, ἢ προλεγουσιν ἅπασι, &c. So THAT *the whole scheme of his accusers* [or the whole effect of their accusations] *is to warn all people to grant him nothing, &c. This is the meaning* [*or this is the* TENDENCY] *of their clamours.*

the commanders who have sailed from this city, (if I advance a falsehood, let me feel the severest punishment) to take money from the Chians, and from the Erythrians, and from any people that would give it; I mean of the inhabitants of Asia. They who have but one or two ships take a talent; they who command a greater force raise a larger contribution. And the people who give this money, whether more or less, do not give it for nothing; (they are not so mad), no; it is the price they pay, to secure their trading vessels from rapine and piracy, to provide them with the necessary convoys, and the like; however they may pretend friendship and affection, and dignify those payments with the name of free gifts. It is therefore evident, that as Diopithes is at the head of a considerable power, the same contributions will be granted to him. Else, how shall he pay his soldiers? how shall he maintain them, who receives nothing from you, and has nothing of his own? From the skies? No; but from what he can collect, and beg, and borrow. So that the whole scheme of his accusers is to warn all people to grant him nothing; as he is to suffer punishment for crimes yet to be committed, not for any he hath already committed, or in which he hath already assisted. This is the meaning of their clamours. "He is going to form "sieges? he leaves the Greeks exposed." Have these men all this tenderness for the Grecian colonies of Asia? They then prefer the interest of foreigners to that of their own country. This must

be the case, if they prevail, to have another general sent to the Hellespont. If Diopithes commit outrages, if he be guilty of piracy, one single edict[a], Athenians! a single edict will put a stop to such proceedings. This is the voice of our laws; that such offenders should be impeached[b] and not opposed[c] with such vast preparations of ships and

[a] *One single edict.* In the Greek Πινάκιον, which in this place may either signify the tablet which was fixed up in public, containing a citation of the accused party, and an account of the crimes of which he was accused; or that which was given to the judges who sat on his trial, to write their sentences upon. I have chosen the first of these senses.

[b] *That such offenders should be impeached.* The Greek words Εἰσαγγέλλειν, and Εἰσαγγελία, which I have translated to *impeach*, and *impeachment*, are terms in the Athenian judicature; and relate to those particular kind of actions, which were not referred to any court of justice, but immediately brought before the senate of 500, or assembly of the people, and sometimes before the Archon: and in which, both the accusation and defence were made by word of mouth, without any written articles.

[c] *And not opposed*, &c. The accusers of Diopithes raised loud clamours against his conduct. They insisted that he had committed depredations on the Grecian colonies, and was meditating further hostilities against them, contrary to his commission and instructions. They declared, that a force should be dispatched to defend them; which Demosthenes calls raising an army against Diopithes. "It is against our enemies," saith he, "whom our "laws cannot reach, that we are to raise our forces; when ci- "tizens have offended we can impeach them," &c. But this interpretation hath been loaded with the heavy charge of absurdity. If the translator had a right to pronounce so peremptorily and so severely, he would declare, that, by the same rule, every ardent expression, every bold figure, every lively image, in short, every

money; (this would be the height of madness:) it is against our enemies, whom the laws cannot touch, that we ought, we must maintain our forces, send out our navies, and raise our contributions. But when citizens have offended, we can decree, we can impeach, we can recall[a]. These are arms sufficient; these are the measures befitting men of prudence: they who would raise disorder and con-

thing in eloquence, not literally and strictly consonant to metaphysical truth, might be pronounced equally absurd. The meaning of the passage here quoted, is said to be, "We are not to protect the islanders by our armies, but to employ them against our enemies." But why were they to raise their armies against their enemies? Because their enemies were not punishable by the laws. Those, therefore, against whom they were not to raise their armies, must have been such as were punishable by the laws. This conclusion might, perhaps, be deemed natural and necessary, even if the orator had not expressly pointed out both those against whom they were, and were not to raise their armies. Ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐχθρούς; *Against enemies.* And, ἐπὶ δ' ἀν ἡμᾶς τοὺς; BUT *against ourselves*, i. e. our own citizens.

[a] *We can recall.* In the original, *we have the* Παράλος, that is the galley (called so, from the hero Paralus, who with Theseus signalized himself against the Thebans.) The Athenians had two gallies, the Salaminian, and Paralian, appointed for the most pressing occasions of the state. In allusion to this usage, Pericles was called the Salaminian galley, because he affected to appear in public only upon extraordinary emergencies. When Lysander had beaten the Athenian fleet at the Hellespont, the Paralian galley was dispatched with the melancholy news to the people. And when Alcibiades was recalled from Sicily, to defend himself against the charge of impiety, the Salaminian galley was ordered to bring him home. Both the one and the other were employed to recall such generals as were superseded. TOUR.

fusion in the state, may have recourse to such as these men propose.

But, dreadful as it is to have such men among us, yet the most dreadful circumstance of all is this. You assemble here, with minds so disposed, that, if any one accuses Diopithes, or Chares[a] or Aristophon[b], or any citizen whatever, as the cause of our misfortunes, you instantly break forth into acclamations and applause. But if a man stands forth, and thus declares the truth, "This is all trifling, "Athenians! It is to Philip we owe our cala- "mities: he hath plunged us in these difficulties: "for, had he observed his treaty, our state would "be in perfect tranquillity:" This you cannot

[a] *Or Chares.* This apology (says Monsieur Tourreil) savours a little of faction and cabal: their ill success might with great justice have been charged upon Chares. Indeed what could have been expected from a general no less incapable than luxurious, who in all his military expeditions drew after him a train of musicians, whom he kept in pay at the expence of his troops? accordingly his enterprises were unsuccessful; and, to crown all his miscarriages, he lost the battle of Chæronea. And yet this Chares was able to support himself to the last, by the credit of those orators who protected him.

[b] *Or Aristophon.* Another Athenian general. Aristotle (Rhet. l. ii. c. 23.) mentions a smart answer made to him by Iphicrates. Aristophon accused him of having betrayed the fleet which he commanded. Iphicrates, with that confidence which an established reputation inspires, asked him, *Would you be guilty of such a piece of treachery? By no means*, answered he. *What!* returned the other, *can Iphicrates have committed what Aristophon would refuse to do?*

deny; but you hear it with the utmost grief, as if it were the account of some dreadful misfortune. The cause is this; (for, when I am to urge the interest of my country, let me speak boldly)—Certain persons, who have been intrusted with public affairs, have for a long time past rendered you daring and terrible in council; but, in all affairs of war, wretched and contemptible. Hence it is, that if a citizen, subject to your own power and jurisdiction, be pointed out as the author of your misfortunes, you hear the accusation with applause; but if they are charged upon a man, who must first be conquered before he can be punished, then you are utterly disconcerted: that truth is too severe to be borne. Your ministers, Athenians! should take a quite contrary course. They should render you gentle and humane in council, where the rights of citizens and allies come before you: in military affairs they should inspire you with fierceness and intrepidity; for here you are engaged with enemies, with armed troops. But now, by leading you gently on to their purposes by the most abject compliance with your humours, they have so formed and moulded you, that in your assemblies you are delicate, and attend but to flattery and entertainment; in your affairs, you find yourselves threatened with extremity of danger.

And now, in the name of Heaven, suppose that the states of Greece should thus demand[a] an

[a] *Suppose that the states of Greece should thus demand,* &c.

account of those opportunities which your indolence hath lost. "Men of Athens! you are ever "sending embassies to us; you assure us that Philip "is projecting our ruin, and that of all the Greeks, "you warn us to guard against this man's designs." (And it is too true, we have done thus.) "But, "O most wretched of mankind! when this man "had been ten months detained abroad; when "sickness, and the severity of winter, and the "armies of his enemies, rendered it impossible for "him to return home; you neither restored the "liberty of Eubœa, nor recovered any of your own "dominions. But while you sit at home in per-"fect ease, and health, if such a state may be cal-"led health, Eubœa is commanded by his two "tyrants[a]; the one, just opposite to Attica, to "keep you perpetually in awe; the other to Scy-"athus. Yet you have not attempted to oppose "even this. No; you have submitted; you have "been insensible to your wrongs; you have fully "declared, that, if Philip were ten times to die, it

After the taking of Olynthus, when the Athenians were at last prevailed upon to declare war in form against Philip, they sent embassies to all the states of Greece, to represent the danger of his growing power, and to engage them to join against him. From hence the orator takes occasion to introduce this beautiful Prosopopœia, by which he throws out the bitterest reproaches against his countrymen, so artfully, as not to give them offence, and yet at the same time sets the shamefulness of their misconduct in the strongest light. TOUR.

[a] *By his two tyrants.* Philistides and Clitarchus: the one fixed at Eretria, opposite to Attica; the other at Oreum, over-against Scyathus, an island subject to Athens.

" would not inspire you with the least degree of " vigour. Why then these embassies, these accu- " sations, all this unnecessary trouble, to us ?"—If they should say this, what could we allege ? what answer could we give ? I know not !

We have those among us, who think a speaker fully confuted by asking, " What then is to be " done ?" to whom I answer, with the utmost truth and justness, " not what we are now doing."—— But I shall be more explicit, if they will be as ready to follow, as to ask advice.

First then, Athenians ! be firmly convinced of these truths : That Philip does commit hostilities against us, and has violated the peace ; (and let us no longer accuse each other of his crimes ;)—that he is the implacable enemy of this whole city, of the ground on which this city stands, of every inhabitant within these walls ; even of those who imagine themselves highest in his favour. If they doubt this, let them think of Euthycrates and Lasthenes, the Olynthians. They who seemed the nearest to his heart, the moment they betrayed their country, were distinguished only by the superior cruelty of their death. But it is against our constitution that his arms are principally directed ; nor, in all his schemes, in all his actions, hath he any thing so immediately in view, as to subvert it. And there is in some sort a necessity for this. He knows full well, that his conquests however great and extensive, can never be secure, while you con-

tinue free; but that, if once he meets with any accident, (and every man is subject to many) all those whom he hath forced into his service will instantly revolt, and fly to you for protection. For you are not naturally disposed to grasp at empire yourselves; but to frustrate the ambitious attempts of others; to be ever ready to oppose usurpation, and assert the liberty of mankind: this is your peculiar character. And therefore it is not without regret that he sees, in your freedom, a spy upon the incidents of his fortune. Nor is this his reasoning weak or trivial.

In the first place, therefore, we are to consider him as the enemy of our state, the implacable enemy of our free constitution. Nothing but the deepest sense of this can give you a true, vigorous, and active spirit. In the next place, be assured, that every thing he is now labouring, every thing he is concerting, he is concerting against our city; and that, wherever any man opposes him, he opposes an attempt against these walls. For none of you can be weak enough to imagine that Philip's desires are centred in those paltry villages of Thrace; (for what name else can one give to Drongilus, and Cabyle and Mastira[a], and all those places

[a] *For what name else can one give to Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Mastira*, &c. Drongilus and Cabyle, however the orator affects to treat them with contempt, are yet mentioned in history. As to Mastira, it is entirely unknown: hence Harpocration suggested, that instead of Mastira we should read Bastira, a town of Thrace of that name, having been mentioned in a history of Philip, written by Anaximenes, a work a long time lost. Tour.

he is now reducing to his obedience?) that he endures the severity of toils and seasons, and braves the utmost dangers for these; and has no designs upon the ports, and the arsenals, and the navies, and the silver-mines, and all the other revenues of Athens; but that he will leave them for you to enjoy; while, for some wretched hoards of grain in the cells of Thrace, he takes up his winter-quarters in the horrors of a dungeon[a]? Impossible! No; these and all his expeditions are really intended to facilitate the conquest of Athens.

Let us then approve ourselves men of wisdom; and, fully persuaded of these truths, let us shake off our extravagant and dangerous supineness. Let us supply the necessary expences; let us call upon our allies; let us take all possible measures for keeping up a regular army: so that, as he hath his force constantly prepared to injure and enslave the Greeks, yours too may be ever ready to protect and assist them. If you depend upon occasional detachments you cannot ever expect the least degree of success: you must keep an army constantly on foot, provide for its maintenance, appoint public treasurers, and by all possible means secure your military funds: and, while these officers account for all disburse-

[a] *In the horrors of a dungeon.* In the original it is in a *Barathrum.* There was a ditch or cavern in Athens of that name, into which criminals were precipitated. So that by this figure he not only represents the dreadful and deadly nature of the country, but at the same time sets Philip in the light of a wicked wretch, who merited the vilest and most ignominious fate. Tour.

ments, let your generals be bound to answer for the conduct of the war. Let these be your measures, these your resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the real observance of an equitable peace, and to confine himself to his own kingdom, (which is most for our interest) or we shall fight him upon equal terms.

If any man thinks that the measures I propose will require great expence, and be attended with much toil and trouble, he thinks justly. Yet, let him consider what consequences must attend the state, if these measures be neglected; and it will appear, that we shall really be gainers, by engaging heartily in this cause. Suppose some god should be our surety, (for no mortal ought to be relied on in an affair of such moment,) that, if we continue quiet, and give up all our interests, he will not at last turn his arms against us; it would yet be shameful; It would (I call all the powers of heaven to witness!) be unworthy of you, unworthy the dignity of your country, and the glory of your ancestors, to abandon the rest of Greece to slavery, for the sake of private ease. I, for my part, would die, rather than propose so mean a conduct: however, if there be any other person who will recommend it, be it so; neglect your defence; give up your interests! But, if there be no such counsellor; if, on the contrary, we all foresee, that the farther this man is suffered to extend his conquests, the more formidable and powerful enemy we must find in him; why this reluctance? why do we

delay? or when, my countrymen! will we perform our duty? Must some necessity compel us? What one may call the necessity of freemen, not only presses us now, but hath long since been felt: that of slaves, it is to be wished, may never approach us. And how do these differ? To a freeman, the disgrace of past misconduct is the most urgent necessity! to a slave, stripes and bodily pains. Far be this from us! It ought not to be mentioned!

I WOULD now gladly lay before you the whole conduct of certain politicians; but I spare them. One thing only I shall observe: The moment that Philip is mentioned, there is still one ready to start up, and cry, "What a happiness to live in peace! "how grievous the maintenance of a great army! "certain persons have designs upon our treasury!" Thus they delay your resolutions, and give him full liberty to act as he pleases: hence you gain ease and indulgence for the present, (which I fear may, at some time, prove too dear a purchase;) and these men recommend themselves to your favour, and are well paid for their service. But, in my opinion, there is no need to persuade you to peace, who sit down already thoroughly persuaded. Let it be recommended to him who is committing hostilities: if he can be prevailed on, you are ready to concur. Nor should we think those expences grievous which our security requires; but the consequences which must arise, if such expences be de-

nied. Then, as to plundering our treasury, this must be prevented by intrusting it to proper guardians, not by neglecting our affairs. For my own part, Athenians! I am filled with indignation, when I find some persons expressing their impatience, as if our treasures were exposed to plunderers; and yet utterly unaffected at the progress of Philip, who is successively plundering every state of Greece; and this, that he may at last fall with all his fury upon you.

WHAT then can be the reason, Athenians! that, notwithstanding all his manifest hostilities, all his acts of violence, all the places he hath taken from us, these men will not acknowledge that he hath acted unjustly, and that he is at war with us; but accuse those of embroiling you in a war, who call upon you to oppose him, and to check his progress? I shall tell you. That popular resentment which may arise from any disagreeable circumstances with which a war may be attended, (and it is necessary, absolutely necessary, that a war should be attended with many such disagreeable circumstances,) they would cast upon your faithful counsellors, that you may pass sentence upon them, instead of opposing Philip; and they turn accusers, instead of meeting the punishment due to their present practices. This is the meaning of their clamours, that certain persons would involve you in a war: hence have they raised all these cavils and debates. I know full well, that, before any Athenian had ever moved you to declare war against him, Philip had seized many

of our dominions; and hath now sent assistance to the Cardians. If you are resolved to dissemble your sense of his hostilities, he would be the weakest of mankind if he attempted to contradict you. But, suppose he marches directly against us, what shall we say in that case? He will still assure us, that he is not at war: such were his professions to the people of Oreum, when his forces were in the heart of their country; and to those of Pheræ, until the moment that he attacked their walls; and thus he at first amused the Olynthians, until he had marched his army into their territory. And, will you still insist, even in such a case, that they who call upon us to defend our country are embroiling us in a war? Then slavery is inevitable. There is no other medium between an obstinate refusal to take arms, on your part, and a determined resolution to attack us, on the part of our enemy.

Nor is the danger which threatens us the same with that of other people. It is not the conquest of Athens which Philip aims at: no, it is our utter extirpation. He knows full well, that slavery is a state you would not, or, if you were inclined, you could not submit to; for sovereignty is become habitual to you. Nor is he ignorant, that, at any unfavourable juncture, you have more power to obstruct his enterprises, than the whole world besides.

Let us then be assured, that we are contending for the very being of our state; let this inspire us with abhorrence of those who have sold themselves

to this man; and let them feel the severity of public justice: for it is not, it is not possible to conquer our foreign enemy, until we have punished those traitors who are serving him within our walls. Else, while we strike on these, as so many obstacles, our enemies must necessarily prove superior to us. ——And whence is it that he dares treat you with insolence, (I cannot give his present conduct any other name,) that he utters menaces against you, while on others he confers acts of kindness? (to deceive them at least, if for no other purpose!) Thus, by heaping favours on the Thessalians, he hath reduced them to their present slavery. Is it not possible to recount the various artifices by which he abused the wretched Olynthians, from his first insidious gift of Potidæa? But now he seduced the Thebans to his party, by making them masters of Bœotia, and easing them of a great and grievous war. And thus, by being gratified in some favourite point, these people are either involved in calamities known to the whole world, or wait with submission for the moment when such calamities are to fall upon them. I do not recount all that you yourselves have lost, Athenians! but in the very conclusion of the peace, how have you been deceived? how have you been despoiled? Was not Phocis, was not Thermopylæ, were not our Thracian dominions, Doriscum, Serrium, and even our ally Cersobleptes*, all wrested from us? Is he

* *And even our ally Cersobleptes.* The late treaty of peace between Philip and the Athenians, was concluded without giving

not at this time in possession of Cardia? and does he not avow it? Whence is it, I say, that he treats you in so singular a manner? Because ours is the only state where there is allowed full liberty to plead the cause of an enemy; and the man who sells his country may harangue securely, at the very time that you are spoiled of your dominions. It was not safe to speak for Philip at Olynthus, until the people of Olynthus had been gained by the surrender of Potidæa. In Thessaly, it was not safe to speak for Philip, until the Thessalians had been gained by the expulsion of the tyrants, and the recovery of their rank of Amphictyons; nor could it have been safely attempted at Thebes, before he had restored Bœotia, and extirpated the Phocians. But at Athens, although he hath robbed us of Amphipolis, and the territory of Cardia; though he awes us with his fortifications in Eubœa; though he be now upon his march to Byzantium[a]; yet his partizans may speak for Philip without any danger. Hence some of them, from the meanest property, have on a sudden risen to affluence; some, from obscurity and disgrace, to eminence and honour: while you, on the contrary, from glory, have sunk into meanness; from riches, to poverty: for the

Cersobleptes (then in alliance with Athens) an opportunity of acceding to it: nor was any provision made by it for his security and protection. By this means Philip found himself at liberty to turn his arms against him, and a few years after drove him from his kingdom, and obliged him to become his tributary.

[a] *To Byzantium.* See the introduction to the following oration.

riches of a state I take to be its allies, its credit, its connexions; in all which you are poor. And by your neglect of these, by your utter insensibility to your wrongs, he is become fortunate and great, the terror of Greeks and Barbarians; and you abandoned and despised; splendid indeed is the abundance[a] of your markets; but, as to any real provision for your security, ridiculously deficient.

THERE are some orators, I find, who view your interests and their own in a quite different light. They would persuade you to continue quiet, whatever injuries are offered to you: they themselves cannot be quiet, though no one offers them the least injury. When one of these men rises, I am sure to hear, "What! will you not propose your "decree? will you not venture? No; you are "timid, you want true spirit."——I own, indeed, I

[a] *Splendid indeed is the abundance,* &c. They who opposed Philip's interest in the Athenian assembly, were ever urging the fallen condition of their country, and the dishonour of suffering another power to wrest that pre-eminence from her which had been enjoyed for ages. The speakers on the other side at first affected to despise the power of Philip, or insisted on the sincerity and uprightness of his intentions. But now, when the danger became too apparent, and his designs too flagrant to be dissembled, it appears that they had recourse to other arguments. They endeavoured to confine the views of the Athenians to what passed within their own walls; displayed the advantages of their trade, the flourishing state of their commerce; and perhaps recommended it as their true policy, to attend only to these, without making themselves a party in the quarrels of others, or loading the state with the expence of maintaining wars to support the power and interest of foreigners.

am not, nor would I choose to be a bold, an importunate, an audacious speaker. And yet, if I mistake not, I have more real courage than they who manage your affairs with this rash hardiness. For he who, neglecting the public interests, is engaged only in trials, in confiscations, in rewarding, in accusing, doth not act from any principle of courage; but as he never speaks but to gain your favour, never proposes measures that are attended with the least hazard: in this he has a pledge of his security; and therefore he is daring. But he who for his country's good, oftentimes opposes your inclinations; who gives the most salutary, though not always the most agreeable counsel; who pursues those measures whose success depends more on fortune than on prudence, and is yet willing to be accountable for the event; this is the man of courage, this is the true patriot: not they who, by flattering your passions, have lost the most important interests of the state: men whom I am so far from imitating, or deeming citizens of worth, that should this question be proposed to me, "What "services have you done your country?" although I might recount the galleys I have fitted out, and the public entertainments I have exhibited[a], and the

[a] *The public entertainments I have exhibited.* In the original, it is the offices of *Choregus* that I have discharged. Each of the ten tribes of Athens had their bands of musicians to perform in the feasts of Bacchus, together with a poet, to compose the hymns and other pieces; and these bands contended for a prize. The feasts were exhibited with great magnificence; and in order to defray the charges, they appointed the richest citizens out of each

contributions I have paid, and the captives I have ransomed[a], and many like acts of benevolence, I would yet pass them all by, and only say, that my public conduct hath ever been directly opposite to theirs. I might, like them, have turned accuser, have distributed rewards and punishments; but this is a part I never assumed: my inclinations were averse; nor could wealth or honours prompt me to it. No; I confine myself to such counsels as have sunk my reputation; but, if pursued, must raise the reputation of my country. Thus much I may be allowed to say, without exposing myself to envy. ——I should not have thought myself a good citizen, had I proposed such measures as would have made me the first among my countrymen, but reduced you to the last of states: on the contrary, the faithful minister should raise the glory of his country; and, upon all occasions, advise the most salutary, not the easiest measures. To these, nature itself inclines; those are not to be promoted, but by the utmost efforts of a wise and faithful counsellor.

I HAVE heard it objected, "that indeed I ever "speak with reason; yet still this is no more than

tribe (or sometimes he offered himself) to exhibit them at his own cost. He was called the Choregus; and, if his band gained the prize, his name was inscribed, together with those of the tribe and the poet, upon the vase; which was the reward of the conquerors. TOUR.

[a] *The captives I have ransomed.* See the preface to the Oration on the Peace.

" words: that the state requires something more " effectual, some vigorous actions." Upon which I shall give my sentiments, without the least reserve. The sole business of a speaker is, in my opinion, to propose the course you are to pursue. This were easy to be proved. You know, that when the great Timotheus moved you to defend the Eubœans, against the tyranny of Thebes, he addressed you thus: " What, my countrymen! " when the Thebans are actually in the island, are " you deliberating what is to be done? what part " to be taken? Will you not cover the seas with " your navies? why are you not at the Piræus? " why are you not embarked?"—Thus Timotheus advised; thus you acted; and success ensued. But had he spoken with the same spirit, and had your indolence prevailed, and his advice been rejected, would the state have had the same success? By no means. And so, in the present case; vigour and execution is your part; from your speakers you are only to expect wisdom and integrity.

I SHALL just give the summary of my opinion, and then descend. You should raise supplies, you should keep up your present forces, and reform whatever abuses may be found in them (not break them entirely upon the first complaint). You should send ambassadors into all parts, to reform, to remonstrate, to exert all their efforts in the service of the state. But, above all things, let those corrupt ministers feel the severest punishment; let them, at all times, and in all places, be the objects

of your abhorrence; that wise and faithful counsellors may appear to have consulted their own interests, as well as that of others.—If you will act thus, if you will shake off this indolence, perhaps, even yet, perhaps, we may promise ourselves some good fortune. But if you only just exert yourselves in acclamations and applauses, and when any thing is to be done, sink again into your supineness, I do not see how all the wisdom in the world can save the state from ruin, when you deny your assistance.

END OF THE ORATION ON THE CHERSONESUS.

THE

TENTH ORATION

AGAINST

PHILIP:

COMMONLY CALLED THE THIRD.

PRONOUNCED

IN THE SAME YEAR.

INTRODUCTION.

THE former oration had its effect. For, instead of punishing Diopithes, the Athenians supplied him with money, in order to put him in a condition of continuing his expeditions. In the mean time Philip pursued his Thracian conquests, and made himself master of several places, which, though of little importance in themselves, yet opened him a way to the cities of the Propontis, and above all to Byzantium, which he had always intended to annex to his dominions. He at first tried the way of negotiation, in order to gain the Byzantines into the number of his allies; but this proving ineffectual, he resolved to proceed in another manner. He had a party in the city, at whose head was the orator Python, that engaged to deliver him up one of the gates: but, while he was on his march towards the city, the conspiracy was discovered, which immediately determined him to take another route. His sudden countermarch, intended to conceal the crime of Python, really served to confirm it. He was brought to trial; but the credit, and the presents of Philip, prevailed to save him.

The efforts of the Athenians to support their interests in Eubœa, and the power which Philip had acquired there, and which every day increased, had entirely destroyed the tranquillity of this island. The people of Oreum, divided by the Athenian and Macedonian factions, were on the point of breaking out into a civil war, when, under pretence of restoring their peace, Philip sent them a body of a thousand forces, under the command of Hipponicus; which soon determined the superiority to his side. Philistides, a tyrant, who had grown old in factions and public contests, was entrusted with the government of Oreum, which he administered with all possible severity and cruelty to those in the Athenian interest; while the other states of the island were also subjected to other Macedonian governors. Callias, the Chalcidian, whose inconstancy had made him espouse the interests of Athens, of Thebes, and Macedon, successively, now returned to his engagements with Athens. He sent deputies thither to desire assistance, and to prevail on the Athenians to make some vigorous attempt to regain their power in Eubœa.

In the mean time the king of Persia, alarmed by the accounts of Philip's growing power, made use of all the influence which his gold could

gain at Athens, to engage the Athenians to act openly against an enemy equally suspected by them both. This circumstance perhaps disposed them to give the greater attention to the following oration.

PHILIPPIC THE THIRD.

Sosigenes, Archon—A. R. Philip 19.—Olympiad 109. An. 3.

THOUGH we have heard a great deal, (Athenians!) in almost every assembly, of those acts of violence which Philip hath been committing, ever since his treaty, not against ours only, but the other states of Greece; though all (I am confident) are ready to acknowledge, even they who fail in the performance, that we should every one of us, exert our efforts, in council and in action, to oppose and to chastise his insolence; yet, to such circumstances are you reduced by your supineness, that, I fear, (shocking as it is to say, yet) that, had we all agreed to propose, and you to embrace such measures, as would most effectually ruin our affairs, they could not have been more distressed than at present. And to this, perhaps, a variety of causes have conspired; nor could we have been thus affected by one or two. But, upon a strict and just inquiry, you will find it principally owing to those orators, who study rather to gain your favour, than to advance your interests. Some of whom (attentive only to the means of establishing their own reputation and power) never extend their thoughts beyond the present moment, and therefore think that your views are equally confined. Others, by their accusations and invec-

tives against those at the head of affairs, labour only to make the state inflict severity upon itself; that, while we are thus engaged, Philip may have full power of speaking and of acting as he pleases. Such are now the usual methods of our statesmen, and hence all our errors and disorders.

LET me intreat you, my countrymen, that if I speak some truths with boldness, I may not be exposed to your resentment. Consider this: on other occasions, you account liberty of speech so general a privilege of all within your walls, that aliens and slaves[a] are allowed to share it. So that many domestics may be found among you, speaking their thoughts with less reserve than citizens in some other states. But from your councils you have utterly banished it. And the consequence is this: in your assemblies, as you listen only to be pleased, you meet with flattery and indulgence: in the cir-

[a] *Aliens and slaves.* The Athenians piqued themselves upon being the most independent and most humane of all people. With them a stranger had liberty of speaking as he pleased, provided he let nothing escape him against the government. So far were they from admitting him into their public deliberations, that a citizen was not permitted to touch on state affairs in the presence of an alien. Their slaves enjoyed a proportionable degree of indulgence. The Saturnalia, when they were allowed to assume the character of masters, was originally an Athenian institution, and adopted at Rome by Numa. At Sparta and Thessaly, on the contrary, slaves were treated with such severity, as obliged them frequently to revolt. The humanity of Athens had its reward; for their slaves did them considerable service on several occasions; at Marathon, in the war of Egina, and at Arginusæ.

cumstances of public affairs, you find yourselves threatened with the extremity of danger. If you have still the same dispositions, I must be silent: if you will attend to your true interests, without expecting to be flattered, I am ready to speak. For although our affairs are wretchedly situated, though our inactivity hath occasioned many losses, yet, by proper vigour and resolution, you may still repair them all. What I am now going to advance may possibly appear incredible; yet it is a certain truth. The greatest of all our past misfortunes is a circumstance the most favourable to our future expectations. And what is this? That the present difficulties are really owing to our utter disregard of every thing which in any degree affected our interests. For, were we thus situated, in spite of every effort which our duty demanded, then we should regard our fortune as absolutely desperate. But now Philip hath conquered your supineness and inactivity; the state he hath not conquered. Nor have you been defeated; your force hath not even been exerted.

WERE it generally acknowledged that Philip was at war with the state, and had really violated the peace, the only point to be considered would then be, how to oppose him with the greatest ease and safety. But, since there are persons so strangely infatuated, that, although he be still extending his conquests, although he hath possessed himself of a considerable part of our dominions, although all mankind have suffered by his injustice, they can

yet hear it repeated in this assembly, that it is some of us who are embroiling the state in war. This suggestion must first be guarded against, else there is reason to apprehend that the man who moves you to oppose your adversary, may incur the censure of being the author of the war.

And, first of all, I lay down this as certain: if it were in our power to determine whether we should be at peace or war; if peace (that I may begin with this) were wholly dependent upon the option of the state, there is no doubt but we should embrace it. And I expect, that he who asserts it is, will, without attempting to prevaricate, draw up his decree in form, and propose it to your acceptance. But if the other party hath drawn the sword and gathered his armies round him; if he amuse us with the name of peace, while he really proceeds to all kinds of hostilities, what remains but to oppose him? To make professions of peace, indeed, like him;—if this be agreeable to you, I acquiesce. But if any man takes that for peace, which is enabling him, after all his other conquests, to lead his forces hither, his mind must be disordered: at least, it is our conduct only towards him, not his towards us, that must be called a peace. But this it is for which all Philip's treasures are expended, that he should carry on the war against you, but that you should make no war on him.—Should we continue thus inactive, till he declares himself our enemy, we should be the weakest of mortals. This he would not do, although he were in the heart of

Attica, even at the Piræus, if we may judge from his behaviour to others. For it was not till he came within a few miles[a] of Olynthus that he declared that "either the Olynthians must quit their "city, or he his kingdom." Had he been accused of this at any time before, he would have resented it, and ambassadors must have been dispatched to justify their master. In like manner, while he was moving towards the Phocians; he still affected to regard them as allies and friends: nay, there were actually ambassadors from Phocis, who attended him in his march; and among us were many who insisted that this march portended no good to Thebes. Not long since, when he went into Thessaly, with all the appearance of amity, he possessed himself of Pheræ. And it is but now he told the wretched people of Oreum, that he had, in all affection, sent some forces to inspect their affairs: for that he heard they laboured under disorders and seditions; and that true friends and allies should not be absent upon such occasions. And can you imagine that he who chose to make use of artifice, rather than open force, against enemies by no means able to distress him, who at most could but have defended themselves against him, that he will openly proclaim his hostile designs against you; and this, when you yourselves obstinately shut your eyes against them? Impossible! He would be the absurdest of mankind, if, while his outrages pass

[a] *A few miles*, &c. In the original, *forty stadia*, about five miles.

unnoticed, while you are wholly engaged in accusing some among yourselves, and endeavouring to bring them to a trial, he should put an end to your private contests, warn you to direct all your zeal against him, and so deprive his pensioners of their most specious pretence for suspending your resolutions, that of his not being at war with the state. Heavens! is there any man of a right mind, who would judge of peace or war by words, and not by actions? Surely no man. *To examine then the actions of Philip.*—When the peace was just concluded, before ever Diopithes had received his commission, or those in the Chersonesus had been sent out, he possessed himself of Serrium and Doriscum, and obliged the forces our general had stationed in the citadel of Serrium and the Sacred Mount to evacuate these places. From these proceedings, what are we to judge of him? The peace he had ratified by the most solemn oaths.——And let it not be asked[a], of what moment is all this? or how is the state affected by it? Whether these things be of no moment, or whether we are affected by them or no, is a question of another nature. Let the instance of violation be great or small, the sacred obligation of faith and justice is, in all instances, the same.

But farther: when he sends his forces into the Chersonesus, which the KING, which every state

[a] *Let it not be asked,* &c. The partisans of Philip affected to speak with contempt of these places. To deny the right of Athens to them was dangerous and unpopular; they therefore endeavoured to represent them as beneath the public regard.

of Greece acknowledged to be ours; when he confessedly assists our enemies, and braves us with such letters, what are his intentions? for they say he is not at war with us. For my own part, so far am I from acknowledging such conduct to be consistent with his treaty, that I declare, that by his attack of the Megareans, by his attempts upon the liberty of Eubœa, by his late incursion into Thrace, by his practices in Peloponnesus, and by his constant recourse to the power of arms, in all his transactions, he has violated the treaty, and is at war with you, unless you will affirm, that he who prepares to invest a city is still at peace, until the walls be actually assaulted. You cannot, surely, affirm it! He whose designs, whose whole conduct, tends to reduce me to subjection, that man is at war with me, though not a blow hath yet been given, nor one weapon drawn. And, if any accident should happen, to what dangers must you be exposed! The Hellespont will be no longer yours: your enemy will become master of Megara and Eubœa: the Peloponnesians will be gained over to his interest. And shall I say, that the man who is thus raising his engines, and preparing to storm the city, that he is at peace with you? No: from that day in which Phocis fell beneath his arms, I date his hostilities against you. If you will instantly oppose him, I pronounce you wise; if you delay, it will not be in your power when you are inclined. And so far, Athenians! do I differ from some other speakers, that I think it now no time to debate about the Chersonesus or Byzantium; but that we

should immediately send reinforcements, and guard these places from all accidents, supply the generals stationed there with every thing they stand in need of, and extend our care to all the Greeks, now in the greatest and most imminent danger. Let me entreat your attention, while I explain the reasons which induce me to be apprehensive of this danger: that, if they are just, you may adopt them, and be provident of your own interests at least, if those of others do not affect you: or, if they appear frivolous and impertinent, you may now, and ever hereafter, neglect me as a man of an unsound mind.

THAT Philip, from a mean and inconsiderable origin, hath advanced to greatness; that suspicion and faction divide all the Greeks; that it is more to be admired that he should become so powerful from what he was, than that now, after such accessions of strength, he should accomplish all his ambitious schemes: these, and other like points which might be dwelt upon, I choose to pass over. But there is one concession, which, by the influence of your example, all men have made to him, which hath heretofore been the cause of all the Grecian wars. And what is this? an absolute power to act as he pleases, thus to harass and plunder every state of Greece successively, to invade and to enslave their cities. You held the sovereignty of Greece seventy-three years[a]: the Lacedemonians commanded for the space of twenty-nine years[b]: and

[a] *Seventy-three years.* See a note on Olynth. 2. p. 105.

[b] *Twenty-nine years,* That is, from the destruction of Athens

in these latter times, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans were in some degree of eminence. Yet neither to you, nor to the Thebans, nor to the Lacedemonians, did the Greeks ever grant this uncontrouled power: far from it. On the contrary, when you, or rather the Athenians of that age, seemed to treat some persons not with due moderation, it was universally resolved to take up arms; even they who had no private complaints espoused the cause of the injured. And, when the Lacedemonians succeeded to your power, the moment that they attempted to enlarge their sway, and to make such changes in affairs as betrayed their ambitious designs, they were opposed by all, even by those who were not immediately affected by their conduct. But why do I speak of others? we ourselves and the Lacedemonians, though from the first we could allege no injuries against each other, yet, to redress the injured, thought ourselves bound to draw the sword. And all the faults of the Lacedemonians in their thirty years, and of our ancestors in their seventy years, do not amount to the outrages which Philip hath committed against the Greeks, within less than thirteen years of power[a],

by Lysander, in the last year of the 93d Olympiad, to the first war in which the Athenians, when re-established by Conon, engaged against Sparta, to free themselves and the other Grecks from the Spartan yoke, in the last year of the 100th Olympiad.

TOUR.

[a] *Thirteen years of power.* Philip had now reigned nineteen years. But, being at first engaged in wars with his neighbours, he did not begin to make any considerable figure in Greece until

or rather do not all make up the smallest part of them. This I shall easily prove in a few words.

Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and the two-and-thirty cities of Thrace, I pass all over, every one of which felt such severe effects of his cruelty, that an observer could not easily determine whether any of them had ever been inhabited or no. The destruction of the Phocians, a people so considerable, shall also pass unnoticed. But, think on the condition of the Thessalians. Hath he not subverted their states and cities?—hath he not established his tetrarchs over them, that not only single towns, but whole countries[a], might pay him vassalage?—are not the states of Eubœa in the hands of tyrants, and this in an island bordering on Thebes and Athens?—are not these the express words of his letters, "they who are willing to obey "me may expect peace from me?" And he not only writes, but confirms his menaces by actions. He marches directly to the Hellespont; but just before he attacked Ambracia; Elis[b], one of the

the eighth year of his reign, when, after the taking of Methone, he expelled the tyrants of Thessaly, and cut off the Phocian army commanded by Onomarchus. From this period Demosthenes begins his computation. Tour.

[a] *Whole countries*, &c. The word in the original signifies a number of different people dependent on one principal state or city.

[b] *Elis*, &c. He made himself master of this place by treaty, not by force of arms. Elis entered into the league of the Am-

chief cities of Peloponnesus, is in his possession; not long since he entertained designs against Megara. All Greece, all the barbarian world, is too narrow for this man's ambition. And though we Greeks see and hear all this, we send no embassies to each other, we express no resentment; but into such wretchedness are we sunk, (blocked up within our several cities,) that even to this day, we have not been able to perform the least part of that, which our interest or our duty demanded; to engage in any associations, or to form any confederacies; but look with unconcern upon this man's growing power, each fondly imagining, (as far as I can judge) that the time in which another is destroyed is gained to him, without ever consulting or acting for the cause of Greece; although no man can be ignorant that, like the regular periodic return of a fever, or other disorder, he is coming upon those who think themselves most remote from danger.

You are also sensible, that whatever injuries the Greeks suffered by the Lacedemonians, or by us, they suffered by the true sons of Greece. And one may consider it in this light. Suppose a lawful heir, born to an affluence of fortune, should, in some instances, be guilty of misconduct; he indeed lies open to the justest censure and reproach; yet

phictyons, by which Philip was acknowledged as their chief; and maintained its freedom till after the death of Alexander.

it cannot be said that he hath lavished a fortune to which he had no claim, no right of inheritance. But, should a slave, should a pretended son, waste those possessions which really belonged to others, how much more heinous would it be thought! how much more worthy of resentment! And shall not Philip and his actions raise the like indignation? he, who is not only no Greek, no way allied to Greece, but sprung from a part of the barbarian world, unworthy to be named; a vile Macedonian; where formerly we could not find a slave fit to purchase. And, hath his insolence known any bounds? Besides the destruction of cities, doth he not appoint the Pythian games[a], the common entertainment of Greece: and, if absent himself, send his slaves to preside? Is he not master of Thermopylæ? Are not the passes into Greece possessed by his guards and mercenaries? Hath he not assumed the honours of the temple[b], in opposition to our claim, to that of the Thessalians, that of the Doreans, and

[a] *The Pythian games*, &c. To this honour he was admitted by being made an Amphictyon, and declared head of the sacred league. By *his slaves*, we are to understand no more than his subjects: for those old republicans affected to speak thus of the subjects of every king or tyrant. TOUR. and OLIV.

[b] *The honours of the temple*, &c. Προμαντεία, the right of precedency in consulting the oracle of Delphos. This the Phocians had enjoyed, as being in possession of the temple: and Philip was invested with it, as well as their other privileges. It was thought of considerable consequence by the Greeks, as appears from the first article of a peace made between the Athenians and the allies of Lacedemon. See Thucyd. B. 5. TOUR.

of the other Amphictyons; honours, to which even the Greeks do not all pretend? Doth he not send out his forces, some to Porthmus, to expel the Eretrian colony; some to Oreum, to make Philistides tyrant? And yet the Greeks see all this without the least impatience. Just as at the fall of hail; every one prays it may not alight on his ground, but no one attempts to fend against it: so they not only suffer the general wrongs of Greece to pass unpunished, but carry their insensibility to the utmost, and are not roused even by their private wrongs. Hath he not attacked Ambracia and Leucas, cities of the Corinthians? Hath he not wrested Naupactus from the Achæans[a], and engaged by oath to deliver it to the Ætolians? Hath he not robbed the Thebans of Echinus[b]? Is he not on his march against the Byzantines[c]? And are they

[a] *Wrested Naupactus from the Achæans*, &c. Naupactus was not a city of the Achæans, but of the Locri Ozolæ. Possibly Demosthenes speaks with the liberty of an orator, and founds his assertion on some alliance which Naupactus might have had with the Achæans against the Ætolians, its inveterate enemies. This city, thus delivered up, remained ever after under the jurisdiction of Ætolia, and is mentioned by Livy and Polybius as the principal city of that country. TOUR.

[b] *Echinus*. There were two places of this name; the one in Acarnania; the other, which is here spoken of, founded by the Thebans on the Maliac Gulph. TOUR.

[c] *Against the Byzantines*. He had threatened them already, but had not as yet executed his threats; for we learn from history, that Philip, having, for a considerable time, besieged Perinthus, raised the siege, in order to march to that of Byzantium. If the siege of Perinthus had preceded this oration, Demosthenes could

not our allies? I shall only add, that Cardia, the chief city of the Chersonesus, is in his possession. Yet these things do not affect us: we are all languid and irresolute: we watch the motions of those about us, and regard each other with suspicious eyes; and this when we are all so manifestly injured. And, if he behaves with such insolence towards the general body, to what extravagancies, think ye, will he proceed, when master of each particular state?

And now, what is the cause of all this? (for there must be some cause, some good reason to be assigned, why the Greeks were once so jealous of their liberty, and are now ready to submit to slavery.) It is this, Athenians! Formerly, men's minds were animated with that which they now feel no longer, which conquered all the opulence of Persia, maintained the freedom of Greece, and triumphed over the powers of sea and land; but now that it is lost, universal ruin and confusion overspread the face of Greece. What is this? Nothing subtle or mysterious; nothing more than an unanimous abhorrence of all those who accepted bribes from princes, prompted by the ambition of subduing, or the bare intent of corrupting Greece.

not have forgotten so memorable an expedition, in recounting the enterprises of Philip. Probably this prince made a feint of marching to Byzantium, in order to conceal his designs against Perinthus. Tour.

In the introduction to this oration, the reader has another account of Philip's first march against Byzantium.

To be guilty of such practices was accounted a crime of the blackest kind; a crime which called for all the severity of public justice; no petitioning for mercy, no pardon was allowed. So that neither orator nor general could sell those favourable conjunctures, with which fortune oftentimes assists the supine against the vigilant, and renders men utterly regardless of their interests, superior to those who exert their utmost efforts; nor were mutual confidence among ourselves, distrust of tyrants and barbarians, and such-like noble principles, subject to the power of gold. But now are all these exposed to sale, as in a public mart; and, in exchange, such things have been introduced, as have affected the safety, the very vitals of Greece. What are these? Envy, when a man hath received a bribe; laughter, if he confess it; pardon, if he be convicted; resentment, at his being accused; and all the other appendages of corruption. For, as to naval power, troops, revenues, and all kinds of preparations, every thing that is esteemed the strength of a state, we are now much better, and more amply provided, than formerly; but they have lost all their force, all their efficacy, all their value, by means of these traffickers.

41 That such is our present state, you yourselves are witnesses, and need not any testimony from me. That our state, in former times, was quite opposite to this, I shall now convince you, not by any arguments of mine, but by a decree of your ancestors, which they inscribed upon a brazen column erected

in the citadel; not with a view to their own advantage, (they needed no such memorials to inspire them with just sentiments) but that it might descend to you, as an example of the great attention due to such affairs. Hear then the inscription: "LET ARTHMIUS[a] OF ZELIA, THE SON "OF PYTHONAX, BE ACCOUNTED INFA-"MOUS, AND AN ENEMY TO THE ATHE-"NIANS AND THEIR ALLIES, BOTH HE "AND ALL HIS RACE." Then comes the reason of his sentence: "BECAUSE HE "BROUGHT GOLD FROM MEDIA INTO "PELOPONNESUS."—Not to Athens. This is the decree. And now, in the name of all the gods, reflect on this! think what wisdom, what dignity, appeared in this action of our ancestors! one Arthmius of Zelia, a slave of the KING's, (for Zelia is a city of Asia) in obedience to his master, brings gold, not into Athens but Peloponnesus. This

[a] *LET ARTHMIUS*, &c. This, in a few words, was the occasion of publishing this terrible decree against Arthmius, of which Themistocles was the author. Egypt had thrown off the yoke of Artaxerxes Longimanus A formidable army marched to reduce the rebels, but failed of success, as Athens had provided for their defence. The resentment of Artaxerxes then turned against the Athenians. He sent Megabyzus, and other secret agents, into Peloponnesus, to raise up enemies against them by the force of bribery; and to blow up the flame of resentment and jealousy in Sparta, which was ever ready to break out. But the attempt was ineffectual. Arthmius probably was one of the king of Persia's agents in this affair; and Diodorus, who does not name him, includes him however in the general appellation of *the emissaries of Artaxerxes.* TOURREIL.

man they declare an enemy to them and their confederates, and that he and his posterity shall be infamous. Nor was this merely a mark of ignominy; for how did it concern this Zelite whether he was to be received into the community of Athens or no? The sentence imported something more: for, in the laws relating to capital cases, it is enacted, that, WHEN THE LEGAL PUNISHMENT OF A MAN'S CRIME CANNOT BE INFLICTED, HE MAY BE PUT TO DEATH. And it was accounted meritorious to kill him. "LET NOT "THE INFAMOUS MAN," saith the law, "BE "PERMITTED TO LIVE." Intimating that he is free from guilt who executes this sentence.

OUR fathers, therefore, thought themselves bound to extend their care to all Greece: else they must have looked with unconcern at the introduction of bribery into Peloponnesus. But we find they proceeded to such severity against all they could detect in it, as to raise monuments of their crimes. Hence it was (and no wonder) that the Greeks were a terror to the Barbarians, not the Barbarians to the Greeks. But now it is not so; for you do not shew the same spirit, upon such, or upon any other occasions. How then do you behave? you need not be informed. Why should the whole censure fall on you? the conduct of the rest of Greece is no less blameable. It is my opinion, therefore, that the present state of things demands the utmost care, and most salutary counsel. What counsel? Shall I

propose it? and will ye not be offended?—Read this memorial.

[*Here the secretary reads. And the speaker resumes his discourse.*]

And here I must take notice of one weak argument made use of, to inspire us with confidence: That Philip is not yet so powerful as the Lacedemonians once were, who commanded by sea and land, were strengthened by the alliance of the KING [a], were absolute and uncontrouled; and yet we made a brave stand against them; nor was all their force able to crush our state. In answer to this, I shall observe, that, amidst all the alterations and improvements which have happened in affairs of every kind, nothing hath been more improved than the art of war: for, in the first place, I am informed, that, at that time, the Lacedemonians, and all the other Greeks, used to keep the field four or five months, just the convenient season;

[a] *Were strengthened by the alliance of the KING.* After the expedition into Sicily, an expedition, as unfortunate as it was imprudent, the Athenians might still have supported themselves, if the king of Persia had not concurred to precipitate their ruin. Tissaphernes, the satrap of Darius Nothus, conducted the first alliance between his master and the Lacedemonians. This alliance had at that time no very great effect. But when Cyrus the Younger was sent, by order of his father, to command in Asia Minor, Lysander gained the affection of this young prince, who soon made him able to give law to Athens. It is this period which Demosthenes points out. Tour.

and, having so long continued their invasion, and infested the territories of the enemy, with their heavy-armed and domestic forces, they retired into their own country. Then, such was the simplicity, I should say the national spirit[a] of that age, that the

[a] *I should say the national spirit*, &c. Circumstances peculiar to any people, singular customs, particular relations, and the like give rise to words and phrases, incapable of being precisely rendered into any other language. And such I take to be the word Πολιτικως. Every particular state of Greece was a member of a larger political body, that of the nation, in which all the several communities were united by national laws, national customs, and a national religion. This I have explained at large, on another occasion. (See Prelim. Dissert. to the Life of PHILIP.) The word Πολιτικως, therefore, I understand as expressive of that duty which each state owed to the HELENIC BODY, which prescribed bounds and laws to their wars, and forbad their passions, contests, and animosities against each other, to break out into any excesses which might affect the welfare of the nation. They were to fight, not as inveterate foes, but competitors for power and honour. To recur to bribery, in order to defeat their antagonists, was to be guilty of corrupting the morals of what, in an extensive sense, may be called their country. In like manner, the word CIVILIS, in Latin, is used in a sense somewhat analogous to this, as denoting the regard which every citizen should pay to the rights of others, in opposition to despotism, pride, imperiousness, and all those passions which are enemies to liberty and the general good. Thus we find in Tacitus, "Juveni CIVILE, ingenium "mira comitas. Ann. 1. Silentium ejus non CIVILE, ut credi- "derat, sed in superbiam accipiebatur." Ann. 6. And of Tiberius, the historian says, "Liberatus metu, CIVILEM se admodum "inter initia, ac paulo minus quam privatum egit." I have observed, in a note on the exordium of the second Philippic, that a regard to the interest of Greece was generally the most extensive affection in the minds of its inhabitants. And that the extensive social affections were denoted by the Greek word πολιτικὴν,

power of gold was never called to their assistance; but all their wars were fair and open. Now, on the contrary, we see most defeats owing to treachery; no formal engagements, nothing left to the decision of arms. For you find the rapid progress of Philip is not owing to the force of regular troops, but to armies composed of light horse and foreign archers. With these he pours down upon some people, already engaged by civil discord and commotions: and, when none will venture out in defence of their state, on account of their private suspicions, he brings up his engines, and attacks their walls. Not to mention his absolute indifference to heat and cold, and that there is no peculiar season which he gives to pleasure. Let these things sink deep into all our minds: let us not suffer his arms to approach these territories: let us not proudly[a] depend on our strength, by forming our judgments from the old Lacedemonian war; but let us attend, with all possible precaution, to our interests and

we learn from Cicero. Let the following quotation, from the fifth book of his treatise DE FINIBUS, suffice on this occasion: "Cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam in-" natum quasi CIVILE et populare quod Græci Πολιτικὸν vocant, " quicquid aget quæque virtus, id a communitate, et ea quam " exposui charitate, atque societate humana, non abhorrebit." The authority of a writer, who devoted so much of his attention to the moral and political learning of the Greeks, and took so much pains to explain it to his countrymen, may surely be deemed decisive.

[a] *Let us not proudly*, &c. In the original ἐκλαχηλισθῆναι, which, besides the signification which Wolfius assigns it, is frequently rendered *insolescere, superbire.*

our armaments: and let this be our point in view; to confine him to his own kingdom; not to engage him upon equal terms in the field. For if you be satisfied with committing hostilities, there, nature hath given you many advantages[a] (let us but do our part). The situation of his kingdom, for instance, exposes it to all the fury of an enemy; not to speak of many other circumstances. But if we once come to a regular engagement, there his experience must give him the superiority.

But these are not the only points that require your attention: nor are you to oppose him only by the arts of war. It is also necessary that reason and penetration should inspire you with an abhorrence of those who plead his cause before you: ever bearing in mind the absolute impossibility of conquering our foreign enemy, until we have punished those who are serving him within our walls. But this, I call the powers of heaven to witness, ye cannot, ye will not do! No: such is your infatuation, or madness, or——I know not what to call it, (for I am oftentimes tempted to believe, that some power, more than human, is driving us to ruin) that through malice, or envy, or a spirit of ridicule, or some like motive, you command hirelings to speak, (some of whom dare not deny that they are

[a] *Many advantages.* Although the Athenians had lost Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa, they were still in possession of Thassus, Lemnos, and the adjacent islands, from whence they might readily have attempted a descent on Macedon. Tour.

hirelings) and make their calumnies serve your mirth. Yet, shocking as this is, there is something still more shocking; these men are allowed to direct the public affairs with greater security than your faithful counsellors. And now observe the dreadful consequences of listening to such wretches, I shall mention facts well known to you all.

In Olynthus, the administration of affairs was divided between two parties. The one, in the interest of Philip, entirely devoted to him; the other, inspired by true patriotism, directed all their efforts to preserve the freedom of their country. To which of these are we to charge the ruin of the state? or who betrayed the troops, and by that treachery destroyed Olynthus?—The creatures of Philip. Yet, while their city stood, these men pursued the advocates for liberty, with such malicious accusations and invectives, that an assembly of the people was persuaded even to banish Apollonides.

But this is not the only instance. The same custom hath produced the same calamities in other places. In Eretria, at the departure of Plutarchus and the foreign troops, when the people had possession of the city, and of Porthmus, some were inclined to seek our protection, some to submit to Philip. But, being influenced by this latter party, on most, or, rather, all occasions, the poor unfortunate Eretrians were at length persuaded to banish their faithful counsellors. And the consequence was this: Philip, their confederate and friend, de-

tached a thousand mercenaries, under the command of Hipponicus, rased the fortifications of Porthmus, set three tyrants over them, Hipparchus, Automedon, and Clitarchus; and, after this, when they discovered some inclination to shake off the yoke, drove them twice out of their territory; once by the forces commanded by Eurylochus; and again, by those under Parmenio.

To give but one instance more. In Oreum, Philistides was the agent of Philip; as were Menippus, and Socrates, and Thoas, and Agapæus, the present masters of that city. And this was universally known. But there was one Euphræus, a man for some time resident at Athens, who stood up against captivity and slavery. Much might be said of the injurious and contemptuous treatment which he received from the people of Oreum, upon other occasions. But the year before the taking of the city, as he saw through the traitorous designs of Philistides and his accomplices, he brought a formal impeachment against them. Immediately, considerable numbers form themselves into a faction, (directed and supported by Philip) and hurry away Euphræus to prison, as a disturber of the public peace. The people of Oreum were witnesses of this; but, instead of defending him, and bringing his enemies to condign punishment, shewed no resentment towards them; but approved, and triumphed in his sufferings. And now the faction, possessed of all the power they wished for, laid their schemes for the ruin of the city, and were

carrying them into execution. Among the people if any man perceived this, he was silent; struck with the remembrance of Euphræus and his sufferings. And to such dejection were they reduced, that no one dared to express the least apprehension of the approaching danger, until the enemy drew up before their walls, and prepared for an assault. Then some defended, others betrayed their state. When the city had thus been shamefully and basely lost, the faction began to exercise the most tyrannic power; having either by banishment or death, removed all those who had asserted their own cause, and that of Euphræus; and were still ready for any noble enterprise. Euphræus himself put an end to his own life; and thus gave proof, that, in his opposition to Philip, he had been actuated by a just and pure regard to the interest of his country.

And now what could be the reason (you may possibly ask with surprise) that the people of Olynthus, and those of Eretria, and those of Oreum, all attended with greater pleasure to the advocates of Philip than to their own friends? The same reason which prevails here. Because they who are engaged on the part of truth and justice, can never, even if they were inclined, advance any thing to recommend themselves to favour: their whole concern is for the welfare of their state. The others need but to soothe and flatter, in order to second the designs of Philip. The one press for supplies; the others insist that they are not wanted: the one call their countrymen to battle and alarm them

with apprehensions of danger; the others are ever recommending peace, until the toils come too near to be escaped. And thus, on all occasions, one set of men speak but to insinuate themselves into the affections of their fellow-citizens; the other to preserve them from ruin: till, at last, the interests of the state are given up; not corruptly or ignorantly, but from a desperate purpose of yielding to the fate of a constitution thought to be irrecoverably lost. And, by the powers of heaven! I dread, that this may prove your case; when you find that reflection cannot serve you! And, when I turn my eyes to the men who have reduced you to this, it is not terror[a] that I feel; it is the utmost detestation. For, whether they act through design or ignorance, the distress to which they are reducing us is manifest. But far be this distress from us, Athenians! It were better to die ten thousand deaths, than to be guilty of a servile complaisance to Philip, and to abandon any of your faithful counsellors! The people of Oreum have now met a noble return for their confidence in Philip's creatures, and their violence towards Euphræus. The Eretrians are nobly re-

[a] *It is not terror*, &c. The word in the original signifies the most abject fear and dismay; and the whole passage seems to have a particular reference or allusion. Possibly some of Philip's partisans might have accused Demosthenes of being thus affected at their sight; while they magnified their own integrity and resolution, their true discernment, and patriotic zeal for the interest of their country; and possibly might have called out for severe punishment on the man who dared to utter the most bitter invectives against a powerful prince in alliance with Athens.

warded for driving out our ambassadors, and committing their affairs to Clitarchus. Captivity and stripes, and racks are their reward. Great was his indulgence to the Olynthians, for chusing Lasthenes their general, and banishing Apollonides. It were folly and baseness to be amused with such false hopes as theirs, when neither our counsels direct us, nor our inclinations prompt us, to the pursuit of our true interests; and to suffer those who speak for our enemies, to persuade us that the state is too powerful to be affected by any accident whatever. It is shameful to cry out, when some event hath surprised us, "Heavens! who could have ex-"pected this? We should have acted thus and "thus; and avoided these and these errors." There are many things, the Olynthians can now mention, which, if foreseen in time, would have prevented their destruction. The people of Oreum can mention many: those of Phocis many: every state that hath been destroyed can mention many such things. But what doth it avail them now! While the vessel is safe, whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every person should exert himself in his particular station, and preserve it from being wrecked, either by villainy or unskilfulness. But, when the sea hath once broken in all care is vain. And therefore, Athenians! while we are yet safe, possessed of a powerful city, favoured with many resources, our reputation illustrious——What are we to do? (perhaps some have sat with impatience to ask.)——I shall now give my opinion, and pro-

pose it in form; that, if approved, your voices may confirm it.

HAVING, in the first place, provided for your defence, fitted out your navy, raised your supplies, and arrayed your forces; (for, although all other people should submit to slavery, you should still contend for freedom,) having made such a provision (I say) and this in the sight of Greece, then we are to call others to their duty; and, for this purpose, to send ambassadors into all parts, to Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios, and even to the KING; (for he is by no means unconcerned in opposing the rapidity of this man's progress.) / If ye prevail ye will have sharers in the dangers and expence which may arise; at least you may gain some respite: and, as we are engaged against a single person, and not to the united powers of a commonwealth, this may be of advantage; as were those embassies of last year in Peloponnesus, and those remonstrances which were made in several places by me, and Polydatus, that true patriot, and Hegesippus, and Clitomachus, and Lycurgus, and the other ministers; which checked his progress, prevented his attack of Ambracia, and secured Peloponnesus from an invasion.

I DO not mean that we should endeavour to raise that spirit abroad, which we ourselves are unwilling to assume. It would be absurd to neglect our own interests, and yet pretend a regard to the common cause; or, while we are insensible to present dangers, to think of alarming others with apprehensions

of futurity. No: let us provide the forces in the Chersonesus with money, and every thing else that they desire. Let us begin with vigour on our part; then call upon the other Greeks; convene, instruct, exhort them. Thus it becomes a state of such dignity as ours. If you think the protection of Greece may be entrusted to the Chalcidians and Megaræans, and so desert its cause, you do not think justly. It will be well if they can protect themselves. No; this is your province; this is that prerogative transmitted from your ancestors, the reward of all their many, and glorious, and great dangers. If every man sits down in ease and indulgence, and studies only to avoid trouble, he will certainly find no one to supply his place; and I am also apprehensive, that we may be forced into all that trouble to which we are so averse. Were there persons to act in our stead, our inactivity would have long since discovered them; but there are really none.

You have now heard my sentiments. You have heard the measures I propose, and by which I apprehend our affairs may be yet retrieved. If any man can offer some more salutary course, let him arise, and declare his opinion. And, whatever be your resolution, the gods grant that we may feel its good effects.

END OF THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.

THE

ELEVENTH ORATION

AGAINST

PHILIP:

COMMONLY CALLED THE FOURTH.

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF NICOMACHUS,

THE YEAR AFTER THE FORMER ORATION.

INTRODUCTION.

SOON after the preceding oration the Athenian succours arrived at Eubœa. Demosthenes had proposed the decree for them; and the command was given to Phocion, whom the Athenians gladly employed on all extraordinary emergencies, and who was always ready to serve them, at the same time that he highly condemned their conduct.

Demosthenes attended Phocion, not in a military character, but to endeavour to gain over the people of Eubœa to the Athenian interest; in which he had some success: while the general, on his part, acted with so much conduct and resolution, that the Macedonians were forced to abandon the island; and the Eubœans entered into a treaty of alliance with Athens.

In the mean time, Philip marched along the Hellespont, to support his fleet then in view, and to prevent Diopithes from cutting off his provisions. When he had crossed the Isthmus of the Chersonesus, he returned and, by a forced march, arrived with the choice of his army at

Cardia; where he surprised Diopithes, and defeated him in an action in which that general fell. This he affected to consider, not as an open breach of his treaty, but only as the consequence of the protection he had granted to the Cardians, and an act of particular revenge he had determined to take on Diopithes.

Philip then joined his army, and encamped before Perinthus, a place considerable by its commerce and situation, ever firm to the Athenians, and consequently dreadful and dangerous to Philip. The Perinthians defended themselves with a courage almost incredible, and which, it appeared, could not be abated by danger or fatigue. Philip, on his part, pressed them by all the methods of assault; and, after many vigorous efforts on each side, when the city was just on the point of being taken by assault, or of being obliged to surrender at discretion, fortune provided for it an unexpected succour.

The fame of Philip's arms having alarmed the court of Persia, Ochus sent his letters mandatory to the governors of the maritime provinces, directing them to supply Perinthus with all things in their power: in consequence of which they filled it with troops and provisions. While the Byzantines, justly conceiving their own turn

would be next, sent into the city the flower of their youth, with all other necessaries for an obstinate defence.

The Perinthians, thus reinforced, resumed their former ardour. And, as all they suffered was on account of Athens, they dispatched ambassadors thither, to demand the speedy and effectual assistance of that state. On this occasion Demosthenes pronounced the following oration.

PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH[a].

Nicomachus, Archon—A. R. Philip 20—Olympiad 109. An. 4.

As I am persuaded, Athenians! that you are now convened about affairs of greatest moment, such as affect the very being of the state, I shall endeavour to speak to them in the manner most agreeable to your interests.

THERE are faults of no late origin, and gradually increased to no inconsiderable number, which have conspired to involve us in the present difficulties. But, of all these, what at this time most distresses us is this; that your minds are quite alienated from public affairs; that your attention is engaged just while you are assembled, and some new event related; then each man departs, and, far from being

[a] We shall find in this oration many things which occur in those that are precedent; and as it is on the same subject, already exhausted by so many orations, it was in some sort necessary for the orator to make use of repetitions. And it should seem, that in such a case repetition is by no means a fault, particularly as we may consider this as a recapitulation of all the others; and may in effect call it the PERORATION OF THE PHILIPPICS. In which the orator resumes the arguments he had already made use of; but, in resuming them, gives them new force, as well by the manner in which they are disposed, as by the many additions with which they are heightened. TOUR.

influenced by what he hath heard, he does not even remember it.

THE insolence and outrage with which Philip treats all mankind, are really as great as you hear them represented. That it is not possible to set bounds to these, by the force of speeches and debates, no one can be ignorant; for, if other arguments cannot convince, let this be weighed; whenever we have had occasion to plead in defence of our rights, we have never failed of success, we have never incurred the censure of injustice; but all places and all persons must acknowledge that our arguments are irresistible. Is he then distressed by this? and are our affairs advanced? By no means! For, as he proceeds to take up arms, leads out his troops, and is ready to hazard his whole empire in pursuit of his designs, while we sit here, pleading, or attending to those who plead the justice of our cause, the consequence (and I think the natural consequence) is this: actions prove superior to words; and men's regards are engaged, not by those arguments which we ever have advanced, or may now advance, how just soever, but by the measures we pursue; and these are by no means fitted to protect any of the injured states; to say more of them is unnecessary.

As, then, all Greece is now divided into two parties; the one composed of those who desire neither to exercise, nor to be subject to arbitrary power, but to enjoy the benefits of liberty, laws, and independence; the other, of those, who, while they aim at an absolute command of their fellow-

citizens, are themselves the vassals of another person, by whose means they hope to obtain their purposes: his partizans, the affecters of tyranny and despotism, are superior every where. So that, of all the popular constitutions, I know not whether one be left firmly established, except our own. And they, who in the several states have been raised by him to the administration of affairs, have their superiority secured by all the means which can advance a cause. The first and principal is this. When they would bribe those who are capable of selling their integrity, they have a person ever ready to supply them. In the next place, (and it is of no less moment) at whatever season they desire it, there are forces at hand to overwhelm their opposers: while we, Athenians! are not only deficient in these particulars, but unable even to awaken from our indolence; like men reduced by some potion[a] to a lethargic state. In consequence of this, (for I hold it necessary to speak the truth) we are fallen into such contempt and infamy, that, of the people immediately threatened with danger, some contend with us for the honour of commanding, some about the place of conference[b]; while

[a] *Like men reduced by some potion*, &c. In the original, *like men who have drank of Mandragora*; an herb ranked by naturalists among those of a soporiferous kind. It seems to have been a proverbial phrase, to signify indolent and negligent servants. TOURREIL.

[b] *For the honour of commanding, some about the place of conference.* In all the confederate wars of the Greeks, that state which was acknowledged the most powerful, had the honour of

others determine rather to trust to their own strength than to accept of your assistance.

And why am I thus particular in recounting these things? I call the gods to witness, that I would not willingly incur your displeasure; but I would have you know, and see, that in public as well as in private affairs, continued indolence and supineness, though not immediately felt in every single instance of omission, yet, in the end, must affect the general welfare. You see this in the instances of Serrium and Doriscum. When the peace was made, we began with neglecting these places. (Perhaps some of you have never heard of them.) And these places, thus abandoned and despised, lost you Thrace, and your ally Cersobleptes. Again, when he saw that this did not rouse you, and that you sent no assistance, he rased Porthmus; and, to keep us in continual awe, erected a tyranny in Eubœa, over against Attica. This was disregarded: and his attempt upon Megara was well nigh successful. Still ye were insensible, expressed no impatience, no inclination to oppose him. He purchased Antronæ; and soon after got possession of Oreum. I pass over many things; Pheræ, the march to Ambracia, the massacre of Elis[a], and thousands of the

giving a commander in chief, and of appointing the place of general congress for concerting the operations. In the Persian war we find the Lacedemonians and Athenians sometimes contending for these points; which in effect was a dispute which of these states was most respectable.

[a] *Pheræ, the march to Ambracia, the massacre of Elis.* An orator

like actions: for it is not my design to give a detail of Philip's acts of outrage and injustice; but to convince you, that the property and liberty of mankind will never be secure from him, until he meets with some effectual opposition.

THERE are persons who, before they hear affairs debated, stop us with this question, "What is to be "done?" not that they may do it, when informed, (for then they would be the best citizens) but to prevent the trouble of attending. It is my part, however, to declare what we are now to do.

FIRST, then, Athenians! be firmly persuaded of this: that Philip is committing hostilities against us, and has really violated the peace: that he has the most implacable enmity to this whole city; to the ground on which this city stands; to the very gods of this city: (may their vengeance fall upon

does not always pique himself on an exact adherence to history; but sometimes disguises facts, or aggravates them, when it serves his purpose. One would imagine that Philip had committed some terrible outrages at Pheræ: and yet he only restored the liberty of that city, by expelling its tyrants. And, as to the massacre of Elis, it is not to be imputed immediately to Philip. He had, indeed, as chief of the allies in the sacred war, and head of the Amphictyons, suggested the resolution of proscribing the Phocians, and all the favourers of their impiety. Some of these who had fled into Crete with their general Phalecus, joined with a body of men who had been banished from Elis, made an inroad into Peloponnesus, and attempted an attack upon their countrymen; who, with the assistance of the Arcadians, obliged this rebellious army to surrender at discretion; and, in obedience to the decree of the Amphictyons, put it to the sword. TOUR.

him!) but against our constitution is his force principally directed; the destruction of this is, of all other things, the most immediate object of his secret schemes and machinations. And there is, in some sort, a necessity that it should be so. Consider; he aims at universal power; and you he regards as the only persons to dispute his pretensions. He hath long injured you; and of this he himself is fully conscious; for the surest barriers of his other dominions are those places which he hath taken from us: so that if he should give up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he would not think himself secure in Macedon. He is then sensible that he entertains designs against you, and that you perceive them; and, as he thinks highly of your wisdom, he judges that you hold him in the abhorrence he deserves. To these things (and these of such importance) add, that he is perfectly convinced, that although, he were master of all other places, yet it is impossible for him to be secure, while your popular government subsists: but that, if any accident should happen to him, (and every man is subject to many) all those who now submit to force, would seize the opportunity, and fly to you for protection: for you are not naturally disposed to grasp at power, or to usurp dominion; but to prevent usurpation, to wrest their unjust acquisitions from the hands of others, to curb the violence of ambition, and to preserve the liberty of mankind, is your peculiar excellence. And therefore it is with regret he sees in that freedom you enjoy a spy upon the incidents of his fortune: nor is this his reasoning weak or

trivial. First, then, he is on this account to be regarded as the implacable enemy of our free and popular constitution. In the next place, we should be fully persuaded, that all those things which now employ him, all that he is now projecting, he is projecting against this city. There can be none among you weak enough to imagine, that the desires of Philip are centered in those paltry villages[a] of Thrace (for what name else can we give to Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Mastira, and all those places now said to be in his possession?) that he endures the severity of toils and seasons, and exposes himself to the utmost dangers for these; and has no designs upon the ports, and the arsenals, and the navies, and the silver-mines, and other revenues, and the situation, and the glory of Athens, (which never may the conquest of this city give to him or any other!) but will suffer us to enjoy these: while, for those trifling hoards of grain he finds in the cells of Thrace, he takes up his winter-quarters in all the horrors of a dungeon. It cannot be! Even in his march thither he had these in view; these are the chief objects of all his enterprises.

Thus must we all think of him. And let us not oblige that man, who hath ever been our most faithful counsellor, to propose the war in form: that would be to seek a pretence to avoid it, not to pursue the interest of our country. To yourselves

[a] *Those paltry villages*, &c. See the notes of the oration on the State of the Chersonesus, p. 155.

I appeal: if, after the first, or the second, or the third of Philip's infractions of his treaty, for there was a long succession of them) any man had moved you to declare hostilities against him, and he had given the same assistance to the Cardians, as now, when no such motion came from any Athenian, would not that man have been torn to pieces? would you not have cried out, with one voice, that it was this which made him ally to the Cardians? Do not then seek for some person whom you may hate for Philip's faults, whom you may exposé to the fury of his hirelings. When your decree for war hath once passed, let there be no dispute, whether it ought or ought not to have been undertaken. Observe his manner of attacking you: imitate it in your opposition: supply those who are now opposing him with money, and whatever else they want: raise your supplies: prepare your forces, galleys, horse, transports, and all other necessaries of a war. At present your conduct must expose you to derision. Nay, I call the powers to witness, that you are acting as if Philip's wishes were to direct you. Opportunities escape you; your treasures are wasted; you shift the weight of public business upon others; break into passion; criminate each other. I shall now shew whence these disorders have proceeded, and point out the remedy.

You have never, Athenians! made the necessary dispositions in your affairs, or armed yourselves in time, but have been ever led by events. Then, when it proves too late to act, you lay down your arms.

If another incident alarms you, your preparations are resumed, and all is tumult and confusion. But this is not the way. It is impossible ever to secure the least success by occasional detachments. No: you must raise a regular army, provide for its subsistence, appoint state-treasurers, and guard the public money with the strictest attention: oblige those treasurers to answer for the sums expended, and your general for his conduct in the field: and let this general have no pretence[a] to sail to any other place, or engage in any other enterprise, but those prescribed. Let these be your measures, these your resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the real observance of an equitable peace, and to confine himself to his own territory, or you will engage him upon equal terms. And perhaps, Athenians! perhaps, as you now ask, "What is "Philip doing? whither is he marching?" so there may come a time when he will be solicitous to know whither our forces have directed their march, and where they are to appear.

If it be objected, that these measures will be attended with great expence, and many toils and perplexities, I confess it. (It is necessary, absolutely necessary, that a war should be attended with many disagreeable circumstances). But let us consider what consequences must attend the state, if we refuse to take this course, and it will appear that we shall really be gainers by a seasonable performance

[a] *Have no pretence*, &c. See note on Phil. i. p. 15, 16.

of our duty. Suppose some god should be our surety, (for no mortal could be depended on, in an affair of such moment) that, although you are quite inactive and insensible, yet he will not at last lead his armies hither; still it would be ignominious, it would (I call every power of Heaven to witness!) be beneath you, beneath the dignity of your state, beneath the glory of your ancestors, to abandon all the rest of Greece to slavery, for the sake of private ease. I, for my part, would rather die, than propose such a conduct: if, however, there be any other person to recommend it to you, be it so; make no opposition; abandon all affairs: but if there be no one of this opinion; if, on the contrary, we all foresee, that the farther this man is suffered to extend his conquests, the more dangerous and powerful enemy we must find in him; why is our duty evaded? why do we delay? or when will we be disposed to exert ourselves, Athenians? Must some necessity press us? What one may call the necessity of freemen, not only presseth us now, but hath long since been felt: that of slaves, it is to be wished, may never approach us. How do these differ? To freemen the most urgent necessity is dishonour; a greater cannot, I think, be assigned: to slaves, stripes and tortures. Far be this from us! It ought not to be mentioned!

And now, the neglect of those things, to which your lives and fortunes should be devoted, it must be confessed is by no means justifiable: far from it! some pretence, however, may be alleged in its ex-

cuse. But to refuse even to listen to those things which demand your utmost attention, which are of the greatest moment to be fully considered, this deserves the most severe censure. And yet you never attend but upon occasions like this, when the danger is actually present; nor in time of disengagement do you ever think of consulting: but, while he is preparing to distress you, instead of making like preparations, and providing for your defence, you are sunk in inactivity: and if any one attempts to rouse you, he feels your resentment. But, when advice is received that some place is lost, or invested, then you attend, then you prepare. The proper season for attending and consulting was then, when you refused: now, when you are prevailed upon to hear, you should be acting, and applying your preparations. And by this supineness is your conduct distinguished from that of all other nations: they usually deliberate before events: your consultations follow them.——There is but one course left, which should long since have been pursued; but still may be of service.—This I shall lay before you.

THERE is nothing which the state is more concerned to procure on this occasion than money. And some very favourable opportunities present themselves, which, if wisely improved, may possibly supply our demands. In the first place, they whom the KING regards[a] as his faithful and strenuous

[a] *They whom the king regards*, &c. He probably means the

adherents, are the implacable enemies of Philip, and actually in arms against him. Then the man who was[a] Philip's assistant and counsellor in all his designs against the KING, hath been lately seized, so that the king will be informed of his practices, not by our accusations, to which he might suppose our private interest prompted us, but by the very agent and conductor of them. This will give weight to your assertions; and there will be nothing left for your ministers to urge, but what the KING will gladly attend to: "that we should "unite to chastise the man who hath injured us "equally: that Philip will be much more formi-"dable to the KING, if his first attack be made on "us: for that, if he should be permitted to gain any "advantage here, he will then march against him, "free from all apprehensions." For all these reasons, I think you should send ambassadors to treat

Thebans, who had given Ochus powerful assistance in the siege of Pelusium; and who were now much provoked at Philip, on account of Echinus, which he had taken from them.

[b] *The man who was*, &c. As Philip seems to have already projected an expedition into Asia, he received with open arms all the mal-contents of Persia, and held secret intelligence with the rebel satraps. Hermias, the tyrant of Atarna, a city of Mysia, was of this number; and had been in confidence with Philip. Mentor, the Rhodian, general of the Persian army, drew him to an interview, by feigned promises, where he seized him, and sent him in chains to Ochus. Instead of ἀναίρπαστος, some copies have ἀνάσπαστος, *brought back*: in which case it must be understood of Memnon or Artabazus, two rebellious satraps, who had taken refuge in Philip's court, but, by the mediation of Mentor, were reconciled to the king of Persia. ULP. TOUR.

with the KING; and lay aside those idle prejudices, which have so often been injurious to your interests; "that he is a barbarian, our common "enemy, and the like." For my own part, when I find a man apprehending danger from a prince, whose residence is in Susa and Ecbatana, and pronouncing him the enemy of our state, who formerly re-established its power[a], and but now made us such[b] considerable offers, (if you rejected them, that was no fault of his) and yet speaking in another strain of one who is at our gates, who is extending his conquests in the very heart of Greece, the plunderer of the Greeks, I am astonished; and regard that man, whoever he is, as dangerous, who doth not see danger in Philip.

THERE is another affair, wherein the public hath been injured, which hath been attacked most unjustly and indecently; which is the constant pretence of those who refuse to perform their duty to

[a] *Who formerly re-established its power.* That is, when Conon, by the assistance of Artaxerxes Mnemon, beat the Lacedemonian fleet at Cnidos, and restored the liberty and splendour of his country.

[b] *And but now made us,* &c. Artaxerxes Ochus, in order to reduce Egypt, which had revolted from him, solicited succours from the principal cities of Greece. Argos and Thebes consented; but from Athens and Lacedemon he could obtain only vain professions of friendship. He had, without doubt, offered large advantages to such people as would concur with him. Demosthenes here insinuates an accusation of the imprudence of Athens, in rejecting these offers.

the state; to which you will find the blame of every omission, which every man is guilty of, constantly transferred. I cannot speak of it without great apprehensions. Yet I will speak; for I think I can serve my country, by advancing some things, in behalf of the poor[a], against the necessitous; if

[a] *Some things in behalf of the poor*, &c. The theatrical distributions afforded a perpetual occasion of public contests between the several orders of the state. The poor were ever dissatisfied that the rich citizens shared the largesses, which they considered as their own peculiar right: and the rich beheld with impatience the dissipation of the public funds, which threw the whole weight of the supplies on them. But there was still a greater cause of complaint. The revenues of the state were not always sufficient to defray the immense expences of feasts and entertainments. And, in this case, some factious leader, who was willing to gain popularity, would propose to tax the rich; or, perhaps, by some infamous calumnies, would raise a prosecution, which would bring in a large pecuniary fine. The rich, it may be imagined, were alarmed at such proceedings: they inveighed loudly against the authors of them, and sometimes ventured to accuse them in form, and to bring them to a trial. When their baseness and evil designs were publicly exposed, the people were ashamed to avow their intentions of supporting such flagrant injustice. Their clamours were loud against the person accused. But, as in all judicial processes they gave their votes by ballot, they then had an opportunity of saving their friend.

All that the orator here says in defence of the theatrical appointments, is expressed with a caution and reserve quite opposite to his usual openness and freedom; and which plainly betray a consciousness of his being inconsistent with his former sentiments. How far he may be excused by the supposed necessity of yielding to the violent prepossessions of the people, and giving up a favourite point, I cannot pretend to determine. But it is certainly not very honourable to Demosthenes, to suppose (with Ulpian) that his former opposition was merely personal; and that the death of Eubulus now put an end to it.

we first banish those invectives, unjustly thrown out against the theatrical funds; and those fears, that such an appointment cannot subsist without some dismal consequences; an appointment which above all others, may be most conducive to our interests, and give the greatest strength to the whole community.

ATTEND, then, while I first plead for those who are thought necessitous. There was a time, not long since, when the state could not raise more than one hundred and thirty talents[a]; and yet none of

[a] *The state could not raise more than one hundred and thirty talents.* We must understand this of those revenues raised out of Attica only: for the contributions of the allies, according to the taxation of Aristides, amounted to four hundred and sixty talents annually, and Pericles raised them yet higher. In order to know the real value of their revenues, we should consider the prices of things. In the time of Solon, an ox was sold at Athens for five drachmæ, as we learn from Plutarch, in the life of Solon. A hog in the time of Aristophanes, was worth three drachmæ, as appears from one of his comedies called *the Peace.* OLIVET.

A Drachma, according to Arbuthnot, was equal to 7½d. of our money. A hundred drachmæ made a mina, or 3l. 4s. 7d. We may also, from the same author, add to the foregoing note these particulars. In the time of Solon, corn was reckoned at a drachma the medimnus, or 4s. 6d. *per* quarter. In the time of Demosthenes it was much higher, at five drachmæ the medimnus, which makes it, *per* quarter, 1l. 2s. 7½d. In Solon's time, the price of a sheep was 7¾d. A soldier's daily pay was a drachma. The yearly salary of a common schoolmaster at Athens was a mina. In the early times of the republic, five hundred drachmæ were thought a competent fortune for a gentlewoman, 16l. 2s. 11d. To Aristides's two daughters, the Athenians gave three thousand drachmæ, 96l. 17s. 2d. The arts and sciences were rated very

those who were to command, or to contribute to the equipment of a galley, ever had recourse to the pretence of poverty to be exempted from their duty: but vessels were sent out, money was supplied, and none of our affairs neglected. After this (thanks to fortune!) our revenues were considerably improved; and, instead of one hundred, rose to four hundred talents; and this, without any loss to the wealthy citizens, but rather with advantage; for they share the public affluence, and justly share it. Why then do we reproach each other? why have we recourse to such pretences, to be exempted from our duty? unless we envy the poor that supply with which fortune hath favoured them. I do not, and I think no one should blame them: for, in private families, I do not find the young so devoid of respect to years, or indeed any one so unreasonable and absurd, as to refuse to do his duty, unless all others do quite as much: such perverseness would render a man obnoxious to the laws against undutiful children, for to nothing are we more inviolably bound than to a just and cheerful discharge of that debt, in which both nature and the laws engage us to our parents. And as we, each of us, have our particular parents, so all our citizens are to be esteemed the common parents of the state; and, therefore, instead of depriving them of what the state bestows, we ought, if there were not this

high; and, though the price of a seat in the theatre was no more than two oboli, or 2½d., yet the performers were rewarded magnificently. When Amœbæus sung in the theatre of Athens, his pay *per diem* was a talent.

provision, to find out some other means of supplying their necessities. If the rich proceed upon these principles, they will act agreeably, not to justice only, but to good policy: for, to rob some men of their necessary subsistence, is to raise a number of enemies to the commonwealth.

To men of lower fortunes I give this advice: that they should remove those grievances of which the wealthier members complained so loudly and so justly: (for I now proceed in the manner I proposed, and shall not scruple to offer such truths as may be favourable to the rich.) Look out, not through Athens only, but every other state, and, in my opinion, you will not find a man of so cruel, so inhuman, a disposition, as to complain, when he sees poor men, men who even want the necessaries of life, receiving these appointments. Where then lies the difficulty? whence this animosity? When they behold certain[a] persons charging private fortunes with those demands which were usually answered by the public; when they behold the proposer of this immediately rising in your esteem, and, (as far as your protection can make him) immortal; when they find your private votes entirely different from your public clamours; then it is that their indignation is raised: for justice requires, Athenians! that the advantages of society should be shared by all its members. The rich should have their lives and fortunes well secured; that so, when any dan-

[a] *When they behold certain,* &c. See note on page 211.

ger threatens their country, their opulence may be applied to its defence. Other citizens should regard the public treasure as it really is, the property of all, and be content with their just portion; but should esteem all private fortunes as the inviolable right of their possessors. Thus a small state rises to greatness, a great one preserves its power.

But it may be said, that possibly these are the duties of our several citizens: yet, that they may be performed agreeably to the laws, some regulations must first be made.—The causes of our present disorders are many in number, and of long continuance. Grant me your attention, and I shall trace them to their origin.

You have departed, Athenians! from that plan of government which your ancestors laid down. You are persuaded by your leaders, that to be the first among the Greeks, to keep up your forces ready to redress the injured, is an unnecessary and vain expense. You are taught to think, that to lie down in indolence, to be free from public cares, to abandon all your interests one by one, a prey to the vigilance and craft of others, is to be perfectly secure, and surprisingly happy. By these means, the station which you should have maintained is now seized by another, and he is become the successful, the mighty, potentate. And what else could have been expected? for, as the Lacedemonians were unfortunate, the Thebans engaged in the Phocian war, and we quite insensible; he had no

competitor for a prize so noble, so great, so illustrious, which for a long time engaged the most considerable states of Greece in the severest contests. Thus is he become formidable, strengthened by alliances, and attended by his armies: while all the Greeks are involved in so many and so great difficulties, that it is hard to say where they may find resourses. But, of all the dangers of the several states, none are so dreadful as those which threaten ours: not only because Philip's designs aim principally at us, but because we, of all others, have been most regardless of our interests.

If then, from the variety[a] of merchandises and plenty of provisions, you flatter yourselves that the state is not in danger, you judge unworthily and falsely. Hence we might determine whether our markets were well or ill supplied: but the strength of that state, which is regarded by all who aim at the sovereignty of Greece as the sole obstacle to their designs, the well-known guardian of liberty, is not surely to be judged of by its vendibles. No: we should inquire whether it be secure of the affections of its allies; whether it be powerful in arms. There are the points to be considered: and in these, instead of being well provided, you are totally deficient. To be assured of this, you need but attend to the following consideration. At what time have the affairs of Greece been in the greatest

[a] *If then, from the variety*, &c. See note on the oration on the state of the Chersonesus, p. 163.

confusion? I believe it will not be affirmed, that they have ever been in greater than at present. For, in former times, Greece was always divided into two parties, that of the Lacedemonians, and ours. All the several states adhered to one or the other of these. The KING, while he had alliances here, was equally suspected by all. By espousing the cause of the vanquished[a], he gained some credit until he restored them to the same degree of power with their adversaries; after that, he became no less hated[b] by those whom he had saved, than by those whom he had constantly opposed. But now, in the first place, the KING lives in amity with all the

[a] *By espousing the cause of the vanquished*, &c. Lacedemon first entered into an alliance with Darius Nothus, by the mediation of Tissaphernes; which enabled Lysander to conquer Athens. Conon obtained from Artaxerxes Mnemon the succours necessary to revenge his country, and to re-establish it. And it was with reason that the kings of Persia attended to the preservation of a due balance between the Grecian states, lest the prevailing power might turn its thoughts to Asia, and attempt an invasion there. TOUR.

[b] *He became no less hated*, &c. Lacedemon had no sooner subjected the Athenians, by the help of Darius, but she ravaged the Persian provinces in Asia Minor, and joined with the rebellious satraps. And as soon as the Athenians were delivered by Artaxerxes from the Spartan yoke, they espoused the quarrel of Evagoras, who had revolted from Artaxerxes, and usurped a great part of the kingdom of Cyprus. Benefits could not bind these states. Interest alone formed their engagements, and interest dissolved them. The picture here exhibited of the conduct of the Greeks towards the kings of Persia, is by no means flattering, in point of morals. But it is not in ancient times only that we find morals must be silent, when politics speak. TOUR.

Greeks; (indeed, without some immediate reformation in our conduct, we must be excepted.) In the next place, there are several cities which affect the characters of guardians and protectors. They are all possessed with a strong passion for pre-eminence; and some of them (to their shame!) desert, and envy, and distrust, each other. In a word, the Argians, Thebans, Corinthians, Lacedemonians, Arcadians, and Athenians, have all erected themselves into so many distinct sovereignties. But among all these parties, all these governing states, into which Greece is broken, there is not one (if I may speak freely) to whose councils[a] fewer Grecian affairs are submitted than to ours: and no wonder; when neither love, nor confidence, nor fear, can induce any people to apply to you. It is not one single cause that hath effected this; (in that case the remedy were easy;) but many faults, of various natures and of long continuance. Without entering into a particular detail, I shall mention one in which they all centre: but I must first entreat you not to be offended, if I speak some bold truths without reserve.

[a] *To whose councils*, &c. The ruling states of Greece accounted it their greatest glory to see and hear a number of ambassadors in their assemblies, soliciting their protection and alliance. The conquests which Philip made in Thrace had put an end to many applications of this sort, which had formerly been addressed to the Athenians. And their indolence made people decline any engagements with them. Foreigners were persuaded, that they who were insensible to their own interests, were not likely to grant the due attention to those of others.

EVERY opportunity which might have been improved to your advantage hath been sold. The ease and supineness in which you are indulged have disarmed your resentment against the traitors; and thus others are suffered to possess your honours.—But, at present, I shall take notice only of what relates to Philip. If he be mentioned, immediately there is one ready to start up, and cry, "We should "not act inconsiderately; we should not involve "ourselves in a war." And then he is sure not to forget the great happiness of living in peace, the misfortune of being loaded with the maintenance of a large army; the evil designs of some persons against our treasures; with others of the like momentous truths.

BUT, these exhortations to peace should not be addressed to you: your conduct is but too pacific: let them rather be addressed to him who is in arms. If he can be prevailed on, there will be no difficulty on your part. Then, it cannot be thought a misfortune to provide for our security at the expense of some part of our possessions: the consequences that must arise, if this provision be neglected, rather deserve that name. And as to the plundering of your treasury, this must be prevented, by finding some effectual means to guard it; not by neglecting your interests. Nor can I but express the utmost indignation, when I find some of you complaining that your treasures are plundered, though it be in your power to secure them, and to punish the guilty; and yet looking on with indifference, while Philip

is plundering every part of Greece successively; and this, that he may at last destroy you.

And, what can be the reason, Athenians? that, when Philip is guilty of such manifest violations of justice, when he is actually seizing our cities, yet none of these men will acknowledge that he acts unjustly, or commits hostilities; but assert, that they who rouse you from your insensibility, and urge you to oppose these outrages, are involving you in war? This is the reason; that, whatever accidents may happen in the course of the war, (and there is a necessity, a melancholy necessity, that war should be attended with many accidents,) they may lay the whole blame upon your best and most faithful counsellors. They know, that, if, with a steady and unanimous resolution, you oppose the insolent invader, he must be conquered, and they deprived of a master, whose pay was ever ready. But, if the first unhappy accident calls you off to private trials and prosecutions, they need but appear as accusers, and two great points are secured: your favour, and Philip's gold; while you discharge the vengeance due to their perfidy against your faithful speakers. These are their hopes; these the grounds of their complaints, that certain persons are involving you in war. For my own part, this I know perfectly, that, although it hath never been proposed by any Athenian to declare war, yet Philip hath seized many of our territories, and but just now sent succours to the Cardians. But, if we will persuade ourselves that he is not committing hostilities, he would be

the most senseless of mortals, should he attempt to undeceive us: for, when they who have received the injury deny it, must the offender prove his guilt? But, when he marches directly hither, what shall we then say? He will still deny that he is at war with us; (as he did to the people of Oreum, until his forces were in the heart of their dominions; as he did to those of Pheræ, until he was upon the point of storming their walls; as he did to the Olynthians, until he appeared in their territories at the head of an army.) Shall we then say, that they who urge us to defend our country, are involving us in a war? If so, we must be slaves. There is no medium! Nor is your danger the same with that of other states. Philip's design is not to enslave, but to extirpate, Athens. He knows, that a state like yours, accustomed to command, will not, or if it were inclined, cannot, submit to slavery: he knows, that, if you have an opportunity, you can give him more disturbance than any other people; and, therefore, if ever he conquers us, we may be sure of finding no degree of mercy.

SINCE, then, you are engaged in defence of all that is dear to you, apply to the great work with an attention equal to the importance of it: let the wretches who have openly sold themselves to this man, be the objects of your abhorrence; let them meet with the utmost severity of public justice. For you will not, you cannot, conquer your foreign enemies, until you have punished those that lurk within your walls. No; they will ever prove so many ob-

stacles to impede our progress, and to give our enemies the superiority.

And, what can be the reason that he treats you with insolence, (for I cannot call his present conduct by another name;) that he utters menaces against you, while he, at least, condescends to dissemble with other people, and to gain their confidence by good offices? Thus, by heaping favours upon the Thessalians, he led them insensibly into their present slavery. It is not possible to enumerate all the various artifices he practised against the wretched Olynthians: (such, among others, was the putting them in possession of Potidæa.) In his late transactions with the Thebans, he enticed them to his party, by yielding Bœotia to them, and by freeing them from a tedious and distressing war. And thus, after receiving their several insidious favours, some of these people have suffered calamities but too well known to all; others must submit to whatever may befal them. What you yourselves have formerly lost, I shall not mention; but, in the very treaty of peace, in how many instances have we been deceived? how have we been despoiled? Did we not give up Phocis and the Straits? Did not we lose our Thracian dominions, Doriscum, Serrium, and even our ally Cersobleptes? Is he not in possession of Cardia? and doth he not avow his usurpation? Whence is it, then, that his behaviour towards you is so different from that towards others? Because, of all the Grecian states, ours is the only one in which harangues in favour of enemies are pronounced with impunity; and the

venal wretch may utter his falsehoods with security, even while you are losing your dominions. It was not safe to speak for Philip, at Olynthus, until the people had been gained by Potidæa. In Thessaly, it was not safe to speak for Philip, until that people had been gained by the expulsion of their tyrants, and by being reinstated in the council of Amphictyons. Nor could it have been safely attempted at Thebes, until he had given them up Bœotia, and exterminated the Phocians. But, at Athens, without the least danger may Philip be defended, although he hath deprived us of Amphipolis and the territory of Cardia; although he threatens our city by his fortifications in Eubœa; although he is now marching to Byzantium. Hence, some of his advocates have arisen from penury to affluence, from obscurity and contempt to honour and eminence; while, on the other hand, you have sunk from glory to disgrace, from wealth to poverty: for, the riches of a state I take to be the number, fidelity, and affection of its allies; in all which you are notoriously deficient. And, by your total insensibility, while your affairs are thus falling into ruin, he is become successful, great, and formidable to all the Greeks, to all the barbarians; and you deserted and inconsiderable; sumptuous indeed in your markets, but, in every thing relating to military power, ridiculous.

THERE are some orators, I find, who view your interests and their own in a quite different light. To you they urge the necessity of continuing quiet, whatever injuries you are exposed to; they themselves find this impossible, though no one offers

them the least injury. To you I speak, Aristodemus[a]! Suppose a person should, without severity, ask you this question: "How is it, that you, who "are sensible, (for it is a well-known truth) that "the life of private men is serene and easy, "and free from danger; that of statesmen, in- "vidious and insecure, subject to daily contests "and disquiets; should yet prefer the life encom- "passed with dangers, to that of peace and disen- "gagement?" What could you say? Suppose we admit the truth of the very best answer you could make, "that you were prompted by a desire of "honour and renown:" is it possible, that you, who engaged in such painful undertakings, who despised all toils and dangers, for the sake of these, should advise the state to give them up for ease and indulgence? You cannot surely say, that it was incumbent upon you to maintain a degree of eminence in the city; and that the city was not concerned to maintain her eminence in Greece! Nor do I see how the public safety requires that we should confine ourselves to our own concerns; and yet, that an officious intrusion into those of others should be necessary for your safety. On the contrary, you are involving yourself in the greatest dangers, by being unnecessarily assiduous; and the

[a] *To you I speak, Aristodemus!* He was by profession a player; and was one of the ten ambassadors which the Athenians had sent to the court of Macedon, to treat about the peace. At his return, Demosthenes proposed a decree for crowning this very man for his good services, whom he here inveighs against with so much bitterness.

city, by being quite inactive. "But then you have "an illustrious reputation, derived from your family, "which it would be shameful not to support: "while, on the contrary, nothing has been trans- "mitted from our fathers, but obscurity and mean- "ness." This is equally false. Your father was like you, and therefore base and infamous. To the honour of our ancestors, let all Greece bear witness; twice rescued[a], by their valour, from the greatest dangers.

THERE are persons, then, who do not act with the same firmness and integrity in the conduct of their own affairs, and those of the state. Is not this the case, when some of them, after escaping from prison, have raised themselves so high, as to forget their former condition; and yet have reduced a state, whose pre-eminence in Greece was but now universally acknowledged, to the lowest degree of infamy and meanness?——I could say more on these and other points; but I forbear: for it is not want of good counsel that now distresses, or ever hath distressed, you. But, when your true interests have been laid before you, and that you have been unanimous in your approbation, you can, with equal patience, attend to those who endeavour to

[a] *Twice rescued*, &c. First at Marathon, and afterwards at Salamis. Isocrates mentions a third time, when they delivered Greece from the Spartan yoke. Demosthenes (frequently speaks of this in the highest terms, but) here rather chooses to lessen the glory of his country, than to recal an event which reflected on the Lacedemonians, now in alliance with Athens. TOUR.

discredit, to overthrow all that hath been advanced. Not that you are ignorant of their characters; (for you can, at first glance, distinguish the hireling and agent of Philip from the true patriot;) but that, by impeaching your faithful friends, and by turning the whole affair into ridicule and invective, you may find a pretence for the entire neglect of your duty.

You have now heard truths of the highest moment, urged with all freedom, simplicity, and zeal. You have heard a speech not filled with flattery, danger, and deceit; calculated to bring gold to the speaker, and to reduce the state into the power of its enemies. It remains, therefore, that the whole tenor of your conduct be reformed! if not, that utter desolation, which will be found in your affairs, must be imputed wholly to yourselves.

END OF THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.

THE

TWELFTH ORATION

AGAINST

PHILIP:

COMMONLY CALLED

THE ORATION ON THE LETTER:

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF THEOPHRASTUS,

THE YEAR AFTER THE FOREGOING ORATION.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

Philip's Letter to the Athenians.

INTRODUCTION.

THE former oration inspired the Athenians with the resolution of sending succours to all the cities that were threatened by Philip's arms: and their first step was, to dispatch to the Hellespont a convoy with provisions; which weighed anchor in view of Selymbria, a city of the Propontis, then besieged by the Macedonians, and was there seized by Amyntas, Philip's admiral. The ships were demanded by the Athenians, and returned by Philip, but with declarations sufficiently alarming.

The obstinate valour of the Perinthians had forced Philip to turn the siege into a blockade. He marched off with a considerable body of his army, to attack other places; and made an incursion into the territories of Byzantium. The Byzantines shut themselves up within their city, and dispatched one of their citizens to Athens, to desire the assistance of that state; who, with some difficulty, prevailed to have a fleet of forty ships sent out, under the command of Chares.

As this general had not the same reputation in other places as at Athens, the cities by which

he was to pass refused to receive him: so that he was obliged to wander for some time along the coasts, extorting contributions from the Athenian allies; despised by the enemy, and suspected by the whole world. He appeared at last before Byzantium; where he met with the same mortifying treatment as in other places, and was refused admission: and shortly after was defeated by Amyntas in a naval engagement, in which a considerable part of his fleet was either sunk or taken.

Philip had for some time perceived, that, sooner or later, he must inevitably come to a rupture with the Athenians. His partizans were no longer able to lull them into security. Their opposition to his designs, however imperfect and ineffectual, was yet sufficient to alarm him. He therefore determined to endeavour to abate that spirit which now began to break through their inveterate indolence; and for this purpose sent them a letter, in which, with the utmost art, he laid open the causes of complaint he had against them, and threatened them with reprisals. This letter was not received at Athens till after the news of Chares's defeat.

Philip had now laid siege to Byzantium; and exerted all his efforts to make himself master of

that city. On the other hand, the Athenians were disheartened by the ill success of their commander, and began to repent of having sent any succours: when Phocion, who always assumed the liberty of speaking his sentiments freely, assured them, that, for once, they themselves had not been in fault; but that their general only was to blame. He was immediately desired to take on himself the charge of relieving Byzantium; and set sail with a numerous body of forces. He was received with the greatest demonstrations of joy: and his whole conduct expressed the utmost wisdom and moderation. Nor was his valour less conspicuous: he sustained many assaults with an intrepidity worthy of the early ages of the commonwealth; and at last obliged Philip to raise the siege.

Phocion then departed amidst the general acclamations of the people whom he had saved. He proceeded to the relief of the colonies of the Chersonesus, who were ever exposed to the attacks of the Cardians. In his way he took some vessels laden with arms and provisions for the enemy: and obliged the Macedonians, who had attempted Sestos, to abandon their enterprise, and shut themselves up in Cardia.

And thus, after various expeditions highly honourable to himself and to his country, Phocion

returned home, where he found the Athenians engaged in a debate on Philip's letter; on which occasion Demosthenes pronounced his last oration against Philip. To have answered the letter particularly, would have been very difficult: for, though Athens had the better cause, yet many irregularities had really been committed; which Philip knew how to display in their full force. The orator therefore makes use of his art to extricate himself from the difficulty; avoids all former discussions of facts; and applies himself at once to raise the lively passions: affects to consider this letter as an open declaration of war; inflames the imaginations of his hearers with this idea; and speaks only of the means to support their arms against so powerful an enemy.

PHILIP'S LETTER[a]

TO THE

ATHENIANS.

Theophrastus, Archon—A. R. Philip 21.—Olympiad 110. An. 1.

PHILIP,

To the Senate and People of Athens,
Greeting:

As the embassies I have frequently sent to enforce those oaths and declarations by which we stand engaged, have produced no alteration in your con-

[a] This letter is a master-piece in the original. It has a majestic and a persuasive vivacity; a force and justness of reasoning sustained through the whole; a clear exposition of facts, and each followed by its natural consequence; a delicate irony: in short, a noble and concise style, made for kings who speak well, or have taste and discernment at least to make choice of those who can make them speak well. If Philip was himself the author of this letter, as it is but just to believe, since we have no proof to the contrary, we may reasonably pronounce of him, as was said of Cæsar, *that he wrote with that spirit with which he fought. Eodem animo dixit, quo bellavit.* Quint. Inst. l. 10. c. 1.
TOUR.

duct, I thought it necessary thus to lay before you the several particulars in which I think myself aggrieved. Be not surprised at the length of this letter; for, as I have many causes of complaint, it is necessary to explain them all distinctly.

First then, when Nicias the herald[a] was forcibly taken out of my own territory; instead of punishing the author of this outrage, as justice required, you added to his wrongs, by keeping him ten months in prison: and the letters entrusted to him[b], by us, you read publicly in your assembly. Again, when the ports of Thassus were open[c] to the Byzantine galleys, nay, to any pirates that pleased, you looked on with indifference; although our treaties expressly say, that such proceedings shall be con-

[a] *When Nicias the herald,* &c. Probably he had been seized upon his journey from Thrace to Macedon, by Diopithes, at the time of his invading Philip's Thracian dominions, as mentioned in the preface to the Oration on the state of the Chersonesus. TOUR.

[b] *And the letters entrusted to him, by us,* &c. The Athenians hoped, by opening this packet, to get some light into Philip's secret schemes and practices against them. There were found in it some letters directed to Olympias, Philip's queen, which they treated with a most scrupulous respect, and took care she should receive them in the same condition in which they had been intercepted. TOUR.

[c] *When the ports of Thassus were open,* &c. The Athenians had engaged, by an article of their treaty, that the Thassians, who were their subjects, should not receive any ships that committed piracies on the subjects or allies of Philip. This article had not been strictly observed; perhaps on account of Philip's own infidelity. TOUR.

sidered as an actual declaration of war. About the same time it was that Diopithes made a descent upon my dominions, carried off in chains the inhabitants of Crobyle and Tiristasis[a], ravaged all the adjacent parts of Thrace, and at length proceeded to such a pitch of lawless violence, as to seize Amphilochus[b], who went, in quality of an ambassador, to treat about the ransom of prisoners; whom, after he had reduced him to the greatest difficulties, he compelled to purchase his freedom, at the rate of nine talents. And this he did with the approbation of his state. Yet the violation of the sacred character of heralds and ambassadors is accounted, by all people, the height of impiety; nor have any expressed a deeper sense of this, than you yourselves: for, when the Megareans had put Anthemocritus to death[c], the people proceeded so far

[a] *Crobyle and Tiristasis.* The first of these places is quite unknown. Tiristasis is placed by Pliny in the Thraeian Chersonesus. TOUR.

[b] *As to seize Amphilochus.* It is impossible to save the honour of Diopithes, but by denying the fact; at least in the manner that Philip represents it. TOUR.

[c] *For, when the Megareans had put Anthemocritus to death,* &c. Philip, here, beats the Athenians with their own weapons, and cites, very much to the purpose, the example of a memorable vengeance, which they had taken about an age before, upon the Megareans. They had accused this people of favouring a revolt of their slaves, and of profaning a tract of consecrated land; and, upon this account, excluded them from all advantages of commerce in the ports and markets of Athens. Thucydides stops here; but Pausanias adds, that Anthemocritus went from Athens, in quality of an herald, to summon the Megareans to desist from

as to exclude them from the mysteries[a]; and erected a statue before the gates, as a monument of their crime. And is not this shocking to be avowedly guilty of the very same crimes, for which your resentment fell so severely upon others, when you yourselves were aggrieved?

In the next place, Callias, your general, hath made himself master of all the towns upon the bay

their sacrilege, and that, for answer, they put him to death. The interest of the gods served the Athenians for a pretence; but the famous Aspasia, whom Pericles was so violently in love with, was the true cause of their rupture with Megara. Some young Athenians, heated by wine, had taken away from Megara a remarkable courtezan, called Simætha; and the Megareans, by way of reprisal, seized two Athenian ladies of the same character, that were in Aspasia's train. Pericles espoused his favourite's quarrel; and, with the power which he then possessed, easily persuaded the people to whatever he pleased. They thundered out a decree against the Megareans, forbidding all commerce with them upon pain of death: they drew up a new form of an oath, by which every general obliged himself to invade the territories of Megara twice every year. This decree kindled the first sparks of contention, which at length flamed out in the Peloponnesian war. It was the work of three courtezans. The most illustrious events have sometimes as shameful an origin. TOUR.

[a] *To exclude them from the mysteries; and erected,* &c. All the Greeks had, ordinarily, a right to be initiated into what were called the lesser mysteries which the Athenians celebrated at Eleusis, in honour of Ceres and Proserpine. But, upon the death of Anthemocritus, the Megareans were excluded; and a statue or tomb erected in honour of this herald, on the road leading from Athens to Eleusis, near the gate called Dipylon. According to Aristophanes (in Acharn. Act. 2. Sect. 5.) the Megareans denied this murder, and threw the whole blame of it upon Aspasia and Pericles. TOUR.

of Pegasæ; though comprehended in the treaty made with you, and united in alliance to me. Not a vessel could steer its course towards Macedon, but the passengers were all treated by him as enemies, and sold: and this his conduct hath been applauded by the resolutions of your council. So that I do not see how you can proceed further, if you actually declare war against me. For, when we were at open hostilities, you did but send out your corsairs, make prize of those who were sailing to my kingdom, assist my enemies, and infest my territories. Yet now, when we are professedly at peace, so far have your injustice and rancour hurried you, that you have sent ambassadors to the Persian [a] to persuade him to attack me: which must appear highly surprising: for, before that prince had subdued Egypt and Phœnicia, it was resolved [b],

[a] *You have sent ambassadors to the Persian*, &c. Diodorus informs us, that about this time the satraps of the lesser Asia had obliged Philip to raise the siege of Perinthus. The historian does not say that the Athenians invited them: but Philip complains of it here; and Pausanias observes, that in this expedition the Persian forces were commanded by Apollodorus, an Athenian general. We may observe, with what disrespect Philip (whose ancestors, in their greatest prosperity, never aspired higher than to the alliance of some satrap) here speaks of the GREAT KING—*The Persian.* TOUR.

[b] *Before that prince had subdued Egypt and Phœnicia, it was resolved*, &c: Artaxerxes Ochus, who governed Persia at that time, before his reduction of these revolted provinces, had marched into the lesser Asia, against Artabazus, a rebellious satrap. The approach of the Persians alarmed the Greeks: and Athens conceived a design of attacking them in their own country. This

that, if he attempted any new enterprises, you would invite me, as well as all the other Greeks, to an association against him. But now, with such malice am I pursued, that you are, on the contrary, confederating with him against me. In former times I am told, your ancestors objected it as an heinous crime to the family[a] of Pisistratus, that they had led the Persian against the Grecks: and yet you are not ashamed to commit the very same action, for which you were continually inveighing against those tyrants.

But your injustice hath not stopped here. Your decrees command me to permit Teres and Cersobleptes to reign[b] unmolested in Thrace, as being

gave occasion to the oration of Demosthenes, entitled, Περὶ τῶν Συμμοριῶν. Philip pretends that they had resolved to admit him into the confederacy which was then forming in favour of the Greeks, with whom he affects to rank, and by his expressions removes every idea of foreigner and barbarian, which are the representations that the orator frequently makes of him. Tour.

[a] *Your ancestors objected it as an heinous crime to the family*, &c. The comparison which Philip makes here, between the sons of Pisistratus and the orators who advised an alliance with Persia, is founded upon an history too well known to be enlarged upon. It is undoubtedly by no means just: for, in different conjunctures, the good citizen may employ the same forces to save his country that the wicked one had formerly employed to destroy it. However, the turn he gives it was the fittest in the world to affect the people, who thought it their greatest honour to express an inveterate hatred to the Persians.

[b] *To permit Teres and Cersobleptes to reign*, &c. History speaks only of Cersobleptes. They had suffered him to be overthrown

citizens of Athens.——I do not know that they were included in our treaty, that their names are to be found in the records of our engagements, or that they are Athenians. But this I know, that Teres served in my army against you, and that when Cersobleptes proposed to my ambassadors to take the necessary oaths, in order to be particularly included in the treaty, your generals prevented him, by declaring him an enemy to the Athenians. And how is this equitable or just? when it serves your purposes, to proclaim him the enemy of your state; when I am to be calumniated, to give him the title of your citizen; when Sitalces was slain[a], to whom you granted the privileges of your city, instantly to enter into an alliance with his murderer; yet to engage in a war with me, on account of Cersobleptes? and this, when you are sensible that not one of these your adopted citizens have ever shewed the least regard to your laws or determinations. But to bring this affair to a short issue. You granted the

by Philip, and, when they found how nearly they themselves were affected by his fall, employed those decrees to endeavour to restore him. TOUR.

[a] *When Sitalces was slain*, &c. This Sitalces was the grandfather of Cersobleptes. In the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, he rendered the Athenians such important services, that they, by way of acknowledgment, admitted his son Sadocus into the number of their citizens. In the eighth year of this war, Sitalces was killed in a battle against the Triballi. His nephew Seuthes seized the kingdom, in prejudice of his children, and hence became suspected of being the cause of his death. Philip argues, from this suspicion, as if it was an undoubted truth. TOUR.

rights of your community[a] to Evagoras of Cyprus[b], to Dionysius the Syracusian, and to their descendants. Prevail therefore upon the men who have dispossessed each of these, to restore them to their dominions, and you shall recover from me all those

[a] *You granted the rights of your community*, &c. What idea must we form of the splendour of that city, where even kings solicited for the rank of private citizens! The other states of Greece affected the same kind of grandeur. At a time when ambassadors from Corinth were congratulating Alexander on his victories, they made him an offer of the freedom of their city, as the greatest mark of honour possible. Alexander, now in the full splendour of his fortune, disdained to return them any answer but a contemptuous smile. This stung the ambassadors to the quick, and one of them was bold enough to say, "Know, Sir, "that the great Hercules, and you, are the only persons whom "Corinth has ever deigned to distinguish in this manner." This softened the prince: he received them with all possible marks of respect, and accepted of a title which had been so dignified. TOUR.

[b] *To Evagoras of Cyprus.* The Athenians erected a statue to Evagoras, the elder of that name, and declared him a citizen of Athens, for having assisted Conon in restoring their liberty. He caused Salamis to revolt from the Persians, and subdued most part of the island of Cyprus, but was afterwards reduced, and fell by the hands of Nicocles. His son, Evagoras the younger, however, asserted his claim to the kingdom of Cyprus, and was supported by the Athenians against Protagoras, the successor of Nicocles. But his attempts were not successful. Protagoras supplanted him at the court of Persia, where he had been in full favour. He was cited to answer to some heads of an accusation, and, upon his justifying himself, he obtained a government in Asia, well worth his little kingdom. But his bad conduct soon obliged him to abdicate, and fly into Cyprus, where he perished wretchedly.

TOUR.

territories of Thrace[a] which Teres and Cersobleptes commanded. But if you have nothing to urge against those who expelled them, and yet are incessantly tormenting me, am not I justly warranted to oppose you?—I might urge many other arguments upon this head, but I choose to pass them over.

THE Cardians[b], I freely declare, I am determined to support, as my engagements to them are prior to our treaty, and as you refused to submit your differences with them to an arbitration, though frequently urged by me: nor have they been wanting in the like solicitations. Should not I therefore be the basest of mankind, to abandon my allies, and to shew greater regard for you, my inveterate opposers, than for my constant and assured adherents?

FORMERLY (for I cannot pass this in silence) you contented yourselves with remonstrating upon the points above mentioned. But lately, upon the bare complaint of the Peparethians, that they had been severely treated by me, you proceeded to such outrage, as to send orders to your general to revenge their quarrel. Yet the punishment which I inflicted was no way equal to the heinousness of their crime: as they had, in time of peace, seized Halo-

[a] *All those territories of Thrace.* In the original, τὴν Θρᾴκην, ἅπασαν, &c. By the ironical pomp of this expression, he sets their dominions (which were really inconsiderable) in the most contemptuous light. TOUR.

[b] *The Cardians, &c.* See the preface to the Oration on the state of the Chersonesus.

nesus; nor could be prevailed upon, by all my solicitations, to give up either the island or the garrison. The injuries I received from the Peparethians were never thought of, but their punishment commanded all your attention, as it afforded a pretence for accusing me, although I did not take the island either from them, or from you, but from the pirate Sostratus. If then you confess that you delivered it to Sostratus, you confess yourselves guilty of sending out pirates: if he seized it without your consent, how have I injured you by taking possession of it, and by rendering it a secure harbour? Nay, so great was my regard to your state, that I offered to bestow on you this island: but this was not agreeable to your orators[a]: they would not have accepted it, but resumed. So that, if I complied with their directions, I proclaimed myself an usurper: if I still kept possession of the place, I became suspected to the people. I saw through these artifices, and therefore proposed to bring our differences to a judicial determination; and, if sentence was given for me, to present you with the place; if in your favour, to restore it to the people. This I frequently desired: you would not hear it: the Peparethians seized the island. What then was I to do? Should I not punish the violators of oaths? Was I tamely to bear such an audacious insult? If the island was the property of the Peparethians,

[a] *But this was not agreeable to your orators: they,* &c. Demosthenes in particular opposed their receiving a restitution under the name of a present.

what right have the Athenians to demand it? If it be yours, why do you not resent their usurpation?

So far, in short, have our animosities been carried that, when I had occasion to dispatch some vessels to the Hellespont, I was obliged to send a body of forces through the Chersonesus, to defend them against your colonies, who are authorised to attack me by a decree of Polycrates[a], confirmed by the resolutions of your council. Nay, your general has actually invited the Byzantines to join him, and has every where publicly declared, that he has your instructions to commence hostilities at the first favourable opportunity. All this could not prevail upon me to make any attempt upon your city, or your navy, or your territories, although I might have had success in most, or even all of them. I chose rather to continue my solicitations to have our complaints submitted to proper umpires. And which, think ye, is the fittest decision, that of reason or of the sword? Who are to be judges in your cause, yourselves or others? What can be more inconsistent, than that the people of Athens, who compelled the Thassians and Maronites[b] to bring their pre-

[a] *By a decree of Polycrates.* This orator had great credit at Athens, and on many occasions favoured the designs of Philip. Possibly he acted otherwise upon this occasion, the better to conceal his attachment, or that he might afterwards sell his integrity at a dearer rate. TOUR.

[b] *Who compelled the Thassians and Maronites,* &c. The first of these people inhabited an island in the Egean sea; the other, a maritime place in Thrace. The Thassians had founded Styrma,

tensions to the city of Styrma to a judicial decision, should yet refuse to have their own disputes with me determined in the same manner? particularly as you are sensible that, if the decree be against you, still you lose nothing; if in your favour, it puts you in possession of my conquests.

But what appears to me most unaccountable is this: when I sent you ambassadors, chosen from all the confederated powers, on purpose to be witnesses of our transactions; when I discovered the sincerest intentions of entering into reasonable and just engagements with you, in relation to the affairs of Greece; you even refused to hear these ambassadors on that head. It was then in your power to remove all their apprehensions, who suspected any danger from my designs, or to have openly convicted me of consummate baseness. This was the interest of the people; but the orators could not find their account in it; for they are a set of men, to whom (if I may believe those that are acquainted with your polity) peace is war, and war is peace[a]; as they are always

according to Herodotus; but, as it was in the neighbourhood of Maronea, probably the Maronites had, in quality of protectors, or benefactors, acquired some pretensions to it. Tour.

[a] *Peace is war, and war is peace*, &c. Aristotle, in his Rhetor. l. 3. c. 10. quotes this [nearly] as an example of an agreeable antithesis: which, joined to the force, and, what is more, to the order of the arguments contained in this letter, inclines me to think that Aristotle was his secretary on this occasion. But my conjecture, whether well or ill founded, does not detract from Philip, in point of genius and spirit. The true talent of a king,

sure to make a property of the generals, either by aiding their designs, or by malicious prosecutions. Then they need but throw out some scandalous invectives against persons of worth and eminence, citizens or foreigners, and they at once acquire the character of patriots, among the many. I could have easily silenced their clamours against me, by a little gold; and even have converted them into praises: but I should blush to purchase your friendship from such wretches. To such insolence have they proceeded upon other occasions, that they even dared to dispute my title to Amphipolis; which is founded, I presume, upon reasons beyond their power to invalidate: for, if it is to belong to those who first conquered it, what can be juster than our claim? Alexander, our ancestor, was the original sovereign[a]; as appears from the golden statue[b]

is to know how to apply the talents of others to the best advantage. And we do not want other proofs of Philip's abilities in writing: witness his letter to Aristotle, on the birth of Alexander. TOUR.

[a] *Alexander, our ancestor, was the original sovereign.* Philip asserts boldly, without giving himself much trouble even to preserve probability: for in the time of Alexander, the contemporary of Xerxes, there was no city, nor any fortified post, in the place where Amphipolis was afterwards raised: nor was it till thirty years after the defeat of the Persians that Agnon founded it. TOUR.

[b] *As appears from the golden statue,* &c. Herodotus speaks of this statue, and places it near the colossal statue which the Greeks raised, according to custom, out of the Persian spoils. The proximity of these statues, serves Philip as a foundation for giving his ancestors an honour which really belonged to the Greeks. Solinus

which he erected at Delphos, from the first fruits of the Persian spoils taken there. But if this admits of contest, and it is to continue the property of those who were last in possession, it is mine by this title too; (for I took it from the Lacedemonian inhabitants, who had dispossessed you[a]:) and all cities are held either by hereditary right or by the right of conquest. And yet you, who neither were the original possessors, nor are now in possession, presume to lay claim to this city, under pretence of having held it for some short time; and this, when you have yourselves given the strongest testimony in my favour: for I frequently wrote to you upon this head; and you as often acknowledged me the rightful sovereign: and by the articles of our late treaty, the possession of Amphipolis, and your alliance, were both secured to me. What title therefore can be better established? It descended to us from our ancestors; it is ours by conquest; and, lastly,

mentions, that Alexander, a very rich prince, made an offering of a golden statue of Apollo in the temple of Delphos, and another of Jupiter in the temple of Elis; but not that the Persian spoils were any part of these offerings.—This Alexander, surnamed Φιλέλλην, friend of Greeks, had the reputation of an able politician, but not of a good soldier, or great commander. He served the Persians a long time, rather by force than inclination; and, before the battle of Salamis, declared, of a sudden, for the Greeks. TOUR.

[a] *I took it from the Lacedemonian inhabitants, who had dispossessed you*, &c. Brasidas, the Lacedemonian general, took Amphipolis from the republic of Athens: and, by the assistance of Sparta, it afterwards maintained its independence, until it fell into the power of Philip. TOUR.

you yourselves have acknowledged the justice of our pretensions; you who are wont to assert your claim, even when it is not supported by right.

I HAVE now laid before you the grounds of my complaints. Since you have been the first aggressors; since my gentleness, and fear of offending, have only served to increase your injustice, and to animate you in your attempts to distress me; I must now take up arms; and I call the gods to witness to the justice of my cause, and the necessity of procuring for myself that redress which you deny me.

END OF THE LETTER.

THE ORATION

ON THE

LETTER[a].

Theophrastus, Archon—A. R. Philip 21—Olympiad 110. An. 1.

Now, Athenians! it is fully evident to you all, that Philip made no real peace with us, but only deferred hostilities. When he surrendered Halus to the Pharsalians[b], when he completed the ruin of Phocis, when he overturned all Thrace[c], then did

[a] It must be confessed, that this oration consists almost wholly of repetitions. This great man seems to have thought himself superior to all vain criticism; and, only concerned for the safety of Athens, was in no pain about his private glory. He speaks as an orator, whose end is to persuade and convince; not as a declaimer, who seeks only to give pleasure and excite admiration. He therefore resumes those topics he had already made use of, and gives them new force, by the close and lively manner in which he delivers them. TOUR.

[b] *When he surrendered Halus to the Pharsalians*, &c. Halus was a town of Thessaly, upon the river Amphrysus. Parmenio besieged and took it; after which Philip put the people of Pharsalia in possession of it. TOUR.

[c] *When he overturned all Thrace*, &c. This is the language of an orator, who, to represent Philip's outrages with the greater

he really attack the state, under the concealment of false allegations and unjust pretences; but now he hath made a formal declaration of war, by this his letter. That we are not to look with horror upon his power; that, on the other hand, we are not to be remiss in our opposition, but to engage our persons, our treasures, and our navies; in one word, our whole strength, freely, in the common cause; these are the points I would establish.

First then, Athenians! the gods we may justly regard as our strongest allies and assistants; since, in this unjust violation of his treaty, he hath trampled upon religion, and despised the most solemn oaths. In the next place, those secret practices to which his greatness hath hitherto been owing, all his arts of deceiving, all his magnificent promises, are now quite exhausted. The Perinthians, and the Byzantines, and their confederates[a], have at length discovered, that he intends to treat them as he formerly treated the Olynthians. The Thessalians are no longer ignorant, that he affects to be the master, and not the leader, of his allies. The Thebans begin to see danger in his stationing a garrison

aggravation, takes the liberty of speaking of a part of that country as of the whole. Philip had indeed made himself master of the territories of Teres and Cersobleptes, both kings in Thrace, and allies of the Athenians. But Pausanias observes, that, before the Romans, no one had ever made an entire conquest of Thrace. Tour.

[a] *And their confederates.* The inhabitants of Chios, Rhodes, and some other places, joined to defeat Philip's designs upon Perinthus and Byzantium. Tour.

at Nicæa [a], his assuming the rank of an Amphictyon, his bringing into Macedon the embassies from Peloponnesus [b], and his preventing them in seizing the advantage of an alliance with the people of that country. So that, of those who have hitherto been his friends, some are now irreconcilably at war with him; others no longer serve him with zeal and sincerity; and all have their suspicions and complaints. Add to this, (and it is of no small moment) that the satraps of Asia have just now forced him to raise the siege of Perinthus, by throwing in a body of hired troops; and, as this must make him their enemy [c], and as they are im-

[a] *At Nicæa.* This town was situated near Thermopylæ, and was counted among the principal towns of the Locrians, (Epicnemidii) the neighbours and allies of the Bœotians and Thebans. Philip made himself master of it at the time that he seized Thermopylæ, under pretence of putting an end to the sacred war. TOUR.

[b] *His bringing into Macedon the embassies from Peloponnesus,* &c. Probably this was at the time when he interested himself in the disputes between Sparta and the Argians and Messenians, as mentioned in the preface to the second Philippic oration.—— Strabo mentions an application of the Argians and Messenians to Philip, to regulate a contest between them and Lacedemon, about their boundaries. And Pausanias declaims against the pride of Gallus, a Roman senator, who thought it derogated from his dignity to decide the differences of Lacedemon and Argos; and disdained to meddle with a mediation, which Philip had formerly not only accepted, but courted,

[c] *As this must make him their enemy.* This proved an exact prediction of what happened some time after. Alexander, in his letter to Darius, alleges, as one of the principal subjects of their rupture, the powerful succours which Perinthus received from the Persian satraps. Arrian. l. 1. TOUR.

mediately exposed to danger, should he become master of Byzantium, they will not only readily unite their force with ours, but prevail upon the king of Persia to assist us with his treasure; who, in this particular, far exceeds all other potentates; and whose influence in Greece is so great, that formerly, when we were engaged in a war with Lacedemon, he never failed to give the superiority to[a] that party which he espoused; and now, when he unites with us, he will with ease subdue the power of Philip.

I SHALL not mention, as a balance to these so considerable advantages, that he hath taken the opportunity of the peace to make himself master of many of our territories, our ports, and other like conveniencies. For it is observable, that when affection joins, and one common interest animates the confederating powers, there the alliance is never to be shaken; but where subtle fraud, and passions

[a] *He never failed to give the superiority to,* &c. History represents the king of Persia as the supreme arbiter of the fate of Athens and Lacedemon, during the whole time of their quarrels. Darius Nothus joined with the Lacedemonians: and Lysander, their general, destroyed Athens. Artaxerxes Mnemon protected Conon, the Athenian general; and immediately Athens resumed her former splendour. Lacedemon afterwards joined in alliance with the great king; and this intimidated the Athenians, and obliged them to seek for peace. Artaxerxes dictated the articles of it, threatening to declare against those who should refuse to subscribe to them. Athens instantly obeyed. Thus it was that a foreign power lorded it over the Greeks, and, by means of their divisions, had the absolute command of their fate. TOUR.

insatiable, and perfidy, and violence, have formed it, (and these are the means which he hath used,) the least pretence, the slightest accident, gives it the fatal shock, and, in an instant, it is utterly dissolved. And, from repeated observations, I am convinced, Athenians! that Philip not only wants the confidence and affection of his allies, but, even in his own kingdom, he is by no means happy in that well-established regularity, and those intimate attachments which might be expected. The power of Macedon, indeed, as an ally, may have some effect; but, if left to itself, is insufficient; and, when compared with his pompous enterprises, quite contemptible. And, then, his wars, his expeditions, all those exploits which have given him this splendour, are the very means of rendering it yet weaker: for you are not to imagine, Athenians! that Philip and his subjects have the same desires. He is possessed with the love of glory; they wish only for security. The object of his passion must be attended with danger; and they but ill endure a banishment from their children, parents, wives, a life worn out with toils, and exposed to continual perils in his cause.

Hence we may learn how his subjects in general are affected to their prince. But then his guards and officers of his foreign troops; these, you will find, have some military reputation: yet they live in greater terrors than the obscure and mean. These are exposed only to their avowed enemies: the others have more to fear from calumny and

flattery, than in the field. The one, when engaged in battle, but share the common danger: the others, besides their part, and this not the least of that danger, have also their private apprehensions from the temper of their prince. Among the many, when one hath transgressed, his punishment is proportioned to his crime: the others, when they have most eminently distinguished themselves, are then, in open defiance of all decency, treated with the greatest insolence and disdain.

THAT these are incontestible truths, no reasonable man can doubt: for they who have lived with him assure us, that his ambition is so insatiable, that he will have the glory of every exploit ascribed wholly to himself; and is much more incensed against such commanders as have performed any thing worthy of honour, than against those whose misconduct hath ruined his enterprises. But, if this be the case, how is it that they have persevered so long in their attachment to his cause? It is for this reason, Athenians! because success throws a shade on all his odious qualities (for nothing veils men's faults from observation so effectually as success): but let any accident happen, and they will all be perfectly discovered. Just as in our bodies; while we are in health, our inward defects lie concealed; but, when we are attacked by a disorder, then they are all sensible, in the vessels, in the joints, or wherever we are affected: so in kingdoms and governments of every kind, while their arms are victorious, their disorders escape the common ob-

servation; but a reverse of fortune (and this he must experience, as he hath taken up a burden much beyond his strength) never fails to lay them open to every eye.

If there be a man among you, Athenians! who regards Philip as a powerful and formidable enemy, on account of his good fortune, such cautious foresight bespeaks a truly prudent mind. Fortune, indeed, does greatly influence, or rather has the entire direction of all human affairs: but there are many reasons to expect much more from the fortune of Athens, than that of Philip. We can boast an authority in Greece, derived from our ancestors, not only before his days, but before any one prince of Macedon. They all were tributaries of Athens: Athens never paid that mark of subjection to any people. In the next place, the more inviolably we have adhered to piety and justice, the greater may be our confidence in the favour of the gods. But, if this be the case, how is it that, in the late war, his arms had such superior fortune? This is the cause, (for I will speak with undaunted freedom): he takes the field himself, endures its toils, and shares its dangers: no favourable incident escapes him, no season of the year retards him. While we (for the truth must not be concealed) are confined within our walls, in perfect inactivity, delaying, and voting, and wandering through the public places, in search of news. Can any thing better deserve the name of *new*, than that one sprung from Macedon should insult Athens, and dare to send such

letters as you have just heard recited? That he should have his armies and his orators in pay? (Yes, I call heaven to witness, there are those among us, who do not wish to live for Philip, who have not sense to perceive that they are selling all the interests of the state, all their own real interests, for a trifling pittance!)——While we never once think of preparing to oppose him; are quite averse to hiring troops, and want resolution to take arms ourselves. No wonder, therefore, that he had some advantage over us in the late war: on the contrary, it is really surprising that we, who are quite regardless of all that concerns our cause, should expect to conquer him, who leaves no means omitted that may assure his success.

Let things be duly weighed, Athenians! and deeply impressed upon your minds. Consider, that it is not at your option, whether to profess peace or no; for he hath now made a declaration of war, and hostilities are commenced. Spare no expenses, public or private: let a general ardour appear for taking arms: appoint abler commanders than you have hitherto chosen: for, it must not be imagined, that the men, who, from a state of prosperity, have reduced us to these difficulties, will again extricate us, and restore us to our former splendour: nor is it to be expected, that, if you continue thus supine, your cause will find other assertors. Think, how infamous it is, that you, whose ancestors were exposed to such incessant toils, and so great dangers, in the war with Lacedemon, should refuse to en-

gage with resolution in defence of that rightful power which they transmitted to us! how shameful, that this Macedonian should have a soul so daring, that, to enlarge his empire, his whole body is covered with wounds; and that the Athenians, they whose hereditary character it is to yield to none, but to give law to all their adversaries, are now supine and enervated, insensible to the glory of their fathers, and regardless of the interest of their country!

THAT I may not detain you, my sentence is this: that we should instantly prepare for war, and call upon the other states of Greece to join in the common cause; not by words, but actions; for words, if not attended with actions, are of no force. Our professions particularly have always had the less weight, as we are confessedly superior to the rest of Greece, in prompt address and excellence of speaking.

END OF THE ORATION ON THE LETTER.

CONCLUSION.

HAVING thus far traced the progress of Philip's attempts on Greece, it may be no improper conclusion to continue the account down to his final triumph over the liberty of that country.

We have seen the Athenians, at last, exerting themselves in a manner worthy of that renowned people. And Philip, now returning from his Scythian expedition, in which he had engaged, when foiled in his attempts on Perinthus and Byzantium, found himself considerably distressed and harassed by the hostilities of Athens. To extricate himself from these difficulties, he formed a bold and subtle project of entering Greece; and so laid his scheme, as to make the Athenians themselves the instruments of his designs.

By his intrigues he procured Æschines to be sent as their deputy to the council of Amphictyons. This was in reality of the highest consequence: for, no sooner had the deputy taken his seat, but a question was moved, Whether the Locrians of Amphissa had not been guilty of sacrilege, in plowing the fields of Cirrha, contiguous to the temple of Delphos? Sentiments were divided. Æschines proposed a view: this was decreed: and, when the

Amphictyons came to take it, the Locrians, jealous of their property, and no doubt inflamed by those who were in the secret of the whole design, fell on those venerable persons, and obliged them to consult their safety by flight. Such an outrage was judged to demand the severest punishment; and it was agreed, that all Greece should join in inflicting it. But, when the army came to a place of rendezvous, their appearance gave no great prospect of success. His agents and partisans then arose, and, by their artful representations, prevailed upon the Amphictyons to declare Philip general of the Grecian forces, and to invite him to execute their decrees. As the event was expected, his army was ready. He marched into Greece: but, instead of attacking the Locrians, he immediately seized Elatæa, a city of Phocis, of the utmost moment, as it awed Bœotia, and opened him a passage into Attica.

This step struck Greece with astonishment. Athens particularly received the news with inexpressible confusion. The people ran dismayed to an assembly, and called on their usual counsellors to give their opinion in this critical juncture. Demosthenes arose; and his eloquence was exerted to animate their drooping courage; by his advice ambassadors were sent through Greece, and particularly to Thebes, to engage the states to rise at once to oppose the Macedonian torrent before it bore down all. Demosthenes himself headed the embassy to the Thebans. He found a powerful an-

tagonist in Python, Philip's agent: yet, in spite of his remonstrances, he so fired that people, that they at once forgot all the favours Philip had conferred on them, and joined against him with the most cordial zeal. The confederates met at Eleusis. The Pythian priestess uttered the most terrible predictions, and threatened them with the severest fate; but Demosthenes took care to prevent the effect of this, by treating her oracles with contempt, which, he declared, were dictated by Philip, and calculated to serve his interests.

This prince now saw all his arts defeated; and therefore resolved upon an engagement, as his last resource. He advanced to Cheronæa, in the neighbourhood of which city the confederates were encamped, under the command of Chares and Lysicles, two Athenian generals, by no means worthy of commanding so illustrious an army. The next day, by sun-rise, both armies were in the field. Alexander, then but nineteen years old, surrounded by a number of experienced officers, commanded the left wing of the Macedonians. He began the onset: and was bravely opposed by the Sacred Band of the Thebans. On the right, Philip himself commanded; where the Athenians made their attack with such vigour as obliged his soldiers to give ground. The advantage was pursued with the most imprudent and intemperate heat. But, while the Athenians were rushing on without any order, Philip bore down upon them with his pha-

lanx, and obtained an easy, though a bloody victory. At the same time, and with a like effusion of blood, Alexander triumphed over the Thebans.

THUS were the confederates totally overthrown, and the liberty of Greece lost for ever.

THE

ORATIONS

OF

DEMOSTHENES,

ON

OCCASIONS OF PUBLIC DELIBERATION.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

THE ORATION OF DINARCHUS

AGAINST

DEMOSTHENES.

PREFACE.

THE public orations of DEMOSTHENES, here presented to the reader, are not indeed of the same interesting nature with those of the former part of this volume, but such as have been always deemed well worthy the regards of the learned. And, if we may ever hope to gain an attention to the remains of this eloquent statesman, we must look for it in BRITAIN, where a love of liberty possesses its inhabitants, and a freedom of debate, the natural consequence of a freedom of constitution, is held sacred and inviolable; where opposite opinions, accidental abuses and corruptions, various plans of policy, contentions for power, and many other causes, conspire to animate its counsellors, and call forth their abilities; where a profusion of glittering ornament, gay flights of fancy, and figurative eloquence, do by no means form the character of national eloquence: but, simplicity and severity of reasoning, force, and energy, eminently distinguish the speakers of every kind from those of the neighbouring nations; and where, above all, a warm benevolence of heart, confessedly the glory of its citizens, may, at some times, engage their attention to the interests and concerns of a people, who experienced the vicissitudes of integrity and cor-

ruption, happiness and misfortune; who were disgraced or renowned, just as their councils were weak or well directed.

THE history of the wars, negociations, government, and policy, of the conquests and defeats, of the progress and declension, of all ancient states, is universally allowed to be a study highly delightful and interesting to the ingenious mind. The harangues and counsels of their statesmen are no inconsiderable part of this history. Nor can it be deemed an useless or unaffecting occupation to inquire, what were the arguments used in a free assembly, on any occasions where the public interests were concerned; what were the topics urged to awaken the indolence, or to check the violence of the people; to elevate their hopes, or to alarm their apprehensions; to correct their prejudices, and to reform their abuses: what schemes of policy were proposed, what measures suggested: what artifices were used, what arguments urged by contending parties to establish their power and interest; what motives were proposed to engage the community in war, or to inspire the people with pacific dispositions; to prompt them to form, or to dissolve alliances; to extend their views to the interests and concerns of foreigners, or to confine their regards to their own security. These, I say, and such-like, are by no means unworthy of attention; and these we find in a translation of an ancient orator, executed with any tolerable care and fidelity, however it may be discovered, by the

learned reader, inferior to the illustrious original, in dignity of expression, and excellence of style and composition.

Or, if we consider the remains of an ancient orator in a critical view, merely as the productions of art and genius, it can be no unworthy curiosity to endeavour at gaining a just, though faint idea of that excellence, which, we are told, had such wonderful effects. The appearance of a great public speaker, and the power of his eloquence, are so feelingly described by Cicero, that we may be certain the piece was copied for himself, and from what he acccounted his greatest glory. "Give me "the orator[a]," saith he, "who can produce the "following effects: When it is once known that "he is to speak, let there be the utmost impatience "to secure places in the court, which must be in- "stantly crowded; let all be hurry and eagerness; "the clerks and officers must fly up and down "with an obliging solicitude, to provide seats and "accommodations for the assembly. The auditors "must press forward in a crowded circle. Let the

[a] Volo hoc oratori contingat, ut cum auditum sit eum esse dicturum, locus in subselliis occupetur, compleatur tribunal; gratiosi scribæ sint in dando et ce dendo loco, corona multiplex, judex erectus; cum surgit is qui dicturus sit, significetur a corona silentium, deinde crebræ assentationes, multæ admirationes; risus, cum velit; cum velit, fletus; ut qui hæc procul videat, etiamsi quid agatur nesciat, placere tamen, et in scena esse. Roscium intelligat. Hæc cui contingant, cum scito Attice dicere: ut de Pericle audivimus, ut de Hyperide, ut de Æschine; de ipso quidem Demosthene maximè. Cic. in Brut.

" judge be roused to the utmost attention. When " the speaker rises, the audience must command " silence, all must be hushed, till some marks of " approbation are extorted, and expressions of " wonder break out at frequent intervals. If he " would inspire them with mirth, the smile must " be universal; if with sorrow, their tears must " instantly flow. So that a person at a distance, " though he does not know directly what piece is " acting, must yet be witness of the powerful im- " pression, and assured that some great and fa- " vourite actor is on the stage. He that has such " power, we may pronounce the truly complete " speaker. As we have heard of Pericles, as of " Hyperides, as of Æschines; but chiefly of De- " mosthenes himself."

And, if Demosthenes appeared with so great splendour in his judicial pleadings, his speeches in public deliberations seem to have been attended with circumstances still more honourable, and with proofs of his abilities still more forcible. He generally acted in scenes of turbulence and public confusion. The speakers of the opposite party had first laboured to prepossess the people against the sentiments he was to deliver: to this their own corrupted inclinations conspired, and vengeance was denounced against all that should dare to control them. In the midst of clamour and commotion the orator arises: his adversaries dread him, and endeavour to drown his remonstrances in tu-

mult. By degrees he gains a patient audience. Opposition is checked, dismayed, and silenced. His countrymen hang on him as on some oracle, that denounces destruction on their vices and misconduct, and points out the only way to security. They feel their own weakness and unworthiness, they acknowledge the justice of his severity: they resign themselves to his direction, and rush enthusiastically forward, to the dangerous field of glory which he points out to them. Such were generally the immediate impressions, though not always permanent and effectual.

At other times he appeared, when an universal terror and dismay had seized the assembly. When the enemy seemed to be at their gates, when destruction appeared inevitable; and despair had buried the faculties of those speakers in a mournful silence, who in times of less danger were ever forward to take the lead. Then did their country (as Demosthenes himself describes the solemn scene) call on her sons to aid and support her by their counsels, in this affecting hour of distress. But, in a case of extreme difficulty, who can dare to propose any measures whose event must be precarious, where ill success may be imputed to the first adviser, and be severely avenged as his crime? Neither the dangerous situation of affairs, nor the well-known injustice and capriciousness of his countrymen, could deter Demosthenes. He is known on such occasions, to have arisen in the assembly,

and, by his appearance only, to have inspired his countrymen with some confused expectation of relief. He has awakened them from their despair, and gradually calmed their apprehensions; he has dispelled the mist of terror, and diffused bright hopes and chearful expectations through the assembly. Confidence and resolution, magnanimity and courage, indignation and martial rage, vigorous efforts and generous contempt of danger, have fully confessed the irresistible force and energy of the speaker.

SUCH effects were a full reward for the patient assiduity with which Demosthenes laboured to qualify himself for a public speaker and leader; not by weighing words, culling rhetorical flowers, and arranging periods; but, by collecting a large treasure of political knowledge, with which his most early performances appear to be enriched; by learning and habituating himself to strict and solid reasoning, by studying the human heart, and the means of affecting it; by acquiring, from constant practice, a promptness which no difficulties could embarass, an acuteness which no opposition, however subtle and unexpected, could disconcert; and a copiousness inexhaustible; prepared for all emergencies; ever flowing, and ever abundantly supplied from its rich and bountiful source.

"ELOQUENCE," saith an admired writer[a],

[a] Lord Bolingbroke, Spirit of Patriotism.

" must flow like a stream that is fed by an abun-
" dant spring, and not spout forth a little frothy
" stream, on some gaudy day, and remain dry for
" the rest of the year." Such was the eloquence of all those illustrious ancients that history hath celebrated; and such, in every free state, must be the eloquence, which can really bring advantage to the public, or honour to the possessor. The voice may be tuned to the most musical perfection, the action may be modelled to the utmost grace and propriety; expressions may be chosen, of energy, delicacy, and majesty; the period may be taught to flow with all the ease and elegance of harmonious modulation: yet, these are but inferior parts of genuine eloquence; by no means the first and principal, much less the sole objects of regard. The weapon of the orator should be bright and glittering indeed; but this should arise from the keenness of its edge: it should be managed with grace; but with such a grace as is an indication of consummate skill and strength.

We are told of a Grecian general, who, when he travelled, and viewed the country round him, revolved in his mind, how an army might be there drawn up to the greatest advantage; how he could best defend himself, if attacked from such a quarter; how advance with greatest security; how retreat with least danger. Something similar to this should be the practice and study of a public speaker. And thus was Demosthenes, for the most part, employed, in his days of retirement and se-

vere application. It is, indeed, insinuated by his enemy[a], that he was more solicitous about rounding a period, than preserving his country. But this is an object fitted rather to the minute regards of such a speaker as the noble author, quoted above, describes with so just a contempt; whose whole abilities consist in providing a slender fund for some particular occasion, when, perhaps, a weak or wicked cause is to be graced and ornamented; who lays on his thin covering, with the utmost care, and most scrupulous nicety; which dazzles for a moment, till the first blast of true, forcible eloquence puffs away the flimsy produce of his labours, and leaves all beneath in its native condition of deformity and shame.

But to return from this digression. Ancient eloquence in general, and that of Demosthenes in particular, we are told, had wonderful effects. The impression was strong and violent; the consequences, sometimes, of the utmost moment. But, by reading the orator in a modern language, how fully and justly soever it might be possible to express the genius and general spirit of the original, or by consulting the original itself, are we always affected with the like impressions; or, can we always trace the artifice, or feel the force, which produced effects so magnificently described? By no means! And this is partly to be imputed to the

[a] Æschines in Ctesiph.

fault of the reader, partly to a difference of circumstances.

He who applies himself to the study of Demosthenes, after a long intercourse with writers of a different character; who hath been accustomed to pointed periods, phrases of affected delicacy, fanciful allusions, figures and images calculated to dazzle and delight the eye, rather than to illuminate, and cast the full glory of evidence round simple truth; he, I say, must throw by the author in disgust, or labour through him, in a cold and lifeless progress, which must serve but to fatigue and disappoint him. He whose taste is ever so justly formed to relish simplicity, and true manly grace, must yet read the orator to great disadvantage, if entirely a stranger to the spirit of free uncontrolled debate. Liberty (if we may so speak) hath its own ideas and its own language, whose force cannot always be felt, or even its meaning rightly and thoroughly conceived by strangers.

Tourreil, the French interpreter of Demosthenes, and Lucchesini, the Italian commentator, seem to have been instances of what is here advanced. The first appears to have had no just taste for the simplicity of modest Attic elegance. He dressed out his author in all that finery, to which he annexed the notions of grace and beauty; and presented him to his countrymen turgid and inflated, encumbered and disgraced by adventitious ornaments. The latter lived and wrote in a coun-

try where the voice of liberty is but seldom and faintly heard; where political transactions are of a confined nature, and not generally discussed in bold and spirited debate: where parties are seldom formed, public dissentions seldom raised; no grand interests boldly asserted; no political measures freely censured. And the effect seems to have been this: the commentator appears shocked at the free, lively, and animated excursions of Demosthenes; he endeavours to reduce him within more sober bounds; and is sometimes, perhaps, misled by trying his expressions by the rules of cold precision. Passages might be produced to warrant these observations: but I shall content myself with just hinting at one, of which notice hath been taken in this volume[a], and which seems to prove what may be deemed the boldest assertion, that Demosthenes cannot be, always, even understood but in a country of liberty. "I am sensible," saith the orator, "that the Persian is the common enemy of the "Greeks." To the Italian, this assertion was strange and unaccountable, at a time when the two nations were at peace, and when treaties actually subsisted between them. History was ransacked and tortured for some plausible pretence or grounds for this extraordinary declaration. But in BRITAIN such pains were needless: there, no idea is more familiar than that of a NATURAL, and HEREDITARY ENEMY.

THE reader's taste, however, may be strictly just;

[a] See Orat. on the Classes.

he may be well acquainted with the sentiments and language of liberty; he may be duly instructed in the history of an ancient people; he may suffer their affairs and interests to make a lively and forcible impression on his mind: yet still, though well prepared for the perusal of an orator, he cannot always perceive his whole force and artifice; as, at this distance of time, facts may appear trivial, and arguments inconclusive, which fired every imagination, and silenced all opposition, in the assembly to which they were originally addressed. We know, in general, the genius, character, and temper of a people, whom the orator may have endeavoured to affect: we can, therefore, in general, conceive and must acknowledge his force and delicacy, the propriety and energy of his representations: they must please and surprise us, and sometimes affect and warm us; and such impressions sufficiently reward our attention. But, in particular passages, the traces of excellence must be faint, or, perhaps, totally effaced; where the art and force of the speaker consist in a judicious attention to particular circumstances of times, occasions, conjunctures of affairs, and dispositions of the auditors. A modern reader is struck with some particular argument or topic; he is, perhaps, disappointed to find, that it is not extended and enlarged on. But it is possible, nay, very likely, that the disposition of those, who heard it, required but a single hint, and that a minute detail would have tired and offended. We read, that such a particular stroke of eloquence had wonderful effects; that such a pas-

sage raised a general acclamation, affected, transported, or terrified: we examine this passage by the general rules of criticism, and we pronounce it inadequate to the wonderful effects ascribed to it. But here we seem to confine our regards to our own sentiments, our own passions, and our own situations: we argue from our own feelings to those of other persons, in circumstances totally different. Cicero, by introducing the mention of the battle of Pharsalia, and the danger which Cæsar there encountered, in a manner artful and lively indeed, but such as by no means indicates a surprising or singular elevation of genius, is said to have made this hero turn pale and tremble. And, why should we doubt of the reality of these effects? We can read of this battle of Pharsalia without emotion; but it was a more important object to a Roman; still more affecting to the soldier who fought in that famous field: but to the general, who there gained the victory, and by this victory rescued himself from destruction, and obtained the sovereignty of the world, what object can be conceived more capable of alarming his passions, and filling his mind with the most turbulent emotions?

But it may be said, that however true the general position, yet the instance brought to illustrate it, is but unhappily chosen; for that, in this case, Cæsar's emotion was but pretended. "He[a] was "himself an accomplished orator, and knew all

[a] See Brown's Essay on Ridicule.

" the windings of the art—he courted Cicero's " friendship, he saw where his vanity and his " weakness lay; with perfect address, therefore, he " played back the orator's art upon himself; his " concern was feigned."—With deference to the author here quoted, I must declare, that I cannot think this suggestion well warranted; no more than I can suppose, that Octavia, the sister of Augustus, meant to pay a compliment to the poet, and but pretended concern, when she appeared to faint at the recital of the famous passage in the sixth Eneid.

> Heu miserande puer! Si qua fata aspera rumpas,
> Tu Marcellus eris.

If Cæsar was too well acquainted with the arts of eloquence, and, of consequence, too well armed against them, to receive any real impression from the efforts of Cicero; this orator, who was equally well acquainted with those arts, the proper occasions of exerting them, and the effects to be expected from them, could not well be deceived by any unnatural semblance of emotion. I say, unnatural semblance; because, it is supposed, that such emotion, in such a case, is contrary to reason, and the nature of things: and, therefore, Cicero, amidst all his vanity, must have seen and despised the injudicious artifice.

The truth seems to be, that, in minds the most enlightened, the passions frequently retain a considerable degree of strength; and, when kindled by

some touch of the orator's address, the combustion is too sudden, as well as too violent, to be effectually suppressed by reason. At least, the ancients seem persuaded of this; for, whatever may be said of eloquence being made for the[a] *multitude* and the *forum*, yet when they addressed themselves, not to the *populace*, but to select and refined judges, they were by no means (as Quintilian expresses it), "quadam eloquentiæ frugalitate contenti, ac ma-"num semper intra pallium continentes." On the contrary, some of the noblest and boldest efforts of art were exerted, some of the sublimest flights of genius indulged, on such occasions. To be convinced of this, we need but turn to any of the judicial pleadings of Cicero. Take the beautiful passage, in an oration against Verres, quoted by Mr. Hume, in his elegant essay on Eloquence; or, read the following passage in the oration for Milo: "On[b] you, ye Albanian mounts and groves, on "you I call. Bear witness for me, ye ruined altars "of Alba, (equal in sanctity to the Roman shrines,) "destroyed, and buried under the profane edifices

[a] Cicero in Brut.

[b] Vos enim jam Albani tumuli atque luci, vos inquam imploro atque obtestor, vosque Albanorum obrutæ aræ, sacrorum populi Romani sociæ et æquales, quas ille præceps amentiâ, cæsis prostratisque sanctissimis lucis, substructionum insanis molibus oppresserat: vestræ tum aræ, vestræ religiones viguerunt, vestra vis valuit, quam ille omni scelere polluerat; tuque ex tuo edito monte Latiari, sancte Jupiter, cujus ille lacus, nemora, finesque sæpe omne nefario stupro, et scelere macularat, aliquando ad eum puniendum oculos aperuisti; vobis illæ, vobis, vestro in conspectu feræ sed justæ tamen, et debitæ pœnæ solutæ sunt.

" raised by his outrageous sacrilege. Your in-
" fluence, your power it was which then prevailed.
" Your divinity then triumphed, and completed its
" vengeance on all his profanations. And thou,
" O holy Jove, didst then, at length, look down
" from thy mount; then didst thou execute thy
" justice on the wretch, whose wickedness and
" abandoned impurity had so often polluted thy
" lakes, thy groves, thy boundaries. To thee, to
" thee, and in thy presence, did he pay the late,
" but justly merited, punishment."—That the circumstances of the trial contributed to animate the orator's style, is certain, as he himself informs us[a]. Yet, amidst all his enthusiasm, the consummate master must have had a due regard to propriety. He could not have forgotten that he addressed himself immediately to a few selected judges. And if such elevated strains of eloquence sometimes failed of success in select assemblies, and before judges of penetration and refinement, the same may be observed of sober, solid, and just argument. Modern times are acquainted with refined assemblies, in which affairs of highest moment are commonly discussed; and, if the spirited and impassioned orator doth not, on all occasions, obtain a majority in such assemblies, they do not always impute it to the superior strength of reason, that fortifies his hearers against the assaults of eloquence.

In poetry, the impression made upon the hearer,

[a] In Brut.

is so far from being lessened or defeated by his refinement and understanding, that it is really heightened and increased in proportion to the accuracy of his judgment, and the delicacy of his sentiments. And although the man of sense, who, in this case, resigns himself up to the pleasing delusion, guards and arms himself against all artifice, in that of eloquence, it might not be difficult to show how this vigilance is sometimes defeated and eluded. But the points which I am at present concerned to establish, are no more than these: That the wonderful effects ascribed to ancient eloquence are not mistaken or exaggerated: That its force was really extraordinary, and its impressions in proportion violent; but, that the reader, who applies himself to study the remains of an ancient orator, and of Demosthenes in particular, may, sometimes, be disappointed in his sanguine expectations of delight, if he hath been long accustomed to compositions of less intrinsic worth, though of more glittering ornament; if he is in general unused to the energy of free debate; if he is unacquainted with the history and character of the people to whom the orator addressed himself; or, if he precipitately judges of the real force and efficacy of his eloquence, from his own sentiments and feelings, without making the necessary allowance for a difference of times, circumstances, passions, and dispositions.

He who will not acknowledge that some particular traces of that exquisite skill, which our orator possessed, are now become faint and obscure,

pays him a veneration rather too implicit. And he who does not still perceive, and feel, "his[a] rapid "harmony exactly adjusted to the sense, his ve- "hement reasoning without any appearance of art, "his disdain, anger, boldness, freedom, involved "in a continued stream of argument," may justly suspect his own deficiency in point of taste: nor is it any indication of a superior strength of reason, if he doth not sometimes accompany the orator in these impetuous passions and exalted sentiments which animate his compositions.

It is a common observation, how much an orator is assisted by the charms of action or pronunciation, which Demosthenes is said to have regarded as the chief part, or rather the whole, of his art: and how much the loss of these must diminish his lustre. Yet, there are other advantages, which such a speaker derives from subjecting his works to a private review, to a strict, dispassionate, and reiterated study. The justness of his reasoning, the soundness of his policy, the worth and elevation of his sentiments, (and these are the really valuable parts of an orator,) are thus brought to a new and severe trial: and if, on such a trial, these excellencies preserve their weight and lustre, this is an additional proof that they are real and intrinsic. What Longinus observes of the Sublime, is, equally applicable to all the excellencies of an orator; that, if they are really genuine, we must form

[a] See Hume's Essay on Eloquence.

the higher ideas of them, the more frequently and attentively they are considered; and that the true and indisputable proof of a writer's value, arises from the consenting approbation of all ages, professions, and inclinations. This last and final sanction our author's merit hath received from private examination, though, at this time, but a part of his merit can thus appear. And hence, again, we may form a judgment of the force and influence of his living eloquence. If he still commands our approbation, and even warms our hearts, how must the Rhodians have been affected, when Æschines read his celebrated performance to that people? And, if they were strongly affected, how must the speaker himself have shaken and transported the souls of his hearers, in the Athenian assembly?

It may be said, that the excellence of this author, in the original, is a point too plain to require proof or illustration; that it is universally acknowledged, and has been the subject of repeated praise. But, that this consummate excellence of the original necessarily inspires a prejudice against all attempts to copy it in another language; that such attempts are presumptuous, the learned despise them, others are deceived by them, and made to think with less honour of the great author, than his own genuine undisguised merit must ever obtain.

I could wish that this objection could be easily eluded, and, that I could persuade myself, that the present work did not enforce and confirm it.

However, something I presume to say in apology for such attempts, and for the manner in which they are executed.

It hath been already observed, that the sentiments and arguments of an ancient orator may be conveyed to the reader, in a translation executed with tolerable care and fidelity. To this we may add, the manner and order in which he arranges his thoughts; no inconsiderable part of his address and artifice. And, surely, the attention of the reader, unskilled in ancient languages, is rather liberally rewarded by these advantages; although the learned may despise the inglorious toil of the translator, whose composition disgraces his noble original. Yet, even in this point, should our attempts be judged with some degree of candour and indulgence. And ancient language, even were it not superior to our own, must ever be read with favourable prejudice. Antiquity renders it respectable and venerable. Its sounds and phrasesare not debased by common and familiar use, but preserve their dignity in a stately and solemn retirement. Longinus speaks of some vulgar phrases to be found in Demosthenes; but all such now lie concealed; and, unless the image conveyed be low, nothing can appear in the language humble or debased: all flows on in one equal course of decency, grandeur, and dignity. But this is not the case in our own language. Familiarity tempts us to regard it with less reverence. Its phrases and expressions are in constant use; and, what we hear and pronounce

every day, cannot easily endure a comparison with a language to whose very name we have been long taught to annex the ideas of grandeur and excellence. If, in our composition, we adhere scrupulously to the simple and natural form, the pomp and dignity of the original may seem to be lost and degraded. In order to avoid this extreme, we sometimes recur to a grave and laboured style, transpositions unnatural, and periods distorted; an unpardonably awkward substitute to ease and graceful majesty. And scarcely can we steer our course so happily, but that we must be in danger of touching, or appearing to touch, on one or other of these dangerous extremes.

But our difficulties appear stronger, and our claim to indulgence more just, when the real excellence of the ancient languages is considered. The Greek, in particular, is superior even to that of the Romans in point of sweetness, delicacy, and copiousness. This is the judgment of the great Roman critic[a]. And, with him may an English translator still say, "He[b] that expects from us the "grace and delicacy of the Attic style, must give us "the same sweetness, and an equal copiousness of "language." To acknowledge this inferiority in our own language is not to derogate from its real merit. It is a weapon keen and forcible, if care-

[a] Quintil. Inst. Orat. lib. 12. c. 10.

[b] Quare qui a Latinis exigit illam gratiam sermonis Attici, det mihi loquendo eandem jucunditatem, et parem copiam.

fully preserved, and wielded with due skill. But he who should attempt to follow the great writers of antiquity in every maze and winding, through which their advantages enabled them, and their circumstances obliged them, to direct their course; he who should labour through all the streights of a minute and scrupulous imitation, to express their words, and dispose of their periods, exactly in the same form and order, must be equally inattentive to the genius of the language from which he copies, and to that of his own; equally inattentive to the excellencies of this, and to its comparative defects. At least, this is a state of subjection to which the present translator thought it by no means necessary to stoop: and, if in this he should be judged to have taken too great a liberty, he flies for shelter to the authority of Quintilian[a], who compares the copy formed from the outward traces and aspect of the original, to those airy phantoms which were supposed by Epicurus to issue from all bodies. If it may be thought a violation of the Attic simplicity, that he hath sometimes ventured on an epithet, a metaphor, or some other figurative form of speech, to express what is natural and unadorned in the original, let it be remembered, that, in this, he confines himself within much stricter bounds than

[a] Nec—sufficiat imaginem virtutis effingere, et solam ut sic dicerem cutem, vel potius illas Epicuri figuras quas e summis corporibus dicit effluere. Hoc autem illis accidit, qui non introspectis penitus virtutibus, ad primum se velut aspectum orationis aptarunt, et cum iis felicissime cessit imitatio, verbis atque numeris sunt non multum differentes. l. 10. c. 2.

the same great critic prescribes to those who translated from the Greek into Latin. In such works he tells us, Figuras—quibus maxime ornatur oratio, MULTAS AC VARIAS excogitandi etiam NECESSITAS quædam est: quia plerumque a Græcis Romana dissentiunt. l. 10. c. 5. And in imitations of every kind in a language inferior to that of the original, in order to supply the defect, his rule is this: ORATIO TRANSLATIONUM NITORE ILLUMINANDA. l. 12. c. 10.

To exhibit Demosthenes such as he would have appeared in an English assembly similar to that of Athens, should certainly be the scope of his translator. Though he may be unfortunate in his aim, a voluntary deviation would be unpardonable. And an English Demosthenes would undoubtedly attend to the genius of his language. To express his dignity and majesty, he would not assume a constrained, uncouth, and perplexed air. He would have confined himself within the modest bounds of Atticism, but of English Atticism (if the expression may be allowed). He would have adopted a greater share of ornament, because a greater share of ornament would not be inconsistent with neatness, decent elegance, and manly dignity.

IF it be still observed, that our language has been corrupted, and the cause of learning disgraced by translation, it might be easy to shew in what cases this has been, and must be the consequence; and, that an attempt to copy the excellencies of ancient

writers of renown, does not necessarily fall under this censure. Or, if the meanness and insignificance of the employment should be urged, a translator might observe, in the fulness of his vanity, that the great Roman orator himself thought it not beneath his dignity to publish his translations from Plato, Xenophon, and Demosthenes. But as to the utility of this employment, it need not be pointed out, or defended, to the learned. As to its dignity, the translator is not at all solicitous to maintain it. He is ready to acknowledge, that the pittance of reputation to be acquired in this way is but trifling and insignificant, if he is so fortunate as to meet with that candour and indulgence which have hitherto favoured his attempts.

THE ORATION

ON THE

CLASSES:

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF DIOTIMUS,

THE THIRD YEAR OF THE 106th OLYMPIAD.

INTRODUCTION.

THE title of this oration is taken from one particular part of it, in which the speaker enlarges on the method of dividing the citizens into Συμμοριαι, or classes, in order to raise the supplies, and to answer the exigencies of the state. The design of it was, to allay an extravagant ferment which had been raised at Athens, and to recommend caution and circumspection at a time when danger was apprehended. Artaxerxes Ochus, king of Persia, had been for some time employed in making preparations for war. These were represented to the Athenians as the effect of a design formed against Greece, and against their state in particular. They were conscious of having given this prince sufficient umbrage, by the assistance which their general, Chares, had afforded to some of his rebellious subjects: they were entirely possessed by the notions of their own importance, and therefore readily listened to their suggestions, who endeavoured to persuade them, that some important blow was meditated against their dominions. An assembly of the people was convened, and the general temper both of the speakers and auditors

are distinctly marked out in several passages of the following oration. The bare mention of a war with Persia, at once recalled to their minds the glorious days of their ancestors, and the great actions of Athens and her generals against the barbarians. These were now displayed with all the address and force of eloquence, and the people urged to imitate the bright examples of antiquity; to rise up in arms against the Persian, and to send their ambassadors through Greece, to summon all the states to unite with Athens against the common enemy. To flatter the national vanity of their countrymen, was an expedient which many speakers had found effectual for establishing their power and credit in the assembly. And possibly some might have spoken, with a corrupt design of diverting the attention of their countrymen, from those contests and dangers in which they were more immediately concerned. But however this may be, the impropriety of those bold and precipitate measures which they recommended, is urged with the utmost force, in the following oration; in which we shall find the speaker moderating the unseasonable zeal of his countrymen, without absolutely shocking their prejudices. Demosthenes is most generally known as an orator, by the fire and energy with which he rouses his countrymen to arms. But the delicacy of ad-

dress and artifice, which he displays in this and many of the following orations, is a part of his character no less worthy of attention. A youth of twenty-eight years, thoroughly acquainted with the constitution, interests, and connections of his country, rising for the first time in a debate on public affairs, opposing himself with boldness and resolution, and at the same time with the utmost art and insinuation, to the general bent of the assembly; calming the turbulence of his countrymen, and presenting their true interests to their view, in the strongest and most striking colours; is an object truly pleasing and affecting.

THE ORATION

ON THE

CLASSES.

Diotimo, Archon—Olympiad. 106. An. 3.

THE men who thus dwell upon the praises of your ancestors, seem to me, YE MEN OF ATHENS! to have chosen a subject, fitted rather to gratify the assembly than to do the due honour to those on whom they lavish their applause. As they attempt to speak of actions which no words can worthily de-

a That this oration was pronounced in the third year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, we are assured by Dionysius, (in Epist. ad Ammæum,) and that Demosthenes was, at this time, in his twenty-eighth year. Plutarch, indeed, (if he be the author of the Lives of the *Ten Orators*,) places his nativity in the fourth year of the ninety-eighth Olympiad. But, not to mention the inaccuracies in this tract, the orator himself declares, in his oration against Midias, that he was then in his thirty-second year. This oration was spoken in the archonship of Callimachus, that is, (according to Diodorus,) in the fourth year of the hundred and seventh Olympiad. And, therefore, by calculating from hence, the reader will find the authority of Dionysius, as to the time of our orator's birth, clearly and fully confirmed.—— How then came it to pass, that he was allowed to speak on public affairs before the age of thirty years? for, in the Attic laws, re-

scribe, the illustrious subject adorns their speech, and gives them the praise of eloquence; while their hearers are made to think of the virtues of those

specting public speakers, it is expressly enacted, Μη εἰσελθεῖν τινα εἰπεῖν μηπω τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα. "Let no man enter the as-"sembly to speak, who hath not yet attained to the age of "thirty." The solution of this difficulty by Lucchesini seems solid and satisfactory. I know, saith he, there are some who assert, that this, as well as some other laws of Athens, fell into disuse; but such a method of solving the difficulties of antiquity, without any manner of proof or authority, is unsafe and fallacious. Besides, the assertion is contradicted by Æschines, who, in his oration against Timarchus, declares, That not only this, but other severer laws, relative to public speakers, were in full force. In my opinion, the difficulty should rather be explained in this manner: Among the other magistrates who were chosen every year at Athens, there were ten orators appointed by lot, whose business it was, to deliver their opinions in the assemblies on all affairs that concerned the state; and for which they received the gratuity of a drachma [sevenpence three farthings] from the treasury. To these only must that law of Athens, which determines the age of orators, be construed to extend. As it was their duty to deliver their opinions in the senate, they ought of course to be of the senatorial age: but no person could be admitted to the senate, who had not completed his thirtieth year. But, as for the law of Solon, it excludes no citizen whatsoever from the liberty of speaking, who might attend the assembly; nor had the seniors any other privilege than that of speaking first. The law runs thus: "Let the senior first propose such measures as he "thinks most expedient for the republic, and after him such "other citizens as choose it, according to the order of their age." Æschines cites it in the same words against Ctesiphon. No mention is here made of thirty years. Such of the citizens as were in their twentieth year might attend the assembly, and had their names enrolled. That they had a share in the administration, and might speak in public at this age, is confirmed by Lucian in his Jupiter Tragœdus, where Momus thus addresses Apollo:

heroes with much less elevation than these virtues of themselves inspire. To me, time itself seems to be the noblest witness to their glory. A series of so many years hath now passed over, and, still, no men have yet appeared, whose actions could surpass those patterns of perfection. It shall be my part, therefore, solely to endeavour to point out the means, which may enable you most effectually to prepare for war. For, in fact, were all our speakers to proceed in a pompous display of their abilities, such parade and ostentation could not possibly prove of the least advantage to the public: but, if any man whatever will appear, and can explain, to your full satisfaction, what kind of armament, how great, and how supported, may serve the present

" You are now become a legal speaker, having long since left " the class of young men, and enrolled your name in the books " of the Duodecemviri." Now, that the citizens were considered as having arrived at the age of manhood in their eighteenth year, we learn from Demosthenes in his oration against Aphobus. For his father died when he was but seven years old, and he remained for ten years under the care of his guardian, at which time, being released from his hands, he pleaded his own cause against him. Now, his father had given directions, that he should be under a guardian till he had arrived at the age of manhood; and this he did, as soon as he had reached his eighteenth year; all which is collected from his own words. These circumstances considered, it is very easy to suppose that Demosthenes spoke in public, as he really did, in his eight and twentieth year. Nor does any manner of difficulty arise from what he says himself in his oration for the crown: " When the Phocian war was raised," &c. "*for* " *I had then no hand in the administration*:" that war being begun in the second year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, under the archonship of Callistratus, at a time when our orator was only in the twenty seventh year of his age.

exigencies of the state, then all these alarms must instantly be dispelled. This I shall endeavour to the utmost of my abilities, having first briefly declared my opinion of our situation with respect to the KING.

I [a] do regard the KING as the common enemy of all the Greeks. But I cannot, for that reason, advise, that we should be the only people to undertake a war against him: [b] for I do not find the Greeks

[a] The commentators who endeavour to account for this assertion, by considering the present state of Greece, or any late transactions with Persia, seem to examine the orator too rigidly, and with too much coldness and abstraction. It is by no means the result of any recent events. It had been the language of Greece for ages; the language of poets, historians, and orators. Even in those times of corruption, the popular leaders seldom ventured to use any other, particularly in an assembly where national vanity was so predominant as in that of Athens. Whatever treaties had been made with the king of Persia, however peace might have now subsisted between him and the Greeks, still he was their NATURAL ENEMY.

[b] The sacred war now raged in Greece. The Phocians, Lacedemonians, and Athenians, were engaged on one side; the Bœotians, Thessalians, Locrians, and some other inferior states on the other; each party was harassed and exhausted by the war. The Phocians had reason to complain of the Athenians, who proved an useless and inactive ally. Whatever connections had lately subsisted between Athens and Sparta, this latter state still hated its ancient rival, and was impatient to recover its former splendour and power. A prospect of assistance from Persia must have at once determined the Lacedemonians to detach themselves from the confederacy, and to act against the Athenians; particularly, if any plausible pretence could be alledged for uniting with the Persian. The Phocians, who were not always influenced by the

themselves united to each other in sincere affection: nay, some among them seem to have more confidence in him than in certain of their own body. In such circumstances, I account it of the utmost moment, that we should be strictly attentive to the origin of this war, that it may be free from every imputation of injustice. Let our armament be carried on with vigour; but let us carefully adhere to the principles of equity. For, in my opinion, Athenians! the states of Greece (if it be once evident

most religious engagements, might fairly be suspected of making no scruple to accept effectual assistance from the great king, and, at once, renouncing their alliance with the Athenians. The Italian commentator supposes, that the orator expresses his apprehensions only of the Lacedemonians, and that they are particularly pointed out, as the men who have more confidence in the Persian than in their own brethren; and who would sacrifice every consideration to the support of their wars with the Greeks. The Phocians, he observes, could not possibly unite with the Persians, on account of the former injuries they had received from them, as well as of their invariable union with Athens. But a view of the politics of Greece, and indeed of the politics of all ages and nations, may convince us, that too much stress is not to be laid on such an argument. Nor was there less to fear from the confederates on the other side. They fought with an inveterate and implacable rancour; and all their efforts were scarcely sufficient to support the quarrel. Their strength was continually wasting, and their treasures were quite exhausted: the most favourable occasion for the great king to gain them to his purposes. The speaker indeed declares, in another part of this oration, that the Thebans would not concur with the Persian in any design, confessedly formed against the nation of Greece. Yet still they might, in their present circumstances, and, in a cause which they affected to consider as the cause of the nation, accept of his assistance. They actually did accept of it in the course of this war.

and incontestible that the KING makes attempts against them,) will instantly unite, and express the most ardent gratitude to those who arose before them, who, with them, still stand faithfully and bravely to repel these attempts. But, while this is yet uncertain, should you begin hostilities, I fear we may be obliged to fight against an enemy, reinforced by those very men for whose interests we were so forward to express our zeal. Yes! he will suspend his designs; (if he hath really designs against the Greeks;) his gold will be dispersed liberally amongst them; his promises of friendship will be lavished upon them: while they, distressed in their private wars, and attentive only to support them, will disregard the general welfare of the nation.

INTO such confusion, into such weak measures, let us not precipitate the state. With respect to the KING, you cannot pursue the same counsels with some others of the Greeks. Of these, many might, without the charge of inconsistency, neglect the rest of Greece, while engaged in the pursuit of private interest. But, of you it would be unworthy, even though directly injured, to inflict so severe a punishment on the guilty, as to abandon them to the power of the barbarian.

THUS are we circumstanced: and let us then be careful, that we do not engage in this war upon unequal terms; that he, whom we suppose to entertain designs against the Greeks, may not recom-

mend himself to their confidence, so as to be deemed their friend. And how shall these things be effected? by giving public proof, that the forces of this state are well appointed, and complete for action; but that in this our procedure, we are determined to adhere inviolably to justice.

Let the bold and hazardous, who are vehement in urging you to war, attend to this. It is not difficult, when an assembly is convened, to acquire the reputation of courage: no; nor, when dangers are actually impending, to speak with an impassioned boldness. But it is truly difficult, and it is our duty in the time of danger, to support the character of superior bravery; in our councils, to display the same superiority of wisdom.

I, on my part, ye men of Athens! think that a war with the King may prove dangerous; in a battle, the consequence of such a war, I see no danger. And why? Because wars of every kind require many advantages, of naval force, of money, and of places. Here, he is superior to the state. In a battle, nothing is so necessary to ensure success as valiant troops: and of these, we and our confederates can boast the greater number. For this reason, I earnestly recommend to you, by no means to be the first to enter on a war: but for an engagement, I think you should be effectually prepared. Were there one method of preparing, to oppose barbarians, and another for engaging with Greeks, then we might expect, with reason, that any

hostile intentions against the Persian must be at once discovered. But as in every armament the manner is the same, the general provisions equally the same, whether our enemies are to be attacked, or our allies to be protected, and our rights defended; why, when we have[a] avowed enemies, should we seek for others? Shall we not prepare against the one, and be ready to oppose the other, should he attempt to injure us?——Call now upon the Greeks to unite with you.—But suppose ye should not readily concur with them in all their measures, (as some are by no means favourably inclined to this state,) can it be imagined, that they will obey your summons?——"Certainly; for we "shall convince them that the KING forms designs "against their interests, which they do not foresee." —Ye powers! is it possible, that you can be thus persuaded? Yes; I know you are. But, whatever apprehensions you may raise, they must influence these Greeks less forcibly than their disputes with you, and with each other; and therefore, the remonstrances of your ambassadors will but appear like the tales of idle wanderers[b]. If, on the other

[a] The Bœotians, Thessalians, &c. were the avowed enemies of Athens, in consequence of the attachment of this state to Phocis; and the king of Macedon, by his invasions of their settlements in Thrace, and other acts of hostility.

[b] In the original οὐδὲν ἂν ἄλλ' ἢ ΡΑΨΩΔΗΣΟΥΣΙΝ οἱ πρέσβεις περιόντες. It was urged by the speakers on the other side, that ambassadors should be sent through Greece, to represent the dangerous designs of the Persian, and to exhort the several states to suspend their private animosities, and to unite with the Athe-

hand, ye pursue the measures now proposed, there is not a single state of Greece that will hesitate a moment to come in, and to solicit your alliance, when they see[a] our thousand horse, our infantry as numerous as could be wished, our three hundred

ans against the common enemy. The orator, who is endeavouring to represent the useless and ineffectual nature of such a measure, compares these ambassadors to the ancient Rhapsodists, or Bards, whose lives were spent in travelling, and amusing their entertainers with songs and poems. And this similitude seems to arise not only from their repeating the same declarations, but from the circumstance of going from city to city; and exciting curiosity by their speeches, without any other effect.

[a] At first sight it may appear extraordinary, that the orator should speak, in high terms, of such a body as one thousand horse. But we must consider, that Attica was a mountainous country, and therefore unfit for breeding horses. In the infancy of the state, when Athens was governed by kings, their cavalry amounted to no more than ninety-six, each Ναυκράρια, or twelfth part of a tribe, furnishing two. But the number of such divisions was then but forty-eight, as the tribes were originally but four. This small body was, at first, an object of derision to the Persians, at Marathon; but afterwards proved formidable and dangerous. After the defeat of the Persians, the city began to increase in power, and was enabled to raise a body of three hundred horse; which, in the time of the Peloponnesian war, was augmented to twelve hundred, (as we learn from Thucyd. B. 2. and Æschines Παραπ.) This was the greatest body of cavalry the Athenians ever possessed, which seems, by the distresses of the state, to have been reduced to a thousand in the time of Demosthenes, as he mentions no greater number, though it was his business rather to magnify their force, in this passage, than to extenuate it. The Equestrian Order was a rank of dignity at Athens, as among the Romans. But in latter times the citizens were allowed to keep this rank, and to substitute others to serve in their stead.

LUCCHESINI.

ships; an armament which they must regard as their surest refuge and defence. Should you apply for their assistance, you must appear as supplicants: should they refuse it, you incur the shame of a repulse. But if, while your forces are completed, you suspend your operations, the protection you then grant to them must appear as the consequence of their request: and, be assured, they will all fly to you for this protection.

With these, and the like reflections, deeply impressed upon my mind, I have not laboured to prepare a bold, vain, tedious, harangue. No, my fellow-citizens! our preparations have been the sole object of my thoughts, and the manner of conducting them with effect and expedition. Grant me your attention; and, if my sentiments be approved, confirm them by your voices.

It is then the first, and most important part of preparation, to possess your minds with due resolution; so that every citizen, when called to action, may exert himself with alacrity and zeal. You know, that in every instance, where, having first resolved on your designs in concert, every single member deemed it incumbent on him to labour vigorously in the execution, you have never once proved unsuccessful. But, whenever we have first decreed, and then each man hath turned his eyes on others, fondly imagining, that he himself need not act, that his neighbour would do all; our designs have never once been executed.

WITH these sentiments, and these vigorous resolutions, I recommend that you should proceed to the appointment of your TWELVE HUNDRED; and raise them to two thousand, by a further addition of eight hundred. Thus, when all necessary deductions are made, of those who by their condition* are excused from contributing, or by any circumstances are unable to contribute, still the original number of twelve hundred will remain complete. These I would have formed into twenty classes, each consisting of sixty citizens, agreeably to the present constitution. And it is my opinion, that, of these classes, each should be divided into five parts, consisting of twelve persons; ever attending to a just and equal distribution of the richer with the poorer. Thus should our citizens be arranged: the reason will appear, when the whole scheme of the regulation hath been explained.

* *Those who by their condition*, &c.) These are particularly specified in the original, ἐπικλήρων maiden heiresses; ὀρφανῶν, orphans of the other sex; κληρουχικῶν, men appointed to form a colony; and κοινωνικῶν, men incorporated into certain societies, which were exempted from contributing. From whence it seems evident, that the duty and the honour of composing the twelve hundred, who were to supply the exigencies of the state, must have been annexed to certain families; and continued to them, when time and various circumstances might have produced alterations of fortune in many. The inconveniencies which arose from hence were partly removed by the ἀντιδόσεις, or exchanges of fortunes (of which, see note on Phil. 1. p. 42,) and by allowing exemptions to persons in certain circumstances: yet both these expedients must have occasioned delays, and retarded the business of the public. Hence the orator recommends the appointment of the additional eight hundred.

But our ships; how are they to be appointed? Let their whole number be fixed to three hundred, divided, by fifteenth parts, into twenty portions. Of the first hundred, let five[a] such parts; of the second hundred, five parts; and of the third hundred, five, be appointed to each class. Thus shall a fifteenth of the whole be allotted to every class: three ships to each subdivision.

When these establishments are made, I propose[b], as the revenue arising from our lands amounts to

[a] *Of the first hundred let five*, &c. It should seem, from this passage, that each century of the three hundred ships were to be of a different rate and order, by this minute specification of *five of the first hundred, five of the second*, &c.

[b] When, and in what manner, this estimate of the lands was made, we learn from Polybius, lib. 2, whose words shall be quoted immediately. That the barren lands of Attica should produce such a revenue, [amounting, according to Arbuthnot's computation, to 1,162,500l.] seems wonderful; especially, as the lower rank of citizens held their lands free from all taxation. The soil of Athens itself is celebrated, by Homer, for its fertility. But this is of little moment, when the barrenness of the Attic territory in general is considered. But what saith Polybius? Τίς γὰρ ὑπὲρ Αθηναίων οὐχ ἱστόρηκε, διότι καθ' ὃς καιρὸς μετὰ Θηβαίων εἰς τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀνέβαινον πόλεμον, καὶ μυρίους μὲν ἐξέπεμπον στρατιώτας, ἑκατὸν δὲ ἐπλήρουν τριήρεις, ὅτι τότε αρ.ναύλες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξίας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εἰς φορὰς, ἐτιμήσαντο τήν τε χώραν, καὶ τὴν Ατθικὴν ἅπασαν, καὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν οὐσίαν. Αλλ' ὅμως το συμπαν τίμημα τῆς ἀξίας ἐνέλιπε τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων, διακοσίοις καὶ πενηήκονλα ταλαντοις; "What his-
"torian hath not informed us, that the Athenians, at the time
"when they engaged in war, on the part of Thebes, against the
"Lacedemonians, sent ten thousand men to the field, and man-
"ned an hundred ships; that the Athenians, I say, in order to
"make a just estimate of the subsidy they might properly grant
"for this war, then proceeded to a general valuation of their

six thousand talents, that, in order to have our funds duly regulated, this sum may be divided into an hundred parts, of sixty talents each: that five of these parts may be assigned to each of the twenty great classes; which may thus give severally to each of their divisions a single part of sixty talents[a]. So

" lands, of the whole territory of Attica, their houses, and all " their effects. And yet the whole valuation fell short of six " thousand talents, by two hundred and fifty." Which agrees pretty exactly with this passage of Demosthenes. LUCCHESINI.

[a] One hundred ships seem to have been the ordinary marine establishment at Athens; and to this the ordinary revenues seem to have been proportioned. When it was necessary to fit out an extraordinary number, the additional charge was answered by an extraordinary taxation on the richer members of the state. The passage before us is indeed concisely expressed, as became a speaker who addressed himself to persons to whom the least hint was sufficient. But the full meaning of it I take to be this: " If " we have occasion but for an hundred ships, the charge of fur- " nishing each may be divided among twelve trierarchs, who are " to be supplied for the expense of this, and other preparations, " with sixty talents. If for two hundred these twelve trierarchs " must provide two ships; if for three hundred, three. In every " case the revenues of the state are to be equally divided amongst " them. But the greater the force required, the greater must be " the burden on the trierarchs, who are to be taxed for the addi- " tional expense, if any such may be required, for fitting out the " fleet, and completing the other parts of the intended arma- " ment." This latter part, indeed, is not expressed, or insinuated; but I take it to be understood. But, if my explanation should not be entirely consonant to the sentiments of the learned reader, who may have the curiosity to examine this part of the oration with accuracy, I must endeavour to screen myself from the severity of his censure, by subscribing to the following ingenious declaration of Wolfius: " Whatever is here said of fleets, " stores, armaments, and supplies, must, to us who never saw a " fleet or war, and never were conversant in affairs of state, be " attended with considerable obscurity."

that, if she would have occasion for an hundred ships, sixty talents may be granted to each, and twelve trierarchs; if for two hundred, there may be thirty talents assigned, and six trierarchs to each; if for three hundred, twenty talents may be supplied for each, and four trierarchs.

In like manner, my fellow-citizens! upon a due estimate of the stores necessary for our ships, I propose, that, agreeably to the present scheme, they should be divided into twenty parts; that one good and effectual part should be assigned to each of the great classes; to be distributed among the small divisions in the just proportion. Let the twelve, in every such division, demand their respective shares; and let them have those ships, which it is their lot to provide, thoroughly and expeditiously equipped. Thus may our supplies, our ships, our trierarchs, our stores, be best provided and supplied. And now I am to lay before you a plain and easy method of completing this scheme.

I say, then, that your generals should proceed to mark out ten dock-yards, as contiguous as may be to each other, and capable of containing thirty vessels each. When this is done, they should assign two classes, and thirty ships to each of these docks. Among these, also, they should divide the tribes and the respective trierarchs; so that two classes, thirty ships, and one tribe, may be assigned to each. Let then each tribe divide its allotted station into three parts, and the ships in like manner. Let these

third parts be distributed by lot. Thus shall one tribe preside over one entire division of your shipping; and each third of a tribe take care of one third of such division; and thus shall you know, at all times, first where each tribe is stationed; then where each third; then, who are the trierarchs; and lastly, the number of your ships. Let affairs be once set in motion after this manner: and, if any thing hath been omitted, (as it is by no means easy to provide accurately for every circumstance,) the execution will itself discover it. And thus may your whole marine, and all its several parts, be uniformly and exactly regulated.

And now, as to money, as to any immediate supplies: sensible, as I am, that the opinion I am now to declare must appear extraordinary, yet I will declare it; for I trust that, when duly weighed, it will be found the only one which reason can recommend; and which must be approved by the event. I say, then, that at this time we should not speak at all of money: we have a fund, if occasions call for it; a great and honourable, and an equitable fund. Should you attempt to raise it now, far from succeeding in such an attempt, you could not depend on gaining it when really wanted. But, suspend your inquiries, and you will secure it. What fund is this, which now hath no being, yet will be found hereafter? This appears a kind of mystery; but I shall explain it. Cast your eyes round through all this city. Within these walls, Athenians! there are treasures, I had almost said, equal to those of all

other states. But such is the disposition of their possessors, that if all our speakers were to arise with the most alarming declarations, "That the "KING was marching against us; that he was at "our gates: that the danger did not admit of any "possibility of doubt:" If, with these speakers, as many ministers of heaven were to arise, and pronounce the same declarations as the warning of the gods; so far would these men be from contributing, that they would not even discover their riches; they would not acknowledge the possession of them. But should it once appear, that all those dangers, denounced with so much terror, were really and in fact impending; where is the wretch that would not give freely, that would not urge to be admittedt o contribute? For, who would choose to abandon his life and fortune to the fury of an enemy, rather than give up a small portion of his abundance, for the safety of himself, and all the rest of his possessions? Thus shall we find treasures, when occasions really demand them, but not till then. Let us not therefore inquire for them now. Suppose that we were now strictly to exact the subsidies from all our citizens; the utmost we should raise would be more contemptible than none. Imagine the experiment made; it is proposed to exact an hundredth part of the revenue arising from our lands. Well then; this makes just sixty talents. "Nay, but we will raise a fiftieth part." This doubles the sum: we have then one hundred and twenty talents. But what is this, to those hundreds, or those thousands of camels, which they assure us are employed to carry the KING's money? But

suppose it were agreed to raise a twelfth part, amounting to five hundred talents. This, in the first place, would be too great a burden; and, if imposed, still the fund produced would be insufficient for the war. Let then all our other preparations be completed; but, as to money, let the possessors keep it; and never can they keep it for a nobler public service. When their country calls for it, then shall they freely and zealously contribute.

THIS, my fellow-citizens! is a practicable scheme; a scheme highly honourable and advantageous, worthy of this state to be reported to the KING, and which must strike him with no small terror. He[a] knows, that by three hundred vessels, of which one hundred only were supplied by us, his ancestors lost a thousand ships. He will hear, that now we have, ourselves, equipped three hundred. He cannot, then, if he hath not lost all reason, he cannot deem it a trivial matter to make this state his enemy. If, from a dependance on his treasures, he is tempted to entertain proud thoughts, he will find this but a vain dependance, when compared with your resources. [b]They tell us, he is

[a] Whoever consults Herodotus will find, that Demosthenes is by no means exact in his account either of the Athenian or Persian fleets; but we are not to expect historical precision from the orator. His representations are suited to delight and animate his hearers; and probably his success was too great to give them leisure to attend to any inaccuracy in his account.

[b] It is just now, the orator hath represented the wealth of

coming with heaps of gold; but when these are once dispersed, he will look for new supplies. Not the richest streams, not the deepest sources, but must, at length, be totally exhausted, when we copiously and constantly drain away their waters. But we, he will be told, have a perpetual resource in our lands; a fund of six thousand talents. And with what spirit we defend these lands against invaders, his ancestors, who fought at Marathon, could best inform him. Let us continue to conquer, and our treasures cannot ever fail.

Nor yet do I think their errors justly founded, who apprehend, that he may employ his gold in raising a large army of mercenaries. I do indeed believe, that in an expedition against Egypt, against [a]Orontes, or any other barbarians, there are many of

Athens as contemptible, that of Persia as magnificent and great. Now, on the contrary, the resources of Persia are neither solid nor permanent; the riches of Athens great and inexhaustible. Various are the instances of this artifice in Demosthenes; which the judicious reader cannot fail to observe without the direction of the annotator.

[a] Two of this name are mentioned in history. The first was put to death, by the younger Cyrus, on account of a conspiracy. The other, whom Demosthenes points out, was a satrap of Mysia, and served in the army which Artaxerxes sent against Cyprus, under the command of Teribazus. On this occasion he attempted to ruin the reputation of his general, was detected and disgraced; and, in revenge, joined with the rebels of Egypt, Caria, and Phrygia, and headed the army they had raised against the King. But, in hopes of recovering his credit at the Persian court, and of gaining the command of some maritime towns, he betrayed the forces, &c. of the rebels into the hands of the King's lieutenants.

the Greeks that would gladly receive his pay: not from any zeal for aggrandizing him; but each in order to obtain such a supply, as might relieve their present necessities. But I never can persuade myself, that any one Greek would assist him to conquer Greece. Whither should he turn after such an event? Would he go and be a slave in Phrygia? He[a] must know, that, when we take up arms against the Barbarian, we take them up for our country, for our lives, for our customs, for our liberty, and all such sacred rights. Who then could be so base as to sacrifice himself, his parents, the sepulchres of his ancestors, his country, to a trifling pittance? Surely, no man!

Nor is it the interest of the Persian, that his mercenaries should subdue the Greeks; for they who can conquer us, must first prove superior to him. And it is by no means his scheme, by destroying us, to lose his own empire. His wishes are to command all; if this cannot be obtained, at least he would secure his power over his own slaves.

If then it be imagined, that the Thebans will

History speaks no farther of this Orontes. But, as in this year, the eighth from the time of his revolt, Demosthenes mentions him as an enemy to the Persian, we may conjecture, that his last services had been disregarded, and that he had again taken up arms. Lucchesini.

[a] I cannot persuade myself that there is occasion to point out to the reader the force and pertinency of this argument, although it be elliptically expressed. To be assured of the true signifi-

unite with him;—[a] it is a hard part to speak of Thebes in this assembly; for, such is your aversion to this people, that you will not hear the voice of truth itself, if it seems at all to favour them. However, it is the duty of those who debate on great affairs, by no means, and on no pretence whatever, to suppress any argument which may prove of use.—I say, then, that so far are the Thebans from ever, at any time, uniting with the KING against the Greeks, that they would freely give the greatest treasures, were they possessed of them, to purchase a fair occasion of atoning for their ancient errors with respect to Greece. But, let the Thebans be ever so unhappily disposed, still we must all be sensible, that, if they unite with him, their enemies must necessarily unite with the Greeks. And I trust that the cause of justice, and the friends to this cause, will ever prove superior to traitors, and to all the force of the Barbarian. Let us not then

cation of the phrase *πρὸς τον Βάρβαρον*, we need but cast our eyes to a sentence a little farther on, *ἐκ μὲν γε των ΠΡΟΣ τους ἐαυτῶ προγόνους πολέμων, from the wars waged against his ancestors.*

[a] The history of both nations accounts for the detestation with which the Athenians are supposed to hear the name of the Thebans: and perhaps it were impossible, that two nations, so different in genius and manners, ever should entertain any sentiments of friendship and esteem for each other. Our orator, however, was far superior to national prejudices. He considered, without partiality, the real interests of his country, whose welfare should be a statesman's passion. Yet, his regard for the people of Thebes was numbered, by Æschines, among his crimes.—The error which, he says, they would, if possible, redeem, was their joining with Xerxes in his invasion of Greece. FRANCIS.

yield to these extravagant alarms; nor rashly brave all consequences, by being first to take up arms.

NOR do I think that any other of the Grecian states should look upon this war with terror. Is there a man among them, who is not sensible, that[a], while they regarded the Persian as their common enemy, and maintained a firm union with each other, their fortune was completely happy: but when, by a fatal reliance on his friendship, they were betrayed into contests and dissentions among themselves, their calamities were so great, as to exceed all the imprecations which the most inveterate malice could invent? And shall that man, whom fortune, whom heaven itself pronounces, as a friend, unprofitable; as an enemy, of advantage;—shall he, I say, be feared? By no means. Yet, let us have the due regard to ourselves; let us have the due attention to the disorders and suspicions of the rest of Greece; and let us not incur the charge of injustice. Could we, indeed, with all the Greeks united firmly on our side, attack him single and unsupported, I would not then suppose that you could be charged with injustice. But, as this is not to be expected, let us be cautious: let us afford him no pretence of appearing to assert the rights of the other Greeks. If

[a] The well-known and great events described in the history of Greece, confirm these observations of the orator fully, with respect to all the Grecian states. Yet we may concur with the Italian commentator in supposing, that they had the Lacedemonians particularly in view; to whom they are, indeed, eminently applicable.

we continue quiet, his applications to them will be suspicious: if we are the first to take up arms, he will seem justified, by our hostilities, in his attempts to gain their friendship.

Do not then discover to the world the melancholy state of Greece, by inviting those to an alliance, whom you cannot gain; and by engaging in a war, which you cannot support. Be quiet, be resolute, be prepared. Let not the emissaries of Persia report to their King, that Greece and Athens are distracted in their councils, are confounded by their fears, are torn by dissensions. No: let them rather tell him, that, if it were not equally shameful, for the Greeks to violate their honour and their oaths, as it is to him matter of triumph, they would have long since marched against him; and that, if you do not march, you are restrained solely by a regard to your own dignity: that it is your prayer to all the gods, that he may be seized with the infatuation, which once possessed his ancestors; and then, he would find no defect of vigour in your measures. He knows, that by our wars with his ancestors, this state became happy and powerful; that, by our peaceful demeanour before these wars, we acquired a superiority over the other Grecian states, never more observable than at present. He knows, that the affairs of Greece require some power to be either voluntarily or accidentally the instrument of a general peace; he knows, that he himself must prove that instrument, if he once at-

tempts to raise a war: and, therefore, these informations will have their due weight and credit.

THAT I may not longer abuse your patience, I shall repeat the sum of my advice, and then descend.

YOU should prepare your force against your present enemies: you should use this force against the KING, against any power that may attempt to injure you. But never be the first to break through the bounds of justice, either in council or in action. You should be solicitous, not that our speeches, but that our conduct may be worthy of our illustrious descent. Act thus, and you will serve not yourselves only, but the men who oppose these measures: for they will not feel your resentment hereafter, if they be not suffered to mislead you now [a].

[a] What effect this oration had on the people, we may learn from a passage in the oration for the Rhodians; of which the following is a translation: "There are some among you who may "remember, that at the time when the affairs of Persia were "the subject of our consultations, I was the first, the only, or "almost the only one, to recommend it as the wisest measure, "not to assign your enmity to the King, as the motive of your "armament: to make your preparations against your avowed "adversaries, and to employ them even against him, should he "attempt to injure you. Nor did I urge these things without "your full concurrence: they were received with applause."

END OF THE ORATION ON THE CLASSES.

THE

ORATION

FOR THE

MEGALOPOLITANS.

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF EUDEMUS,

THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE 106th OLYMPIAD.

INTRODUCTION.

IN order to prepare the reader for the perusal of the following oration, it is necessary to recal to his view some of the late important transactions in Greece. He is not to be informed of the flourishing condition of Sparta, after the famous Peloponnesian war; the immoderate ambition of that state, and the war in which the Spartans were consequently involved with Thebes. The conduct and vigour of Epaminondas, the Theban, proved fatal to Sparta, and the battle of Leuctra put an end to the tyrannical dominion which this state had long exercised in Peloponnesus.

Immediately after this battle, several of the Peloponnesian states revolted from the Lacedemonians. The Messenians, their ancient rivals, were restored to their original settlement, by the Theban arms, after many ages of dispersion. The Arcadians and Argives asserted their indepency, and, assisted by the Thebans, took up arms against their former sovereigns. The Spartans now seemed on the point of having their ruin completed; they were reduced to fortify

their city, whose defenceless condition had been so long their boast; they armed six hundred of their slaves, and sent a deputation to Athens, humbly to solicit the assistance of their old rivals, in this their state of extremity.

The Athenians, who began to conceive a jealousy of the rising power of Thebes, readily consented to join with the Lacedemonians. Iphicrates was sent, with twelve thousand men, to their relief; and, upon advice received, that Epaminondas was marching against Lacedemon, at the head of the Thebans, Argives, and Arcadians, Chabrias was dispatched, with another reinforcement, to join the Spartans and their confederates.

It is not to the present purpose to mention particularly the several events in the course of this war. It is only necessary to observe, that the Arcadians, in order the better to secure that liberty, for which they now contended, determined to collect all their force into one body, brought the detached settlements of their countrymen to an union; and fixed their common residence in a city, built by the advice and assistance of Epaminondas, (if we may believe Pausanias,) and called Megalopolis, or the GREAT CITY. This was one considerable

barrier against the Lacedemonian power in Peloponnesus; which still subsisted, together with the other equitable regulations of Epaminondas, for securing the liberty of the Peloponnesians.

These were considered, by the Lacedemonians, as so many memorials of their disgrace. And the least respite from the calamities of an unsuccessful war, was sufficient to inspire them with an earnest desire of recovering their ancient power and superiority. Greece was now harassed by the sacred war. Several cities of inferior note had changed their masters, in the course of this quarrel. The re-establishment of peace, and a settlement of the whole nation of Greece, were universally urged as objects highly worthy of the general attention. And now, Archidamus, the king of Sparta, a subtle and designing prince, proposed a plan for this purpose, in appearance advantageous to the whole body, but, in effect, only calculated to restore the superiority of Sparta. He proposed, that, in order to restore the general tranquillity, the several cities should be re-established in the same condition as before the late wars.

This was a scheme which promised some advantage to all the leading states. Oropus, a city on the confines of Bœotia, once commanded by the Athenians, and still claimed as their right,

but now possessed by the Thebans, must have returned to its ancient masters. Thespia and Platæa, two eminent cities in Bœotia, that had felt the jealousy and revenge of Thebes, and now lay subverted and depopulated, were, by the same plan, to be restored and fortified. The Phocians were to give up two important acquisitions gained in the course of the sacred war; the cities of Orchomenus and Coronæa. But these and the other Bœotian cities, were only to acknowledge Thebes, as the principal and leading city in Bœotia, without any absolute submission or dependance, and without any obedience to that jurisdiction which the Thebans claimed and had exercised over them. On the other hand, Peloponnesus was to be reduced to its former state of dependance; the cities of Messene and Megalopolis were to be destroyed, and their inhabitants dispersed; so as to restore the Spartans to the power of resuming that tyrannical dominion, which they had formerly exercised over their neighbours.

Archidamus began with endeavouring to regain that authority in Peloponnesus, to which the Spartans aspired. A dispute was soon raised between Sparta and Argos, about the boundaries of their dominions. And the king of Sparta, having in vain attempted to succeed, by practising

secretly with Nicostratus, the principal citizen of Argos, determined to have recourse to arms.

The people of Megalopolis were equally concerned in this quarrel. A war was on the point of breaking out in Peloponnesus; each side was assiduous to gain over the states of Greece. And on this occasion both the Megalopolitans and Lacedemonians sent their ambassadors to Athens; the one to solicit for assistance and support, the other to prevail on the Athenians to continue neuter.

On this occasion was the assembly convened; in which the following oration was delivered. Each state had its partisans in this assembly, and the speakers, on both sides, seem to have delivered their sentiments with the utmost heat and animosity. The orators who opposed the demands of Megalopolis, urged the connections of Athens with the Lacedemonians, in the Theban war, and the dishonour and inconsistency of arming against their old fellow-soldiers. They represented the old attachment of the Megalopolitans to Thebes in the most odious and suspicious colours; and declared, that, by supporting them and depressing Lacedemon, they would in effect render the Theban power highly formidable, if not irresistible; nor did they for-

get to urge, that, by acquiescing in the attempts of Lacedemon to re-establish its power in Peloponnesus, they themselves would be entitled to the assistance of that state, in order to recover the dominions which had been wrested from them. Through this whole debate, the Athenians seem to have been entirely influenced by motives of policy and convenience. And the reader will find these urged by Demosthenes, with the utmost address and artifice, in favour of the people of Megalopolis, in the following oration.

That this oration was pronounced in the archonship of Theodemus, or Eudemus, we are informed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (in Epist. ad Ammæ.) And this Eudemus was Archon, according to Diodorus, in the fourth year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad. In the beginning of the next year the Lacedemonians made their irruption into Arcadia. So that it is probable, that the ambassadors were received at Athens about the latter end of the year, (*i. e.* a little before the summer solstice,) when the Lacedemonians were just preparing to take the field, and the Arcadians threatened with immediate danger.

THE ORATION

FOR THE

MEGALOPOLITANS.

Eudemo, Archon—Olympiad 106. An. 4.

THE speakers on both sides seem to me, ye men of Athens! equally to blame: the partisans of the Arcadians, and the advocates for Lacedemon. Like the deputies of these communities, not like your citizens, to whom their deputations are addressed, they excuse, they inveigh against each other[a]. This, I say, is to act like deputies; but to speak with a true patriot spirit, to attend entirely to the

[a] This heat and acrimony did not always proceed from conviction and zeal for the public interest. Every city, or community, that solicited any matter in the Athenian assembly, first took care to secure managers and advocates among the popular speakers. If the interposition of these pleaders proved successful, they were sometimes rewarded with a statue erected in the city, whose interests they had supported; sometimes, and, indeed, more frequently, with a sum of money. Agreements were formally made, and, in some cases, securities given for the payment of this fee. In the oration of Æschines against Ctesiphon, we have one instance of a transaction of this nature, between the city of Oreum,

interest of the state, free from all factious principles; these are their duties, who assume the character of our counsellors. But now, were not their persons known, did they not speak our language, I should have taken many of them for two distinct people, the one of Arcadia, the other of Lacedemon.

How hazardous a part it is to urge your real interests, is to me apparent; for, in this violence of opposition, where you are all alike deceived, as well the favourers of this, as the supporters of the opposite opinion, should a man attempt to point out the just mean between them, and should you prove impatient of direction, he would gratify neither party; he would be calumniated by both. Yet still, I freely choose, if such must be my fate, rather to be thought weakly impertinent, than to suffer any men to mislead you from what I deem most advantageous to the state. There are other points, of which, if I have your permission, I shall hereafter speak. I now proceed, from principles acknowledged equally by all, to deduce such truths as I think of greatest moment.

THERE is not a man[a] who can deny, that it is for

and Demosthenes himself; where the stipulation was so notorious as to appear upon the public records of this city; and so firm and binding, as to oblige the people of Oreum, in a time of their distress, to mortgage their revenues to the orator, as a security for the sum agreed on; and to pay interest, monthly, until the principal could be discharged.

[a] *There is not a man,* &c. Upon this principle it is, that the

the interest of Athens, that both the Lacedemonians, and the Thebans also, should be weak. But, such is the present state of things, (if any conjecture may be formed from the discourses we so often hear,) that, if [a]Orchomenus, and Thespia, and Platæa, be

orator founds all his reasoning. The wars, which these three leading states carried on against each other, were either for acquiring, or supporting, or recovering, the sovereignty in Greece. A passion for this pre-eminence constituted the principal part of national virtue and merit. They talked, indeed, of the interest of the whole body of Greece, of an extensive regard and affection to this body, and of the necessity of a just balance of power. Yet, in these days of degeneracy, at least, the duty of aggrandizing their own community was frequently made the great law of the morality of statesmen. And this contributed no less to the final ruin of the Grecian states, than their luxury and corruption. "Græciæ civitates dum imperare singulæ cupiunt, imperium "omnes perdiderunt," saith Justin. A strict union with each other was necessary, even to the being and support of each. But for extensive dominion, the consitution and circumstances even of the most eminent of their communities were by no means calculated.

[a] There were two cities in Greece of this name, the one in Arcadia, the other, of which the orator here speaks, in Bœotia, an ancient and illustrious city, to which Thebes was tributary, in the heroic times, until Hercules enabled it to assert its independence. After the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans determined to reduce this rival city to their obedience, but were restrained by the moderation of Epaminondas, who prevailed on his countrymen to admit the people of Orchomenus to their alliance, instead of reducing them to slavery. However, after the battle of Mantinæa, in which this general fell, the Thebans found a pretence for executing their former severe purposes against Orchomenus. Three hundred Orchomenian cavalry had joined with certain Theban exiles, in a conspiracy to overturn the aristocratical constitution of Thebes; and were betrayed by those whom they had agreed

re-peopled, the Thebans must be weak: that the Lacedemonians, if[a] Arcadia be reduced to their obedience, and the GREAT CITY be possessed by them, must once more become powerful. We are therefore to be careful not to suffer these to be great and formidable, before the others are reduced; nor to betray ourselves into greater inconveniencies by the strength of Lacedemon, than can possibly be compensated by the weakness of Thebes. Not that we assert, that it is more eligible to have the Lace-

to assist. The Thebans, not contented with confining their vengeance to the guilty, seized the city of Orchomenus, put the citizens to the sword, and made slaves of their wives and children. LUCCHESINI.

Of Thespis and Platæa, the reader will find some short account, in the note, p. 105, on the Oration on the Peace. The vicinity of these three cities to Thebes, and their hatred to the Thebans, inspired by the remembrance of injuries never to be forgotten, sufficiently explain the assertion of Demosthenes.

[a] The subversion of the Lacedemonian power, seems to have been not so much the effect of the defeat of Leuctra, as of the revolt of their allies in Peloponnesus, and particularly of the Arcadians. It was not difficult for a warlike nation to have re-assembled and reinforced its troops, after such an engagement. Nor could the Thebans have ventured to pursue their victory so far, as even to threaten Sparta with slavery, unless they had been assisted by the Arcadians. Hence, the Thebans and Athenians ever courted the alliance of the Peloponnesians, and cultivated their friendship with the greatest assiduity. And hence the orator is justly warranted to observe, that the power of Lacedemon must rise to a formidable pitch, by the reduction of the Arcadians, who, by the extent of their territory and the strength of their towns, were, next to Sparta, evidently the most considerable of the Peloponnesian states. LUCCHESINI.

demonians our enemies than the Thebans. This is not the point we would support: but that neither of them should have the power of injuring us in any instance; for thus only can our fears be removed, and our security established.

But it will be said, "Yes! this is indeed a point "of utmost moment: yet it is grievous to make "those our allies, against whom we fought at "Mantinæa; to unite with them against the very "men with whom we then shared the dangers of "the field." Grievous, I confess, it is; but let such delicacy gain some attention among others. Let the parties once agree to live in peace, and we shall not, we need not, send support to the Megalopolitans: our swords shall not then be drawn against our old fellow-soldiers. One party (as they profess) are already in alliance with us, the other are now soliciting our alliance: what have we farther to desire? But, what if justice should be violated? if war should be resolved on?

If it be the sole object of debate, whether we should give up the GREAT CITY to the dominion of Lacedemon, or no; let us give it up: I do not contend against it, though it be not just: let us arm against those who once shared with us the dangers of the field. But we are all convinced, that, if once masters of this city, they will instantly attack Messenè: let any one of those who have been so severe on the Megalopolitans arise and say, what con-

duct he would recommend to us on such an emergency. They are silent. But you are not to be informed, that, whether they should urge us or dissuade us, we should be obliged to send succours both[a] by those sacred oaths which engage us to Messenè, and by our interest, which requires that this city should subsist. Consider, therefore, with yourselves, which would be the noblest and most benevolent procedure, to begin your opposition to the encroachments of Lacedemon, by the defence of the Megalopolitans, or that of the Messenians. In the one case, you will appear attentive only to the safety of the Arcadians, and to the solid establishment of that tranquillity, for which you have exposed yourselves to the dangers and the toils of war. In the other, all mankind must see, that, in defending Messenè, you act not so much from principles of equity, as from your fears of Lacedemon. Our designs and actions should be just; but we should be careful, that at the same time they may also prove conducive to our interest[b].

[a] The Lacedemonians, mortified and incensed at the re-establishment of Messenè, refused to include this state in the general peace, which was made after the battle of Mantinæa; and when the Thebans were once involved in the Phocian war, determined to seize the opportunity of oppressing those Peloponnesians who had united with their rivals. Hostilities were declared against the Messenians: this people applied for succour to the Athenians, who engaged to defend them against invasions, though they refused to assist them in any offensive measures. This seems to have been the engagement to which the orator refers.

[b] The reasoning in this passage may possibly deserve to be

It is urged, by those who have spoken on the other side, that we should endeavour to regain Oropus. But, should we now make those our enemies, who would assist us in this design, we must forfeit all hopes of their assistance. It is my opinion, too, that we should attempt to regain Oropus. But, that Lacedemon will now become our enemy, if we unite with those Arcadians who sue for our alliance, they, of all men [a] never should assert, who

opened and illustrated somewhat farther than can be done by a simple detail of historical facts. It is one of the numberless instances of our orator's accommodating his style and manner of address to the quickness and liveliness of his countrymen; and complimenting their understandings, by leaving something to be supplied by them. The purport of his argument seems to be this: "Sooner or later we must oppose the attempts of Lacedemon, to extend our sovereignty. Our own interest requires it, as well as our regard to equity, and the general interest of Greece. To both we owe the due attention, and it should be our care to make them coincide: while the Arcadians are supported, the Lacedemonians cannot be supposed sufficiently powerful to become an object of terror: our interposition, therefore, in favour of the Arcadians, will be regarded as the pure effect of public spirit. But, if the Lacedemonians be first suffered to reduce Arcadia, and the Athenians then begin to oppose their farther progress, the motives of equity and public spirit may, indeed, still be pleaded, but those of self-interest must necessarily be supposed to have had the greater influence."

a *They of all men never should*, &c. Because these men then reasoned from the necessity of preserving a due balance of power, and preventing any one state from becoming formidable. The resentment of the party to be opposed, they then considered as of no weight against so cogent an argument. The same argument was now urged, with equal force and propriety, in favour of the

persuaded us to support the Lacedemonians in the time of their distress. For, when the whole body of the Peloponnesians was ready to unite with us; when they called on us to lead them against the Lacedemonians, the very men who now urge this objection[a], persuaded you to reject their overtures, (which forced them to apply to Thebes, then their sole resource,) and to expend your treasures, and endanger your persons, in defence of Lacedemon.—Surely, you could not have acted with such spirit, to save this people, had you been fairly told, that, when

Arcadians. They could not, therefore, urge an objection now, which, in a case exactly parallel, they had affected to despise.

[a] The history of this fact, as described by Xenophon, does not exactly agree with this passage, unless supplied and illustrated by the narration of Diodorus. After the battle of Leuctra, the Athenians offered liberty to all the states of Peloponnesus. The Mantinæans, thus encouraged, determined to fortify their city, but were opposed by the Lacedemonians, who first remonstrated by their deputies, and then took up arms. Many of the Arcadians themselves refused to give up their authority over some of their dependent cities. This produced a war between the Lacedemonians, Tegeans, and their allies, on one part; and the Mantinæans, and the principal Arcadian states, on the other. The Mantinæans and Arcadians were victorious: "Yet still," saith Diodorus, (l. 15. an. 4. Olym. 102.) "they dreaded the weight "of Sparta, and could not venture, by themselves, to carry on "the war. They, therefore, gained over the Argians and Eleans, "and sent an embassy to the Athenians, inviting them to unite "in the confederacy against the Spartans.—But, as they could "gain no attention at Athens, they had recourse to the Thebans, "and prevailed on them to join in a league against Lacede-"mon." This extract from Diodorus throws sufficient light on the present passage. LUCCHESINI.

once saved, no restraint must be prescribed to their desires, no bounds to their injustice; else they would retain no sense of that safety which we gave them. Let it then be supposed, that our forming an alliance with the Arcadians be ever so repugnant to the views of the Lacedemonians; still, that gratitude which they owe to this state for their preservation, at a time when they were threatened with the utmost dangers, should far outweigh any resentment they may conceive, from our opposing their injustice. And, can they then deny us their assistance to regain Oropus? This would prove them the most abandoned of mankind. No! by the gods, I cannot suspect them of such baseness!

I HEAR it also urged, and am surprised at the objection, That, by this alliance with the Arcadians, and by the measures now proposed, the state must contradict its former conduct, and thus lose its credit. To me, Athenians! the very contrary seems manifest. And why? Because it cannot be denied, that, in defending the Lacedemonians, in granting the like defence to Thebes, in former times, and, lately, in saving the Eubœans[a], and then admitting them to an alliance, we have uniformly pursued one and the same design.—And, what is this? The protection of the injured.—And, if this be so, the charge of inconsistency must be urged, not against

[a] *In saving the Eubœans.* At the time when the Thebans had gained possession of a part of the island, with an intent of destroying the Athenian power in Eubœa. See note[b] p. 10, on Phil. I.

us, but those who refuse to adhere to justice. Affairs have changed, by means of those whose ambition is unbounded. This state hath not changed.

It appears to me, that the Lacedemonians are now acting a subtle and insidious part. They say, that the Eleans[a] ought to have a portion of Triphylia; the Phliasians, Tricaranus; some others of the Arcadians, the territories which are theirs; and we, Oropus. Not that they wish to see each of us in possession of our rightful dominions. Far from it! Such public-spirited sentiments are new to them. They but affect this zeal for the support of all in the recovery of their several interests; that, when they themselves march against Messenè, all may arm in their cause, and cheerfully join with them; or else appear to act unjustly, who had their concurrence in regaining their particular claims; and yet refuse to grant them the like returns of friendship. It is my opinion, in the first place, that, without subjecting any part of Arcadia to the power of the Lacedemonians, Athens will regain Oropus: that these people will themselves support

[a] *That the Eleans*, &c.] Triphylia was a district on the sea-coast, situated between Elis and Messenè. Certain Arcadian exiles had seized Lassio, its principal city, and delivered it to the Eleans. This produced a war, in which Triphylia so often changed its masters, that the right to it became doubtful. The Arcadians, however, prevailed, at length, and now possessed several cities in this district.——Tricaranus had been taken from the Phliasians, by the Argives, some time after the battle of Leuctra.

our claim, if they have the least regard to justice: and, that there are others[a] to support it, who think that Thebes should not be suffered to possess the rights of others. But, were it evident, that unless we permit the Lacedemonians to overturn all Peloponnesus, we never can be able to obtain this city, I should think it more eligible (if I may so speak) absolutely to resign our pretensions to Oropus, than to abandon Messenè and Peloponnesus to the Lacedemonians. It is not in this particular alone, that we are to attend to the conduct of Lacedemon.—But, I suppress those thoughts which are now starting. I only say, we are, in many instances, exposed to danger.

[b] As to the actions of the Megalopolitans against this state, during the connexion with the Thebans, it is absurd to urge these now as criminal. It is absurd, I say, when they are inclined to form a strict union with us, that so they may redeem their

[a] *There are others*, &c.] The Phocians, Thessalians, and Corinthians, who were now engaged against the Thebans in the sacred war.

[b] The objections on the other side were: "Shall we arm "against the Lacedemonians, our fellow-soldiers, in the Theban "war?" And "shall we assist the Arcadians, who drew their "swords against us at Mantinæa?" Both very popular, and likely to influence the assembly. The speaker seems particularly to dread the latter; he states it in gentle and extenuating terms: his answer hath as much art and liveliness as force; and he appears not at all inclined to dwell long, or particular, on this point.

former conduct, by doing us effectual service, maliciously to seek for all pretences to defeat such favourable intentions; and not to consider, that the greater zeal and ardour they are proved to have discovered for the interest of Thebes, the greater and the juster should be your resentment against those who deprived the state of such confederates. (For your protection they first solicited, before their application to the Thebans.) These are the wretched arguments of men, who wish that these people should unite with other states.

FROM all the judgment I can form, on the most mature reflection, I am persuaded, (and there are many here, who agree with me in this opinion,) that, if the Lacedemonians are once masters of Megalopolis, Messenè must certainly be in danger. Should they gain this city also, I say, we must form an alliance with the Thebans. And, it will be much more noble, much more advantageous, at once to take those allies of the Thebans to our protection, and vigorously to oppose the ambition of Lacedemon; than to refuse them that protection, because allies to the Thebans; to abandon them to their oppressors; and thus be forced to save Thebes itself from ruin; nay, to involve this our own state in danger. For I cannot think it a matter of no consequence to Athens, that the Lacedemonians should be masters of Megalopolis, and resume their ancient greatness: while, even now, I see them draw the sword, not to defend their state from

wrong, but to regain that sovereign power which they formerly enjoyed. And what were their designs, [a] when they enjoyed this power, you can better say than I; and must, therefore, feel the juster and the stronger apprehensions.

I WOULD gladly ask our speakers, those who express such aversion to Thebes, and those who declare themselves the enemies of Lacedemon; whether in these, their particular resentments, they be actuated by a regard to you, and to your interests; or, whether they severally hate the Thebans, for the sake of the Lacedemonians; and the Lacedemonians, from their affection to the Thebans. If, for their sakes; they have lost their reason, and are each unworthy of our attention: if for our interest; whence this unnecessary zeal for their favourite states? It is possible, very possible, to humble the Thebans, without aggrandizing the Lacedemonians. This may be easily effected, as I shall now endeavour to convince you.

IT is well known, that men are, to a certain degree, obliged by shame, to adhere to justice, even where their inclinations are averse. They affect to appear strenuous against every injurious at-

[a] The sovereignty of Lacedemon is to be dated from the destruction of Athens by Lysander, in the first year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad, a considerable time before the birth of Demosthenes, but within the memory of some citizens: at least, the consequences of this important event must have been remembered by numbers in the assembly.

tempt; especially, when, in any instances, they have suffered by such attempts. Here we find the great cause of all disorders, the origin of all calamities, disinterested regard to justice. To avoid this danger, therefore, in our attempts to reduce the power of Thebes, let us declare, that Thespia, and Orchomenus, and Platæa, must be restored: let us exert ourselves for this purpose, and call on others to assist us. Thus shall our true regard to equity, our real patriot spirit, be displayed in this generous concern for the restoration of ancient cities. But, at the same time, let us not abandon Messenè and Megalopolis to the power of their oppressors. Let us not, under the pretence of serving the Thespians and Platæans, look on with unconcern, whilst cities now in being, already filled with inhabitants, are razed to their foundations. If we shew this equal regard to justice, there is not a state in Greece but will readily unite with us, to wrest from the Thebans their unjust acquisition. If not, this people must necessarily oppose our endeavours to restore the cities; an event which they must justly regard as their own destruction: and, in our own affair[a], the attempt must prove ineffectual. And what, in truth, can be expected, if we are ever suffering cities, now in being, to be destroyed; and demanding, that cities, long since ruined, should be restored?

It hath been urged in this debate, by those who

[a] *Our own affair.*] That is, the recovery of Oropus.

have spoken with the greatest appearance of reason, that these people should take down[a] the public monuments of their treaty with Thebes, if they mean to be real allies to this state. On the other side, it is alleged, that it is not monuments, but interest, which they regard as the essential cause of friendship: that they must look on those as their real allies, who will grant them their assistance.

But, however sincerely they may thus profess, this is my opinion; that you should demand, both

[a] *The public monuments,* &c. In the original, Τὰς ΣΤΗΛΑΣ καθελεῖν τας προς Θηβαιους. It was the custom in Greece, that the treaties of the several states, and the conditions of these treaties, should be inscribed on COLUMNS which were erected, and, while the treaties subsisted, were preserved in the most public and frequented places, as, in the scenes of their great games, where the whole nation was collected at particular seasons, and there had an opportunity of being witnesses of the terms agreed on. The observance of these was, in some sort, a matter of national concern, and came under the cognizance of the great council of Amphictyons. That the contracting powers themselves might have the monuments of their public acts continually in view, the like columns were erected in the most conspicuous places of their cities. Thus we learn from Thucydides, (l. 5.) that, when the Athenians and Lacedemonians had concluded a truce for fifty years, in the tenth year of the famous Peloponnesian war, it was provided, that the columns on which the treaty was inscribed, should be erected in such places as have been mentioned. Στήλας δὲ στῆσαι Ολυμπιάσι, καὶ Πυθοῖ, καὶ Ισθμῷ καὶ ἐν Αθήνας ἐν πόλει, καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Αμυκλαίῳ. Pausanias observes, that in his days, many of these columns were preserved in the Olympian temple, and particularly that which was the monument of the treaty concluded between the Athenians, Argians, and Mantinæans, in the twelfth year of the Peloponnesian war.

that these monuments be taken down, and that Lacedemon be obliged to peace. If either of these demands be rejected, we should then unite with that party which hath acquiesced. For if, when they are allowed to live unmolested, the Megalopolitans should still adhere to their connexions with the Thebans, they must discover to the world, that they were influenced by the hopes conceived from the superiority of Thebes; not by motives of equity. If, on the other hand, when the Megalopolitans have, with real faith and sincerity, formed an alliance with us, the Lacedemonians should still refuse to live in peace, it must be manifest, that all this their solicitude is not, that Thespia may be restored, but that, while the Thebans are embroiled in this war, they may seize the opportunity of reducing all Peloponnesus.

I AM surprised at some persons, who express dreadful apprehensions, at the allies of Thebes becoming enemies to Lacedemon; yet, should Lacedemon subdue these people, see no danger in such an event; especially, when we have the experience of past times to assure us, that the Thebans have ever used those allies[a] against the Lacedemonians;

[a] By *those allies*, the orator undoubtedly means not the Arcadians only, but the whole body of the Peloponnesian states. And what he observes of these states, is fully confirmed by history. To mention only the more famous battles fought between the Thebans and Athenians, it appears, that the former were not assisted by the Peloponnesians in their first unsuccessful engagement at

the Lacedemonians, when their masters, have ever employed them against us. It is, therefore, seriously to be considered, that, should you now refuse to admit the Megalopolitans to your alliance, they must either be subverted and dispersed; and then the Lacedemonians, at once, become powerful; or they must escape the danger; (as we sometimes see strange and unexpected events;) and, then, with good reason, they must become firm associates to the Thebans: but, if we accept of these their overtures, they must then owe and acknowledge their preservation to this state.

Tanagra; (An. 4. Ol. 80.) in the second, when they were victorious; (An. 2. Ol. 83.) or in the third, when they were again conquered; (An. 1. Ol. 89.) or in their victory at Delium, in the following year. On the other hand, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans were joined by the Arcadians in their invasion of Sparta, (An. 3. Ol. 102.) and the next year entered the territory of Lacedemon, in conjunction with the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans. But the Lacedemonians were assisted by their Peloponnesian allies, in all their wars with the Athenians. In the great Peloponnesian war, "the confederates of the Lacedemonians "were," says Thucydides, l. 2, "all the Peloponnesians that "dwelt within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans, "who had attachments to each of the contending parties." Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἱ ξύμμαχοι, Πελοποννήσιοι μὲν οἱ ἐντὸς Ἰσθμοῦ πάντες, πλὴν Ἀργείων, καὶ Ἀχαιῶν. Τοῦτοις δὲ ἐς ἀμφοτέρους φιλία ἦν.

Many other instances, to the same purpose, might be produced from history. But should it be objected to the assertion of the orator, that, at the battle of Mantinæa, some of the Peloponnesians united with the Thebans against the Athenian powers, the answer is obvious, that the Athenians were not the objects of this confederacy; that it was formed against the Spartans, to whom Athens served but as an auxiliary. LUCCHESINI.

But let us turn our thoughts from their fortunes and their dangers, and fix our attention on the Thebans and Lacedemonians. Should this war prove fatal to the Thebans, (as our interest requires,) still the power of the Lacedemonians will be duly circumscribed, whilst they have the Arcadians on their borders, ever ready to arm against them. But, suppose the Thebans should prove superior to their dangers, should still defend their country, and should not fall before their enemies; yet, must they be the less powerful, if on our side we be strengthened by allies, to whom we ourselves gave being. At all events, therefore, the interest of the state demands, that we should not abandon the Arcadians; that, if preserved, they should not seem to owe their preservation to themselves; that they should not owe it to any others; but that it should be the act of the Athenians.

And now, my fellow-citizens! I call the gods to witness, that I have spoken, not from private affection, not from particular resentment to either party, but from a regard to what I deem the real interest of my country. This, then, is my opinion; that you should not abandon the people of Megalopolis; no, nor any weaker state to the power of the stronger[a].

[a] It does not appear from history that this oration had the due effect. Whether the prospect of recovering Oropus had greater influence than the more liberal and less confined policy of Demosthenes; or, whether the present circumstances and connexions

of the Athenians prevented them from acting in favour of the Megalopolitans; certain it is, that they did not exert themselves on this occasion, in defence of the liberty of Peloponnesus. The quarrel was carried on, for some short time. The Lacedemonians had generally the advantage; but soon found it necessary to end the war, by a truce with the people of Megalopolis.

END OF THE ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS.

THE ORATION

FOR THE

LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.

PRONOUNCED IN THE

ARCHONSHIP OF THESSALUS,

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE 107th OLYMPIAD.

INTRODUCTION.

AN attempt made (in the hundred and fifth Olympiad) to reduce the states of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, to a dependency on Athens, produced the war, well known by the name of *The Social War*; which was, for three years, supported by the Athenians, on one side; and, on the other, by the Chians, Coans, and Rhodians, assisted by the Byzantines, and by Mausolus, king of Caria; which prince, (or rather his wife Artemisia, who governed in his name,) was the principal agent in fomenting this quarrel. Their fears of the Persian arms obliged the Athenians to give a peace to the confederates, in which it was expressly stipulated, that they should be free and independent. So that, in effect, these states triumphed over their adversary; whose concessions were extorted by necessity, and who, of consequence, harboured all the resentment of disappointed ambition against their opponents.

The people of Rhodes, who had engaged warmly in this confederacy, had formerly been indebted to Athens for assistance, in defence of their popular form of government, against the

favourers of aristocracy; who, on their part, had been supported by the Lacedemonians. The peace, now concluded, promised to put an end to those civil commotions and revolutions to which the state of Rhodes had been exposed. But the enterprising genius of Artemisia, who now reigned in Caria, prompted her to attempt the conquest of Rhodes. The king of Persia favoured her design against an island, which, by its situation, commanded the Ægean sea, and rendered the passage into Greece secure and easy; and which he justly expected to gain from the Carian princess, by treaty, or by arms, with less umbrage to the Greeks than any direct attack would give.

As a step previously necessary to this design, the aristocratical faction was, partly by the gradual influence of secret practices, and partly by force, established in the government of Rhodes; which they proceeded to exercise in an oppressive and tyrannical manner. The people, whose liberties were thus overturned, saw no resource in their distress, but to apply to the generosity of Athens, their ancient protector. Ambassadors were dispatched to implore the assistance of the great defenders of liberty; and, in the assembly convened on this occasion, the following oration was delivered in favour of the people of Rhodes.

Their cause laboured under many difficulties. They had defied the people whose protection they were soliciting, and were now the objects of their resentment.—Their late opposition was considered, at Athens, as the effect, not of a zeal for liberty, but of ingratitude and pride, of perverseness and insolence, which were represented as a part of their national character. No speaker could venture to oppose these sentiments, which afforded those who spoke against the Rhodians ample matter for invective. It was well known that the Persian king interested himself in favour of the reigning party at Rhodes. The danger of irritating this prince had been, by Demosthenes himself, strongly urged upon other occasions. So that, not only the passions and prejudices of the assembly, but policy also, pleaded powerfully against the present demand of the Rhodians. In these circumstances, they required an able, artful, and insinuating advocate: and such they found in our orator.

THE

ORATION

FOR THE

LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.

Thessalo, Archon—Olympiad 107. An. 2.

When affairs, like these, become the subject of our debates, it is my opinion, Athenians! that a general liberty of speech should be allowed to all in this assembly[a]. Not that I have ever thought it

[a] This exordium seems to have been founded on some particular circumstances of the assembly, or some difficulties, which Demosthenes was obliged to encounter, before he could obtain an audience: The assembly of the people at Athens was necessarily subject to the inconveniencies attending all popular meetings. Clamour, tumult, and contention, frequently disturbed it; especially, when the point in debate was of an important kind; or the popular leaders divided; and, by interest or principle, prompted to support their different opinions and parties, with zeal and ardour. Sometimes, (as we learn from some passages in Æschines,) the leaders on one side took occasion to seize the gallery, from whence the speakers addressed themselves to the people, and, by open violence, prevented any one from taking his place there, who was not a friend to the measures which they recommended. Sometimes the magistrates, who presided in the assembly, either thought it necessary, for the preservation of peace and order, or were induced by private motives, to exert

difficult to point out the measures fittest to be pursued; for (to speak my thoughts plainly) you seem of yourselves sufficiently apprized of these. But to prevail on you to pursue them: there is the difficulty. For, when any thing hath been resolved; when it hath been confirmed by your voices, we are just as far from carrying it into execution, as if it had never been resolved.

One particular there is, eminently distinguishable amongst all those favours which we owe to heaven. I mean, that they who, not long since, prompted by their insolence, appeared in arms against us, now rest all their hopes of safety on this state. An event which should inspire us with the greatest satisfaction. For, by a just and proper conduct upon this occasion, we shall, by our actions, gloriously and nobly refute the calumnies of our traducers. The Chians, and the Byzantines, and the Rhodians, accused us of dangerous designs against them: and, from this pretence, conspired to raise the late war against us. But, it will now appear that[a] Mausolus, the great author and conductor of

their authority, and to circumscribe that liberty of speech, for which the constitution of Athens had so scrupulously provided. Hence, frequently arose a tumultuous mixture of acclamation, opposition, loud and vehement commanding, and earnest expostulation, which formed a scene fitted to discourage and terrify an unexperienced or dastardly speaker; a scene for which Demosthenes prepared himself, by declaiming on the sea shore, amidst the roaring of the waves.

[a] This passage seems to intimate that measures had been taken to establish the aristocracy at Rhodes, during the life-time of

this war—he who affected such zeal for the interest of the Rhodians,—is the very person who deprived them of their freedom: that[a] the Chians and Byzantines, who then professed to be their allies, have refused to assist them when distressed: but that you, the great objects of their apprehensions, prove to be the people, of all others, to whom alone they are indebted for protection. When this is once made manifest to the world, such must be the sentiments with which you shall inspire the people of every community, that they will regard your friendship as the pledge of their security. And surely you cannot enjoy greater happiness than such an universal confidence and affection.

IT is with surprise I find the very persons who urged us to oppose the KING[b] in defence of the

Mausolus. The queen, who is said to have directed and governed her husband, probably recommended, and made some progress in the execution of a design, which was crowned with complete success in her own reign.

[a] It was, probably, the fear of Artemisia's power which prevented the Chians and Byzantines from assisting their friends the Rhodians to overturn the usurpation. Otherwise, the Chians, whose government was republican, must have exerted themselves to secure the like constitution to their allies.

LUCCHESINI.

[b] When Artaxerxes engaged in the war with Nectanebus, king of Egypt, both parties applied to the Greeks for assistance: the Persian was refused; but such numbers of Grecian mercenaries engaged in the service of Nectanebus, that he was enabled to detach four thousand of these to the assistance of the Sidonians. And probably the greater part of these forces were Athenians; as

Egyptians, now deterring us, by the apprehensions of his displeasure, from engaging in the affairs of Rhodes; and this, when it is well known that the Rhodians are really Greeks; the others, of the number of this prince's subjects.

THERE are some among you who may remember that, at the time when the affairs of Persia were the subject of our consultations, I was the first, I think the only, or almost the only one, to recommend it as the wisest measure, not to assign your enmity to the KING, as the motive of your armament: to make your preparations against your avowed adversaries: but to employ them even against him, should he attempt to injure you. Nor did I urge these things without your full concurrence. You received them with applause[a]. On this present

the inveterate resentment of this people to the Persians prompted them to take all means of opposing them, which were not absolutely inconsistent with treaties. LUCCHESINI.

[a] The approbation of the people, he affects to consider as a full proof of the justness of these his sentiments. "If they be then "just, the KING must adopt them; no other can be recommended to him. And if his conduct is to be guided by such principles, he cannot be provoked to take up arms against the Athenians, by their interposition in favour of the liberty of Rhodes (a Grecian state). It must be equally his interest not to oppose the Athenians, where his own kingdom is not immediately attacked, as it is for the Athenians not to give unnecessary umbrage to him. Such delicacy and caution must be acknowledged just and necessary, but are quite different from a supine inattention to all his motions; and an abject concession of all the conquests he may be prompted to make, however injurious to Greece. Such conduct would not only be dishonourable

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occasion, my sentiments are exactly consonant to what I then proposed. And were I a subject to the KING, were I called tobe his counsellor, to him I should suggest the very measures I now recommend to you; to fight for his own dominions, if attacked by any of the Greeks; never to indulge an extravagant ambition of making foreign conquests. If, on your part, ye men of Athens! it be resolved to give up all those cities to the KING, which he may reduce to his obedience, by surprising and deceiving some members of the several cities; it is a resolution I can by no means praise. But, if ye be persuaded, that in the cause of justice, ye should, on all occasions, boldly draw the sword, and encounter every difficulty; in the first place, such occasions will occur more rarely, the more you are possessed with this persuasion; and then, it must be acknowledged, that such sentiments are worthy of this state.

THAT I recommend nothing new, in moving you to give liberty to the Rhodians; that you will do nothing new, if my counsels should prevail;

" but impolitic. While, on the contrary, vigour and resolution " prudently directed, instead of involving them in war, must awe " their enemies, and preserve them in peace and security."—This seems to be the sum of the present argument. And the judicious will probably forgive the attempt to open and illustrate particular passages, as the sentiments, in this oration especially, are delivered with such liveliness and rapidity, that a reader, not strictly attentive, is oftentimes in danger of losing the full view of our orator.

may appear from one instance of our former conduct, which proved of important service. It may be remembered, Athenians! that you once sent out Timotheus, to assist Ariobarzanes[a]. It was expressly prescribed in his commission, that he should not proceed to any infringement of our treaty with the KING. He saw that Ariobarzanes had openly revolted from his master. He saw that Samos was held by Cyprothemes, and his Persian garrison;

[a] The time and circumstances of the expedition do not seem necessary for illustrating the argument of Demosthenes, as he himself hath distinctly explained the particulars necessary for his purpose. However, the reader whose curiosity may prompt him to seek for farther information, has here a fuller account, from the Italian commentator.——There is no doubt, but that Timotheus was sent on this expedition in the second, or the beginning of the third year of the 104th Olympiad: because, in this year, Ariobarzanes, together with some other satraps on the sea-coast, Mausolus, and Tachus king of Egypt, revolted from Artaxerxes. The rebellion of Ariobarzanes was probably unknown to the Athenians at this time. The design of the expedition was, to establish this satrap in the government of Phrygia, which he had seized on the death of Mithridates, by his own authority: though possibly he might have assured the Athenians that he had acted by the king's commission. Hence was Timotheus sent to support him, with instructions, however, to commit no infringement of the treaties subsisting between Athens and the Persian. And as this general could not, consistently with these instructions, pursue the intended expedition in favour of Ariobarzanes, it was not without good reason that he chose to employ his force in the relief of Samos; which was under the jurisdiction of Athens, and unjustly seized by the KING's lieutenants, in order to facilitate his operations against the rebels on the sea-coast. Nor was it at all prudent for the Athenians to suffer the Persians to possess an island, from whence they might readily pass over into Greece.

and that Tigranes, the KING's own lieutenant, had placed them in this city. To Ariobarzanes, therefore, he refused assistance: Samos he invested, and restored to freedom. And, to this day, we never were involved in any war, on this account. For there is a material difference between these two motives for war; the enlargement of dominion, and the defence of rightful possessions. When an invasion is to be repelled, the contest is supported to the utmost; not so, for the objects of ambition. Men will, indeed, attempt to gratify this passion, if permitted; but, if opposed, they do not charge the opposition as injurious. Nor do I think that Artemisia will act contrary to these principles, if the state should interpose in the affairs of Rhodes. Hear me for a moment, and judge whether my reasons be well-founded or invalid.

I THINK, then, that if all the KING's attempts in Egypt had been crowned with effectual success, Artemisia would have exerted her utmost efforts to reduce Rhodes to his subjection: not from an affection to the KING, but in order to bind him by a signal favour, should he extend his dominions to her neighbourhood; that, in return, he might admit her to the strictest connexions of friendship. But, since he hath [a]acted—as fame reports; since

[a] We learn from Diodorus, (L. 16.) that, in the present year when the oration was delivered, Ochus had not penetrated as far as Egypt; but led his army against Sidon; which city being betrayed by Mentor, and Tennes its king, was set on fire, and re-

he hath been unsuccessful in all his attempts: she must suppose, (and it is, in fact, the case) that this island can be of no other use to him, but as a citadel, to awe her kingdom, and to controul her motions. So that, in my opinion, she would rather that we were in possession of the island, (provided that this did not appear to be the act of Artemisia,) than that he should gain it. Nor would she assist him in such an attempt; at least, not with sincerity and vigour. As to the KING, how he may act on any emergency, I do not pretend to say. But, that it highly imports this state to have it known explicitly, whether he means to assert any claim to Rhodes or no; this I firmly maintain. If he should, our consultations are not to be confined to the Rhodians; our concern must be for ourselves, and for all the Greeks.

[a]YET, were these Rhodians, who now possess the

duced to ashes by the inhabitants. From hence the Persians marched, the next year, into Egypt, where they at first met with some sinister accidents, (a considerable part of the army being lost in morasses) though in the conclusion they were enabled to conquer Nectanebus at Pelusium, and to reduce him to the utmost extremity. Thus the assertion of Demosthenes seems not reconcileable to history. But it must not be forgotten, that a passionate eagerness for intelligence was a distinguishing part of the character of the Athenians: which, we must suppose, was frequently gratified by rumours and advices invented to please them, and artfully or credulously propagated. Something of this kind might have happened at present: and agreeable news from the Persian camp, whether believed by the orator or no, might have been assumed as certain, without any scruple, to answer the present purpose.

[a] At first glance, it may occur to the reader to ask how it

city, strong enough to maintain their possession, I should not have advised them to grant you aid: no, though they should make you the most magnificent promises. For I find, that, in order to dissolve the free government, they first seduced some citizens to their party; and then, the moment they had gained their purpose, they drove out those very citizens. And they who have been false to both

comes, that Demosthenes, who pleads for the restoration of the popular state, here seems to speak in favour of the reigning party. And though the commentators, &c. take no notice of any difficulty in this passage, it may not be deemed impertinent to endeavour to illustrate its purport and connexion.——Demosthenes hath endeavoured to prove that the KING, however he may favour or support the aristocracy at Rhodes, yet will not consider the interposition of the Athenians, in defence of the liberty of that island, as an act of hostility against him; and that neither he, nor Artemisia, will oppose them. "Not that I pretend," saith the orator, "to ascertain what the KING's designs are, or what "measures he may pursue. But if he should assert any direct "claim to the dominion of Rhodes, his treaty with the Greeks is "broken: We and all Greece are threatened. The question is "no longer how the Rhodians shall be governed; the island "must be defended for our own sake, whatever party may pre-"vail there. But, in such a case, it is the interest of Greece, not "that of the aristocratical faction at Rhodes, which should be "considered; and however warrantable, and just, and prudent, a "vigorous defence of the island would then be; yet still, nothing "but necessity, nothing but the certainty of its falling into the "power of the Persian, without our assistance, could induce me "to recommend the granting that assistance. If the reigning "party could by themselves defend the island, they do not merit, "nor should they be favoured with, our interposition: but, if "not, our own and our nation's interests require, that we should "defeat the designs of the Persian against Rhodes, even though "this party should reap the immediate advantage."

parties, cannot, I presume, prove faithful allies to this state.

THESE things I never should have urged, had I only considered the interest of Rhodes. I have no public[a] attachment to its state; no particular connexion with any of its citizens; or, were I engaged by both these ties, in this assembly I should be influenced only by the interest of my country. As to these Rhodians (if one may so speak who pleads for their protection,) I rejoice at what hath happened: that the men, who could not bear that we should regain our just rights, have now lost their own liberty: that they, who might have united upon terms of equality with the Greeks, and with us, the best of Greeks, [b]chose to admit barbarians and

[a] *I have no public*, &c. The citizens of the more eminent states in Greece had it sometimes in their power to confer favours on inferior communities; and these in return expressed their gratitude by declaring that such persons should, at any time during their residence among them, be entitled to entertainment at the public expense. In like manner, favours conferred and received by particular persons, entitled them to the rights of private hospitality from each other. These were declarations of the most strict and inviolable friendship; and the least neglect or violation of this hospitality was accounted a crime of the most heinous nature.—The expressions in the original are founded on these customs.

[b] By barbarians and slaves, he means the forces of Artemisia, which she sent to the assistance of the aristocratical faction; and which they kept in the citadel for their defence. LUCCHESINI.—The admission of these forces into Rhodes is ascribed by Vitruvius to a stratagem of an extraordinary nature. He tells us, the Rhodians held a private intelligence in Halicarnassus, the capital of

slaves into their citadel, and to become their abject vassals. I had almost said, that these things must prove of use to them, if you vouchsafe your aid. In a course of prosperity, I know not whether they would ever have returned to reason; for they are Rhodians[a]. But now, taught by experience that perverse folly is the cause of numberless calamities, they may possibly entertain sentiments more just and prudent for the future. And this, I apprehend, would be no small advantage to them. Let us then endeavour to avert their ruin: let us not harbour ancient resentments: let it be remembered, that you yourselves have oftentimes been deceived by those who entertained designs against the state: and yet, on none of these will ye confess that punishment should be inflicted.

Caria; and hoped that the inhabitants would willingly unite with them, in order to shake off the yoke of a woman. In these expectations they sent a fleet thither. But Artemisia, having discovered the plot, ordered the inhabitants to range themselves under their walls, and to receive the Rhodians as their expected deliverers. Deceived by this appearance, the Rhodians landed, and left their ships deserted. They were surrounded, and cut to pieces. Artemisia, who had ordered her galleys to fall down some canals which communicated with the port, and to seize their ships, now set sail in the Rhodian fleet, and appeared before their island. It was supposed by the people of Rhodes, that their own army was returned victorious; and the Carians were masters of their fortress before the fatal mistake was perceived.

[a] *They are Rhodians.*] Homer calls the Rhodians ὑπερηφάνους, *insolent*. And to this day they are said to be distinguished by the same fault, though now reduced to the extremity of slavery.

LUCCHESINI.

LET it also be considered, that you, my fellow-citizens, have waged many wars against states, both of popular and oligarchal government. Of this you are not to be informed: but, perhaps, you have never once reflected, what were the causes of your several wars with each. With popular states[a] your wars arose from particular complaints, which could not be decided in a national council; or from disputes about districts and boundaries; or from the love of glory or pre-eminence. But of your wars with [b]Oligarchies, there were different causes: with these you fought for your constitution, for your liberty. So that I should not scruple to avow my opinion, that it would be better for us to be at war with all the states of Greece, provided[c] that

[a] I imagine that the orator had here in view the expeditions against the Corinthians and Syracusans. With the former, the Athenians contended about boundaries and territory; particular causes of complaint, but especially ambition, prompted them to wage war against the latter. And the government both of Corinth and Syracuse was regularly democratical. LUCCHESINI.

[b] By Oligarchies the orator means the Bœotians and Megareans, but principally the Lacedemonians. LUCCHESINI.

[c] *With all the states of Greece, provided,* &c.) To this the orator subjoins a reason, which makes the assertion appear less extraordinary: "If attacked by all, it is true, the contest could not "be supported, yet no terms of accommodation would be imposed "that would alter or destroy our constitution. But no peace "could secure the freedom of the only democratical state. The "enemies of liberty, however apparently reconciled, must ever "hate and fear, and at length destroy it."—As I have taken the liberty to translate this passage in a manner different from that of the commentators and interpreters, it will be necessary fairly to

they enjoyed a popular government, than to be in friendship with them all, if commanded by Oligarchies. For, with free states, I should not think it difficult to conclude a peace whenever ye were inclined; but with oligarchal governments, we could not even form an union, to be relied on. For, it is

quote the original at large. Ὥστε ἔγωγε ἐκ ἂν οἰκήσαιμι εἰπεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγεῖσθαι συμφέρειν, δημοκραλεμένους τὰς Ἕλληνας ἀπαντας πολεμεῖν ὑμῖν, ἢ ὀλιγαρχεμένους φιλους ειναι.——Δημοκραλεμένους τους Ἕλληνας hath been generally taken as equivalent to τας τῶν Ἑλλήνων δημοκραλεμένους, &c. And the original understood as containing this assertion, *It would be more eligible that all the republics in Greece should be at war with us, than that we should be in alliance with all the Oligarchies.* The learned in the Greek language will determine whether, in order to warrant this interpretation, the form of the sentence in the original should not have been τους δημοκραλεμένους Ἕλληνας, instead of δημοκραλεμένους τους, &c. But, not to insist on grammatical niceties, it is submitted to the reader, who attends to the history and circumstances of Greece, whether to be at war with the free states, that is, the states of Peloponnesus, or to be in alliance with the Oligarchies, that is (principally) the states of Lacedemon and Bœotia, be two particulars so necessarily incompatible, as to oblige the Athenians to choose one or the other. If it be said that it is sufficient to suppose that particular quarrels might arise, in which an union with Sparta and Bœotia would prevent the free states from attacking the Athenians; and the rejecting this union might encourage them to the attack; in such case I suspect that the orator never could have advised his countrymen to engage singly in a war, as the most eligible measure, which, by weakening each party, would render both an easier prey to those, who are supposed (from the nature of their constitution) to be their common enemies. And such advice would still be more unaccountable, should it be supposed, that, in consequence of rejecting the alliance of Sparta and Bœotia, these states would unite with the enemies of Athens.

not possible that the few can entertain a sincere affection for the many; or the friends of arbitrary power, for the men who choose to live in free equality.

I AM surprised, that none among you should conceive, that if the [a]Chians, and the Mityleneans, and now the Rhodians, are to be subjected to a few; I had almost said, if all mankind are to be thus enslaved, our constitution must be threatened with danger. It is surprising, that none among you should reflect, that if this form of polity be established in every place, it is not possible that our free government should be suffered to continue. For it must then be certain, that none others but the Athenians can arise to restore affairs to their original state of freedom. And those whom men regard as dangerous, they must ever labour to destroy. In every other case, they who act unjustly, are enemies only to those whom their injustice hath immediately affected; but they who subvert free states, and reduce them to the power of a few, are to be deemed the common enemies of all the zealous friends of liberty. And justice too demands, ye men of Athens, that you, who enjoy a popular government,

[a] From this passage it seems not improbable, that the designs of the Persian had extended farther than to Rhodes; and that he had by his power or influence lately made alterations in the state and government of these inferior islands, which the embarrassed condition of the Athenians, and their attention to the motions of the Macedonian King, might have prevented them from opposing.

should discover the same concern for the misfortunes of other free states, which you yourselves would expect from them, if at any time (which Heaven avert!) the like misfortunes should oppress you. It may be said, indeed, that the Rhodians are deservedly distressed: but this is not a time for such objections. Let the prosperous ever shew the tenderest solicitude for the unhappy; since none can say what may be their own future fortune.

I HAVE heard it frequently observed in this assembly, that, when the state was in its deepest distress, there were not wanting friends to concert measures for its restoration. Of this I shall, at present, briefly mention but one instance, I mean that of the [a]Argives. And I should be sorry that we, whose distinguished character it is to protect the wretched, should appear inferior to the Argives in this particular. They, though seated on the borders of Lacedemon, witnesses of the uncontrouled power of this city, both by sea and land; yet, could not be diverted, could not be deterred, from expressing their affection to the Athenians. When ambassadors came from Lacedemon, to demand some Athenian exiles who had taken refuge at

[a] This instance of the magnanimity of the Argives must have been particularly agreeable to the assembly, as the form of government at Argos was, like that of Athens, republican. The memory of this noble and generous act hath been passed over by historians. But we have it here preserved, enlivened, and enforced, by the most vivid colouring, and the utmost strength of expression. LUCCHESINI.

Argos, they declared by a decree, that unless these ambassadors departed from their city, before the setting sun, they should be accounted enemies. And would it not be shameful, my countrymen, that the populace of Argos should, in such times as these, defy the terror of the Lacedemonian power and sovereignty; and yet, that you, who are Athenians, should be terrified by a barbarian; nay, by a woman? The Argives might have justly pleaded, that they had oftentimes been conquered by the Lacedemonians. But you have frequently proved victorious over the KING; never were once defeated, either by his slaves or by himself. Or, if the Persian boasts to have obtained any advantage over us, he owes it to those treasures which he lavished on the corrupted traitors and hirelings of Greece. If ever he hath prevailed, by these means hath he prevailed. Nor have such successes proved of real use. No: we find that, at the very time when he was endeavouring to depress this state, by the help of Lacedemon[a], his own dominions were exposed to the dangerous attempts of Clearchus and Cyrus. Thus were his avowed attacks ever unsuccessful; his secret practices attended with no real advantage.

[a] In the first year of the 94th Olympiad, the Lacedemonians became master of Athens, and there established the thirty tyrants. In the fourth year of the same Olympiad, Cyrus took up arms against his brother Artaxerxes. So that between these two events, but a small interval of time intervened; which sufficiently warrants the assertion of the orator. LUCCHESINI.

THERE are men among you, who frequently affect a disregard of Philip, as if beneath their attention, but of the KING express the most terrible apprehensions, as of an enemy truly dangerous to those whom he may determine to attack. If then we are never to oppose the one, because weak; and to make unbounded concessions to the other, because formidable; against whom, my countrymen, are we to draw our swords?

THERE are men too most powerful in pleading for the rights of others, in opposition to your demands. To these I would make one request; that they should endeavour to display an equal zeal in the defence of your rights, against your adversaries. Thus shall they be the first to shew a real regard to justice. It is absurd to urge its precepts to you, if they themselves pay no deference to its authority. And, surely, a member of this state cannot pretend to a regard for justice, who seeks industriously for every argument against us, never for those which may be urged in our favour. Consider, I conjure you, why, among the Byzantines, there is no man to inform them, that they are not to seize Chalcedon[a], which is really the KING's; which you some time possessed; but to which they have no sort of

[a] *Chalcedon.* This city of Bythinia, after various vicissitudes of fortune, had been given up to the King of Persia, by the peace of Antalcidas. But now it appears to have been exposed in the invasions of the Byzantines as well as Sylembria, a maritime town in the neighbourhood of Byzantium. LUCCHESINI.

claim: that they should not attempt to reduce Sylembria to their subjection, a city once united in alliance with us: that in assuming a power of determining the boundaries of the Sylembrian territory, the Byzantines violate their oaths, they infringe those treaties which say expressly, that this people shall be governed by their own laws. Why, during the life of Mausolus, or since his death, hath no one been found to inform Artemisia, that she is not to possess herself of Cos, of Rhodes, of many other Grecian states, which the KING, who was master of them, ceded by treaty to the Greeks; and for which the Greeks of those days encountered many dangers, supported many noble contests? Or, were these things thus urged to both; that they would have any influence, is by no means probable.—I, on my part, see no injustice in reinstating the people of Rhodes; but, even if it were not strictly just, yet, when I view the actions of others, I think it my duty to recommend this measure. And why? Because, if all others confined themselves within the bounds of justice, it would be shameful that you, Athenians, should be the only people to transgress. But, when every other state seeks all opportunities of acting injuriously, that you alone should give up every advantage, from pretended scruples, and nice distinctions of right; this is not justice, but cowardice.

IN effect, indeed, we find men proportion their claims of right to their present power. Of this I shall mention one example, well known to all

There are[a] two treaties on record between the Greeks and the KING; that which our state concluded, which is the subject of universal praise; and this latter, made by the Lacedemonians, which was condemned as odious and dishonourable. In these treaties, the rights of either party were by no means defined in the same manner; *and no wonder;* for, in civil society, the rights of individuals are

[a] The passage, as here translated, plainly points out the two most famous treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians: the one, by Cimon the Athenian, (An. 3. Olymp. 77.;) the other, by Antalcidas the Lacedemonian, (An. 2. Olymp. 98.) The first was made immediately after the final overthrow of the Persian forces both by sea and land. By this treaty it was provided, that all the Grecian cities in Asia should be free and independent; and that no Persian ship of war should presume to sail to the westward of the Cyanæan and Chelidonian islands: that is, to approach so near as to give the least umbrage or alarm to the Greeks: terms, which plainly supposed the superiority of Greece, and are, accordingly, represented by historians as highly honourable to this nation. The latter treaty, on the contrary, was dictated by the Persians, and the weakness and disorders of the Greeks obliged them to accept of it. By this, the Grecian colonies of Asia, together with some of the islands, were formally given up to the power and jurisdiction of the Persian king. And historians have not restrained their indignation at the meanness and ignominy of these concessions.

The interpreters and commentators have indeed rendered this passage in another manner. But, without entering into controversy, the translator submits the pertinency and propriety of the present interpretation to the judgment of the learned reader; by no means confident, yet not without hopes of his concurrence. And, should he happen to be more fortunate, in some particular instance, than his predecessors or associates in the same labour, he esteems it a matter which warrants no sort of triumph or exultation.

determined by the laws, with the same equal and common regard to the weak and to the strong. But, in political and national transactions, the powerful ever prescribe the bounds of right to the weaker. You assume the character of arbitrators and defenders of justice: be careful then to preserve such power as may give due weight and effect to your determinations. And this will be done by shewing that the Athenians are the general patrons and protectors of liberty.

SENSIBLE, indeed, I am, and with good reason, that it is not without the utmost difficulty that you can execute any purposes of moment. All others have but one contest to maintain, that against their avowed enemies: when they have once conquered these, they enjoy the fruits of their conquest, without further opposition. But you, Athenians! have a double contest to support. Like others, you have your open enemies; but you have enemies still more dangerous and alarming: you have those of your own citizens to subdue, who, in this assembly, are engaged against the interests of their country. And, as they are ever strenuous in their opposition to all useful measures, it is no wonder that many of our designs are frustrated. Perhaps, those emoluments which their corruptors hold forth to tempt them, may be the inducement to many, boldly to aspire to the rank of ministers and public counsellors. But still you yourselves may be justly blamed. For it is your part, Athenians! to entertain the same sentiments with regard to the rank of civil

duty, as to that of battle. And what are these sentiments? He who deserts the post assigned him by the general, you pronounce[a] infamous, and unworthy to share the common rights of an Athenian citizen. In like manner, he, who, in our civil polity, abandons the station assigned by our ancestors, and attempts to establish the power of the few, should be declared unworthy to speak in this assembly. Do you think it necessary to bind our allies by an oath, to have the same friends and the same enemies with us, in order to be assured of their attachment? And shall those ministers be deemed truly loyal, who are certainly and evidently devoted to the service of our enemies?

But, what might be urged in accusation against them, what might be urged with severity against you, it is by no means difficult to find. By what counsels, by what conduct, the present disorders of our state may be removed; this is the great point of difficulty. Nor is this, perhaps, the time to enlarge on every particular. Exert yourselves on the present occasion; endeavour to render your designs effectual, by an advantageous execution; and then,

[a] In the Olynthiac orations, we find Demosthenes complaining, that the severity of the ancient military laws had been considerably relaxed. And this passage furnishes us with a remarkable instance of such relaxation. For, by the original laws and constitutions of Athens, it was declared a CAPITAL offence for any citizen to fly, or to desert from his post. Even he who cast away his shield was punished with death. If any man lost it by accidental neglect, he was bound to pay a fine of five hundred drachmæ. LUCCHESINI.

your other interests may, perhaps, gradually wear a fairer aspect.

It is, therefore, my opinion, that you should engage in the affairs of this people with the utmost vigour; and act as becomes the dignity of Athens. Think with what joy you attend to those who praise your ancestors, who display their achievements, and recount their trophies. And think, that your ancestors erected these trophies, not that the view might barely strike you with admiration; but that you might imitate the virtues of the men who raised them [a].

[a] From the succeeding oration, we learn, that the address and energy which Demosthenes exerted in favour of the people of Rhodes, were by no means effectual. The times in which he lived were distracted and corrupted; his country not well disposed, nor indeed possessed of force sufficient to support the general cause of liberty. The assembly in which he spoke was, (if we except some extraordinary cases of immediate danger,) ever governed by party. The citizens came together, not to deliberate on the public interests, but to support a faction, already determined, and resolved in what manner to give their voices; and armed against the power of truth. It is no wonder, therefore, that we find the most consummate eloquence, the justest, the strongest, and the most animated representations, in so many instances unsuccessful.

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